

Regional Training Workshop for the Caribbean



Mount Irvine, Tobago
16-18 April 2024

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www.ecbi.org

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The 2024 Caribbean Regional Training Workshop, held from 16-18 April 2024, was attended by 22 novice negotiators from 18 countries (including 10 Fellows from the Alliance of Small Island States – AOSIS – participating virtually from New York). The Workshop covered key issues relevant to the multilateral climate change negotiations, as well as key priorities for AOSIS. It also provided hands-on training in a mock negotiating session.

Science of Climate Change

Following a round of introductions, Amb. Carlos Fuller, Permanent Representative of Belize to the United Nations, explained the science of climate change. He said anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), like carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide, from human activities, including the burning of fossil fuels and the use of chemical fertilizers, has resulted in the trapping of heat in the Earth's atmosphere, causing global warming.

Global average temperatures have risen over 1.1°C in the past 150 years since systematic observation began, with a much steeper rise over the past three decades, indicating that temperature rise is accelerating. For the Caribbean region, data going back 50 to 60 years indicate a similar rise.

Rising global temperatures have affected the global hydrological cycle, and changed precipitation patterns, making it dryer across the Equator (including in the Caribbean) and wetter in the polar regions. The intensity of rainfall is also changing, causing extreme drought followed by extreme rainfall and flooding. For instance, in 2009-2010, Saint Lucia experienced the worst drought in 40 years. This was followed by Hurricane Tomas, which produced 25 inches of rainfall over a 24-hour period.

Sea levels have risen by about three millimetres each year over the past 200 years, but this rate has accelerated to six millimetres over the past 50 years. (This rise is not uniform – it is higher in some places like Guyana, where sea levels have risen to 10.2 mm per year from 1951-1979). The rise is taking place because 90% of the additional energy caused by global warming goes into the oceans, causing them to expand, and due to melting polar ice caps, which are now contributing more to sea level rise than the warming of the oceans.

Heat waves are also increasing, and the Caribbean region is experiencing stronger (Category 3,4, and 5) and more frequent hurricanes, which are closely associated with higher sea surface temperatures. The damages associated with these events are also increasing.

Fuller said global temperatures are projected to increase by 4-6°C by the end of the century, and sea level is expected to rise by one millimeter over normal. Alarmingly, even if the world stops emitting GHGs today, it will take hundreds of years for GHGs in the atmosphere to stabilise to normal levels and millennia for sea levels to stabilise.

He also described the socio-economic impacts of climate change, including on: health, through the rise in incidence of infectious diseases caused by increases in vector populations; agriculture, as crop yields fall and agriculture becomes unviable in the tropics; water resources and quality; and fisheries, as fish populations migrate north to cooler waters.

Fuller concluded by saying that the World Meteorological Organization's latest [State of Global Climate](#) found 2023 was the hottest year on record, with global temperatures 1.5°C over the mean. Sea level rise has doubled in the last ten years. He reminded the young trainee negotiators to avoid the mistakes and mishaps of the past three decades, and to work toward making efforts at the global level to address climate change more effectively.

In the Q&A that followed, Fuller noted that when the negotiations on climate change started, countries viewed the problem as one of global commons. Recently, however, countries have chosen to take a more nationalistic approach. If business as usual continues, he said the world will be in a catastrophic state by the end of the century, with: many Pacific countries underwater due to sea level rise; extinction of fish species due to bleached coral reefs; and the cessation of agriculture in the tropics due to extreme heat.



Climate Geopolitics and the International Governance Framework

Kishan Kumarsingh, Lead Climate Negotiator for Trinidad and Tobago and Head, ecbi Fellowship and Trust-building Programme, described key milestones towards the development of an international response, including:

- A UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution adopted in 1988, declaring climate change a common concern of mankind.
- The first Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 1990, which had considerable influence on policymakers.
- Formation, by UNGA, of an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) for a Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1990. The INC met five times between February 1991 and May 1992.
- Adoption of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The UNFCCC entered into force in 1994. The Convention recognises the “common but differentiated responsibilities” of countries with respect to climate change.

- Adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, setting emission reduction targets for developed countries. The rules for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol were subsequently agreed in 2001, in the Marrakech Accords. The Protocol entered into force in 2005, with a first commitment period up to 2012.
- Establishment of a dialogue on long-term action on climate change in 2005, to allow for an exchange of views on how the evolving climate change regime can be further strengthened.
- Adoption of the Bali Action Plan in 2007, setting up a two-year work programme to develop a new regime for adoption at COP15, in 2009.
- Failure of COP15 in 2009 to adopt an agreement – instead, the “Copenhagen Accord” was “noted”. Although this was viewed as a failure, Kumarsingh said it played a key role in future progress.
- Adoption of the Cancun Agreements in 2010, which formally adopted many elements of the Copenhagen Accord on finance, technology, means of implementation, mitigation, and adaptation, among others. It also formalised pledges by developing countries to reduce emissions through voluntary measures.
- Adoption of the Durban Platform in 2011, advancing the outcomes of Copenhagen and Cancun to negotiate a new instrument.
- Adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015, and its entry into force in 2016. Most of the rules for implementation of the Agreement were adopted in 2018, in Katowice.

Kumarsingh then described elements of the UNFCCC. He said the Convention, led by the Conference of the Parties (COP), seeks to address:

- Scientific concern about the rise in global temperature.
- How to act in the face of uncertainty.
- Unfairness in the distribution of the effects and costs of climate change.
- Unsustainable development.

Article 2 of the UNFCCC defines the objective of the Convention: “... to achieve stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases at levels that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system... within a timeframe sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure food production is not threatened and to enable economic development in a sustainable manner”.

The goal at this point was, therefore, stabilisation and not reduction, Kumarsingh explained, in that no levels for reduction or timeframes are specified in the Convention. The UNFCCC is based on the following principles:

- Intergenerational equity.
- Common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR).
- The precautionary principle.
- The rights of all Parties to sustainable development, and a supportive and open international economic system.

While the UNFCCC calls for leadership by developed countries, he said it relies more on declarations than firm commitments. It includes two Annexes: Annex I of the Convention includes the 41 developed countries and countries with economies of transition; and Annex II, which is a subset of Annex I and includes the 21 highly developed members of the

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Developing countries are referred to as “non-Annex I Parties”.

The negotiations that resulted in the Kyoto Protocol were based on an understanding, reached in Berlin at COP1 in 1995, that no new commitments should be introduced for developing countries. The Protocol sought to address:

- Growth in GHG emissions.
- How to make economies more climate-friendly.
- Equity of responsibility.
- Equity of costs.

The Protocol, led by the COP serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), included the following elements for Annex I countries:

- Commitments, including legally-binding emissions targets to reduce their emissions by an average of 5% by 2012, based on 1990 levels. The Protocol covered a “basket” of six gases: carbon dioxide; methane; nitrous oxide; hydrofluorocarbons; perfluorocarbons; and sulphur hexafluoride.
- Implementation, at the domestic level and through three market mechanisms (Joint Implementation, Clean Development Mechanism or CDