Unpacking Governance of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage

Doreen Stabinsky

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INTRODUCTION

The governance arrangements for the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) and its Executive Committee (ExCom) have been contested since the conclusion of negotiations on Article 8 of the Paris Agreement. Which supreme body – the Conference of the Parties (COP), the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA), or both – is / are responsible for guiding the work of the WIM and its ExCom?

Ambiguities mean that varying legal interpretations currently co-exist, requiring political resolution. This brief addresses a series of questions around governance to illuminate the legal and practical aspects of the governance debate. It does this in three sections: legal foundations; legal relationships; and practical matters of governance.

I. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS

Decision 2/CP. 19, in paragraph (hereafter §) 1, "establishes the Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage … to address loss and damage associated with impacts of climate change, including extreme events and slow onset events, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change."

A. What is the role of the Convention in addressing loss and damage?

In the year prior to the establishment of the WIM, in Decision 3/CP.18, the COP agreed on the role of the Convention in promoting the implementation of approaches to address loss and damage:

5. … agrees that the role of the Convention in promoting the implementation of approaches to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change includes, inter alia, the following:

(a) Enhancing knowledge and understanding of comprehensive risk management approaches to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including slow onset impacts;

(b) Strengthening dialogue, coordination, coherence and synergies among relevant stakeholders;

(c) Enhancing action and support, including finance, technology and capacity-building, to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change;

B. What is the role of the WIM in fulfilling the role of the Convention?

Decision 2/CP.19:

5. Further decides that the Warsaw international mechanism shall fulfil the role under the Convention of promoting the implementation of approaches to address loss and damage associated with the adverse climate change pursuant to decision 3/CP.18, in a comprehensive, integrated and coherent manner by undertaking, inter alia, the following functions:

(a) Enhancing knowledge and understanding of comprehensive risk management approaches to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including slow onset impacts ...
**Note:** A deliberate severing of the relationship between the COP and the WIM, as recommended by some, could result over the long-term in a dilution of attention to the role of the WIM under the Convention, the functions of the WIM as defined by the COP, as well as undermine the possibility to build on the functions through the important “*inter alia*” found in §5 of Decisions 3/CP.18 and 2/CP.19 (cited above). Such an outcome would be undesirable and is a compelling reason to maintain a strong relationship between the WIM and the COP as supreme body.

C. **What is the role of the Paris Agreement in addressing loss and damage, and what is the role of the WIM in fulfilling this role?**

Article 8 of the Paris Agreement treats loss and damage in five paragraphs. Two paragraphs suggest undertakings of Parties to avert, minimise and address loss and damage.

**Article 8.3**

3. Parties should enhance understanding, action and support, including through the Warsaw International Mechanism, as appropriate, on a cooperative and facilitative basis with respect to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change.

**Article 8.4** provides a non-exhaustive list for areas of cooperation and facilitation.

4. Accordingly, areas of cooperation and facilitation to enhance understanding, action and support may include:

(a) Early warning systems;

(b) Emergency preparedness;

(c) Slow onset events;

(d) Events that may involve irreversible and permanent loss and damage;

(e) Comprehensive risk assessment and management;

(f) Risk insurance facilities, climate risk pooling and other insurance solutions;

(g) Non-economic losses;

(h) Resilience of communities, livelihoods and ecosystems.

II. LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS

A. **What is the relationship between the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement?**

The UNFCCC is the parent treaty to the Paris Agreement. In §1 of Decision 1/CP.21, the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC “decides to adopt the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.” The Paris Agreement is therefore subsidiary to the UNFCCC.

The COP is the supreme body of the Convention; the CMA is the supreme body of the Paris Agreement. Article 7.2 of the UNFCCC states that the COP, as the supreme body of the Convention, “shall keep under regular review the implementation of the Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt.” Hence, the COP is also a supreme body to the CMA, even if all Parties to the CMA are also Parties to the COP.
B. What is the relationship between the COP and the WIM and its ExCom?

The COP established the WIM and its ExCom by Decision 2/CP.19, §1 and §2.

Establishes the Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage, under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, subject to review at the twenty-second session of the Conference of the Parties … to address loss and damage associated with impacts of climate change, including extreme events and slow onset events, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change … ;

Establishes an executive committee of the Warsaw international mechanism, which shall function under the guidance of, and be accountable to, the Conference of the Parties, to guide the implementation of functions referred to under paragraph 5;

The ExCom reports annually to the COP, as requested in §3 of Decision 2/CP.19.

3. Requests the executive committee to report annually to the Conference of the Parties through the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and make recommendations, as appropriate;

C. What is the relationship between the WIM and the Paris Agreement?

Article 8.2 sets out the relationship between the Paris Agreement and the WIM. Article 8 is silent on the relationship with the ExCom. As the WIM is not a new mechanism that has been established for the first time, its reference under Article 8.2 of the Paris Agreement must be viewed in that previously established legal context.

Article 8.2

The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts shall be subject to the authority and guidance of the [CMA] and may be enhanced and strengthened, as determined by the [CMA].

D. How might the WIM be enhanced and strengthened under each supreme body?

COP: The COP established the WIM. It broadly has supreme authority to enhance and strengthen the mechanism, including its functions, modalities, and areas of work as defined in Decisions 3/CP.18 and 2/CP.19.

CMA: Under the CMA, the WIM may be enhanced and strengthened (Article 8.2). Article 8.3 indirectly references the current three functions of the WIM – understanding, action, and support – as what should be enhanced, on a cooperative and facilitative basis. As noted above, Article 8.4 includes a non-exhaustive list of areas of cooperation and facilitation to enhance understanding, action and support: early warning systems; emergency preparedness; slow onset events; events that may involve irreversible and permanent loss and damage; comprehensive risk assessment and management; risk insurance facilities, climate risk pooling and other insurance solutions; non-economic losses; and resilience of communities, livelihoods and ecosystems.

As the Paris Agreement is to enhance the implementation of the Convention, and is a subsidiary agreement to the Convention, then it can be implied that the CMA would be able to strengthen the WIM starting from the broad foundations established in COP Decisions 3/CP.18 and 2/CP.19. However if the WIM were under the sole guidance and authority of the CMA, there is the possibility that Parties might focus their enhancing and
strengthening of the WIM based on the narrow list of areas for cooperation and facilitation found in Article 8.4.

**Note:** It is not clear how limiting the text of the Paris Agreement might prove with regard to strengthening and enhancing the WIM, but the language of Article 8 (five paragraphs) is arguably much narrower than what is contained in two entire COP decisions.

**E. How are the WIM and ExCom currently governed?**

The COP has continued to govern the WIM and ExCom since the entry into force of the Paris Agreement in 2016. The ExCom has continued to report to the COP through the subsidiary bodies and the COP has adopted four decisions (Decisions 3/CP.22, 4/CP.22, 5/CP.23, and 10/CP.24) on the WIM. The COP undertook the first, previous review of the WIM, resulting in Decision 4/CP.22. There has been no CMA decision taken yet on the WIM.

**F. What exactly are the governance questions to be resolved?**

At present two supreme bodies – the COP and the CMA – have authority and guidance over the WIM. When the Paris Agreement asserted authority and guidance of the CMA over the WIM in Article 8.2, it added an additional governance relationship to the already existing relationship between the COP and the WIM and its ExCom (Decision 2/CP.19, § 1 and 2). Nothing in Article 8, or the accompanying Decision 1/CP.21, negates the existing relationship between the COP and the WIM and, as noted earlier, the Paris Agreement is completely silent on the relationship with the ExCom.

In essence, there are two related governance questions posed: 1) which supreme body or bodies will direct the work of the WIM, separately or together; and 2) whether the current reporting relationship of the ExCom with the COP should be modified.

These questions will need resolution through political decisions of one or both of the supreme bodies. To answer these questions in a way that can effectively protect developing country interests in a strong and comprehensive mechanism to address loss and damage, Parties should construct a shared governance arrangement with the COP and the CMA.

The question of shared governance of constituted bodies is not unique to the WIM. The following section on practical governance matters provides examples and analysis of other constituted bodies facing the same question in light of new relationships created under the Paris Agreement or subsequent decisions of the COP and CMA. To be very clear: there is no single technical answer to how to design these arrangements. A political decision by the supreme governing bodies is required, setting out reporting and other governance relationships.

**Note:** Developed country Parties, including Parties to the Convention that have announced their intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, have been vocal in advocating for a complete transfer of governance away from the COP, with the CMA having sole authority over the WIM. One obvious benefit to developed country Parties of such a transfer is that it would reinforce the legal impacts of §51 of Decision 1/CP.21, which states that Article 8 does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation.

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1 Some commentators have gone so far as to say that Article 8.2 severs a relationship between the COP and the WIM. There is no legal basis for such a claim.
III. PRACTICAL MATTERS OF GOVERNANCE

A. Could the WIM be governed by both the COP and the CMA? What might shared governance look like?

The WIM was established by the COP and continues as a mechanism under that supreme body. The ExCom currently functions under the guidance of, and is accountable to, the COP.

Parties could maintain those relationships, while expanding authority and guidance of the CMA over the WIM (this is what Article 8.2 does) and adding an additional reporting relationship of the ExCom to the CMA, through the Subsidiary Bodies. That additional relationship would need to be created by a decision of the supreme bodies, as the current decision in effect, Decision 2/CP.19, defines clearly the guidance, accountability, and reporting relationships between the COP and the ExCom.

The Technology Mechanism as a precedent? The Technology Mechanism was established under the Convention in Decision 1/CP.16, in §117, with two associated constituted bodies – the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), through its Advisory Board:

117. Decides to establish a Technology Mechanism...under the guidance of and accountable to the Conference of the Parties, which will consist of the following components:

(a) A Technology Executive Committee, ... ;

(b) A Climate Technology Centre and Network, ... ;

Article 10.3 of the Paris Agreement states that "the Technology Mechanism established under the Convention shall also serve the Paris Agreement", raising similar questions of shared guidance, authority, and reporting relationships as with the WIM. How might these questions be resolved for the Technology Mechanism?

The two constituted bodies of the Technology Mechanism have already recommended a shared reporting relationship to the CMA, reflected in Decision 15/CMA.1:

4. Takes note of the recommendation of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network to prepare and submit their joint annual report to both the Conference of the Parties and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement [CMA];

Decisions 1/CP.16 and 1/CP.21 (the latter, among other things, directs the elaboration of the technology framework) provide some indication as to how reporting might work in practice – which elements of the joint report might be considered by the COP and which by the CMA and, by extension, which would be the areas of the work for which the COP and CMA might respectively provide guidance. Decision 1/CP.16 says that:

the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network shall report, ... to the Conference of the Parties, through the subsidiary bodies, on their respective activities and the performance of their respective functions;

Decision 1/CP.21 states:

68. The Climate Technology Centre and Network...shall report to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, through the subsidiary bodies, on their activities to support the implementation of the Agreement;...
In their reporting to the COP, the TEC and CTCN would communicate on their respective activities and performance of functions defined by COP decisions, and the COP could provide guidance on the same. In their reporting to the CMA, the TEC and the CTCN would communicate on their activities to support the implementation of the Agreement and the CMA would provide guidance on their work.

How to divide labour between the COP and the CMA in relation to the WIM might be less clearly identified in foundational legal language, but could and should be clarified in a decision taken by the COP and the CMA. Practically, the ExCom could forward its report and recommendations through the subsidiary bodies to each of the supreme bodies. One potential arrangement for a division of labour: based on the ExCom report and recommendations, the COP would take decisions with respect to the role of the Convention in addressing loss and damage; CMA decisions would involve actions related to Articles 8.3 and 8.4 of the Paris Agreement.

In addition to the Technology Mechanism and its constituted bodies, other constituted bodies with shared governance arrangements include the Adaptation Committee, the Adaptation Fund, the Consultative Group of Experts, the Katowice Committee on Impacts, the Least Developed Countries (LDC) Expert Group, and the Standing Committee on Finance.

**B. How do various constituted bodies currently report to the COP and / or CMA?**

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<td>Report</td>
<td>COP and CMA</td>
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<td>LDC Group</td>
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<td>Report of meetings</td>
<td>SBI and COP decisions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Standing Committee on Finance</td>
<td>COP¹</td>
<td>Annually</td>
<td>Report Draft guidance to OEs Every four years a report on needs of developing country Parties (for COP and CMA)</td>
<td>COP and CMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology Executive Committee</td>
<td>COP and CMA, through the SBI and SBSTA³</td>
<td>Annually</td>
<td>Joint report with CTCN</td>
<td>COP and CMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate Technology Centre and Network</td>
<td>COP and CMA, through the SBI and SBSTA³</td>
<td>Annually</td>
<td>Joint report with TEC</td>
<td>COP, through the CTCN advisory board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIM ExCom</td>
<td>COP, through the SBI and SBSTA</td>
<td>Annually</td>
<td>Report</td>
<td>COP³</td>
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² The Adaptation Committee is not submitting its report to the CMA in 2019.
³ CMA2 is considering draft guidance prepared by the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) for the GEF and the GCF, and on the LDC Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund. A link to the SCF report is included in the CMA agenda but there is no indication that the entire report will be considered by the CMA.
⁴ Recommended by the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network.
⁵ The CMA guidance to the operating entities of the financial mechanism of the Convention is transmitted to the CMA by the COP.
⁶ As noted in the text, Decision 2/CP.19, and reaffirmed in Decision 2/CP.20, sets out the relationship between the COP and the ExCom. Both the Paris Agreement and Decision 1/CP.21 are silent on this relationship.
Treaty and decision text establishing these relationships can be found in the Annex to this brief.

C. How might these relationships change for constituted bodies that may also need to report to the CMA, or will receive guidance from the CMA?

As can be discerned from the above table, there will be a range of new reporting relationships established for constituted bodies established under the Convention and also serving the Paris Agreement. Some of these relationships are already obvious from the workplans of the bodies, while others are clearly works-in-progress. Below is what can be discerned from existing documents:

**Adaptation Committee:** In its current workplan, the Adaptation Committee references guidance it has received from both the CMA and the COP. There is no indication of whether it will continue to report solely to the COP, or whether its report may be submitted to both the COP and CMA, through the Subsidiary Bodies.

**Consultative Group of Experts (CGE):** The CGE reports to the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI). Its terms of reference are currently under revision, as it will now also serve the Paris Agreement to support the implementation of the enhanced transparency framework. It has no reporting relationship with the COP. The COP, and presumably also now the CMA, provide input to the CGE through the SBI and decisions.

**Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG):** The LEG reports to the SBI. It has no reporting relationship with the COP. The COP, and presumably also now the CMA, provide input to the LEG through the SBI and decisions.

**Standing Committee on Finance (SCF):** In its current workplan, the SCF references guidance it has received from both the CMA and the COP. A schematic in the workplan indicates that the SCF will prepare its report to COP25, and intersessionally prior to COP25 will work on reports to the COP and CMA.

One of the tasks of the SCF is to develop draft guidance to the operating entities of the financial mechanism. The SCF will prepare that draft guidance for the COP as well as draft guidance for the CMA with regards to implementation of the Paris Agreement. It should be pointed out that the CMA does not communicate directly with the operating entities, as these are the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention. Instead, a CMA decision must be transmitted to the Financial Mechanism by the COP, as noted below in §61 of Decision 1/CP.21 and reiterated in §9 of Decision 3/CMA.1:

61. Recommends that the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement shall provide guidance to the entities entrusted with the operation of the Financial Mechanism of the Convention on the policies, programme priorities and eligibility criteria related to the Agreement for transmission by the Conference of the Parties.

**Technology Executive Committee:** New reporting relationships have not yet been defined but presumably are works in progress. The two constituted bodies of the Technology Mechanism – the TEC and the CTCN – have together recommended that they would submit their joint annual report to both the COP and the CMA. This recommendation is merely taken note of in Decision 15/CMA.1.

**CTCN and its Advisory Board:** New reporting relationships have not yet been defined but presumably are works in progress. The two constituted bodies of the Technology Mechanism – the TEC and the CTCN – have together recommended that they would submit their joint annual report to both the COP and the CMA. This recommendation is merely taken note of in Decision 15/CMA.1.
**Executive Committee of the WIM:** Decision 2/CP.19, and reaffirmed in Decision 2/CP.20, sets out the relationship between the COP and the ExCom. As noted above, both the Paris Agreement and Decision 1/CP.21 are silent on this relationship. Last year, in advance of COP24, the Secretariat strongly pushed for the report of the WIM ExCom to be sent only to the CMA. Of course, this is not a decision that can be taken by the Secretariat; Parties decided to continue to have the ExCom report to the COP, with the COP taking Decision 10/CP.24 under the WIM agenda item.

At the 50th session of the Subsidiary Bodies in June 2019, there was a vibrant conversation on the content of COP25 and CMA2 agendas taking place under the SBI agenda item on arrangements for intergovernmental meetings, including debate on the location of an agenda item on the WIM.

What is clear is that, as earlier mentioned, the decisions that will be taken to resolve these governance relationships are not merely technical, as there are a variety of ways in which relationships may be established. Parties should devote considerable effort to crafting relationships in the best interest of vulnerable developing countries and their long-term vision for a strong and effective WIM. Maintaining a strong link to the Convention and Decisions 3/CP.18 and 2/CP.19 would seem critical in this regard.

**D. Which body will consider the outputs of the review of the WIM?**

There has been no decision yet as to which body will receive the outputs of the WIM review. There are at least three options:

- **COP:** Procedurally, this is most the most parsimonious and legally straightforward option. The COP established the WIM and the review was mandated under COP Decision 4/CP.22. The ExCom continues to function under the guidance of and be accountable to the COP, and the functioning of the ExCom and its subsidiary arrangements is an element under consideration in the review.

- **CMA:** Some Parties favour this arrangement, as does the Secretariat, but the legal basis for such a decision is hard to imagine.

- **COP and CMA:** Until governance relationships are clarified, this could be a compromise arrangement, although again the legal basis for such an arrangement is not obvious.
## ANNEX

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<th>Constituted Body</th>
<th>COP governance language</th>
<th>CMA governance language</th>
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| Adaptation Committee             | **Decision 1/CP.16**  
20. Decides to hereby establish an Adaptation Committee to promote the implementation of enhanced action on adaptation in a coherent manner under the Convention, inter alia, through the following functions …  
**Decision 2/CP.17**  
92. Affirms that the Adaptation Committee shall be the overall advisory body to the Conference of the Parties on adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change;  
93. Also affirms that the Adaptation Committee was established to promote the implementation of enhanced action on adaptation in a coherent manner under the Convention, as provided for by the Cancun Adaptation Framework, inter alia through the following functions …  
95. Also decides that the Adaptation Committee shall operate under the authority of, and be accountable to, the Conference of the Parties, which should decide on its policies in line with relevant decisions;  
96. Requests the Adaptation Committee to report annually to the Conference of the Parties, through the subsidiary bodies, including on its activities, the performance of its functions, guidance, recommendations and other relevant information arising from its work, and, as appropriate, on further action that may be required under the Convention, for consideration by the Conference of the Parties; | **Decision 11/CMA.1**  
1. Decides that the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group shall serve the Paris Agreement;                                                                                                                                                  |
| Consultative Group of Experts     | **Decision 8/CP.5**  
3. Decides also to establish a consultative group of experts on national communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention;  
6. Recommendations of the consultative group shall be forwarded to the subsidiary bodies for their consideration;  
**Decision 19/CP.19**  
7. Also requests the Consultative Group of Experts to submit a progress report annually on its work to the Subsidiary Body for Implementation for its consideration at the sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation which are held in conjunction with the sessions of the Conference of the Parties;  
**Decision 11/CP.24**  
1. Decides to extend the term of the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention for eight years, from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2026, and to rename it the Consultative Group of Experts;  
25. Requests the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, at its fiftieth session (June 2019), to review and revise the terms of reference of the Consultative Group of Experts taking into account the functions referred to in the annex to Decision 19/CP.19, annual reports of the Consultative Group of Experts, and Decision 18/CMA.1, paragraph 15, with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fifth session (December 2019); | **Decision 18/CMA.1**  
15. Subject to the extension of its term by the Conference of the Parties… the Consultative Group of Experts… shall also serve the Paris Agreement, starting from 1 January 2019, to support the implementation of the enhanced transparency framework under Article 13 of the Paris Agreement; |
| Least Developed Country Group     | **Decision 29/CP.7**  
1. Decides to establish a least developed countries expert group pursuant to the terms of reference included in the annex to the present decision;  
**Decision 19/CP.21**  
1. Decides to extend the mandate of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group under its current terms of reference;  
3. Invites the Least Developed Countries Expert Group to … make recommendations for consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation … with a view to those recommendations being forwarded to the Conference of the Parties … as appropriate;  
Also note Decisions 7/CP.9, 4/CP.11, 8/CP.13, 6/CP.16, 5/CP.17, 12/CP.18 and 3/CP.20 extending the mandate of the LEG. | **Decision 11/CMA.1**  
1. Decides that the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group shall serve the Paris Agreement; |
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<th>Constituted Body</th>
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<th>CMA governance language</th>
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<tr>
<td>Standing Committee on Finance (SCF)</td>
<td>Decision 1/CP.16 112. Decides to establish a Standing Committee under the Conference of the Parties ...</td>
<td>Decision 1/CP.21 63. Also decides that the Standing Committee on Finance shall serve the Agreement in line with its functions and responsibilities established under the Conference of the Parties;</td>
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<td>Decision 2/CP.17 120. Decides that the Standing Committee shall report and make recommendations to the Conference of the Parties, for its consideration, at each ordinary session of the Conference of the Parties on all aspects of its work;</td>
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<td>Technology Mechanism</td>
<td>Decision 1/CP.16 117. Decides to establish a Technology Mechanism under the guidance of and accountable to the Conference of the Parties, which will consist of the following components: (a) A Technology Executive Committee, ...</td>
<td>Paris Agreement, Article 10.3 The Technology Mechanism established under the Convention shall serve this Agreement.</td>
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<td>(b) A Climate Technology Centre and Network, ... ;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technology Executive Committee</td>
<td>Decision 1/CP.16 126. Decides that the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network shall report, ... to the Conference of the Parties, through the subsidiary bodies, on their respective activities and the performance of their respective functions;</td>
<td>Decision 1/CP.21 68. The Technology Executive Committee ... shall report to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, through the subsidiary bodies, on their activities to support the implementation of the Agreement;</td>
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<td>Decision 15/CMA.1 1. Adopts the technology framework under Article 10, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement ... ;</td>
<td>Decision 15/CMA.1 2. Decides that the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network, consistently with their respective functions, mandates and modalities of work, shall implement the technology framework in close collaboration under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;</td>
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<td>4. Takes note of the recommendation of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network to prepare and submit their joint annual report to both the Conference of the Parties and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTCN and Advisory Board of the CTCN</td>
<td>Decision 1/CP.16 126. Decides that the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network shall report, to the Conference of the Parties, through the subsidiary bodies, on their respective activities and the performance of their respective functions; Decision 14/CP.18 5. Decides that the Advisory Board of the Climate Technology Centre and Network is hereby established, ... ; 14. Reaffirms that the Climate Technology Centre and Network shall be accountable to, and under the guidance of, the Conference of the Parties through the Advisory Board, ... ;</td>
<td>Decision I/CP.21 68. The Climate Technology Centre and Network... shall report to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, through the subsidiary bodies, on their activities to support the implementation of the Agreement; Decision 15/CMA1 1. Adopts the technology framework under Article 10, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement ... ; 2. Decides that the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network, consistently with their respective functions, mandates and modalities of work, shall implement the technology framework in close collaboration under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement; 4. Takes note of the recommendation of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network to prepare and submit their joint annual report to both the Conference of the Parties and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;</td>
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<td>Warsaw International Mechanism for loss and damage</td>
<td>Decision 2/CP.19 1. Establishes the Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage, under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, subject to review at the twenty-second session of the Conference of the Parties ... to address loss and damage associated with impacts of climate change, including extreme events and slow onset events, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change ... ; 5. Further decides that the Warsaw international mechanism shall fulfill the role under the Convention of promoting the implementation of approaches to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, pursuant to Decision 3/CP.18, in a comprehensive, integrated and coherent manner by undertaking, inter alia, the following functions: (a) Enhancing knowledge and understanding of comprehensive risk management approaches to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including slow onset impacts ... (b) Strengthening dialogue, coordination, coherence and synergies among relevant stakeholders ... (c) Enhancing action and support, including finance, technology and capacity-building, to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, so as to enable countries to undertake actions pursuant to Decision 3/CP.18, paragraph 6 ...</td>
<td>Paris Agreement, Article 8.2 The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts shall be subject to the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement and may be enhanced and strengthened, as determined by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Agreement.</td>
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<td>ExCom of the WIM</td>
<td>Decision 2/CP.19 (and reaffirmed in Decision 2/CP.20, §3) 2. Establishes an executive committee of the Warsaw international mechanism, which shall function under the guidance of, and be accountable to, the Conference of the Parties, to guide the implementation of functions referred to under paragraph 5; Decision 2/CP.19 (and reaffirmed in Decision 2/CP.20, paragraph 4) 3. Requests the executive committee to report annually to the Conference of the Parties through the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and make recommendations, as appropriate;</td>
<td>No text.</td>
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</tbody>
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*As identified by the UNFCCC*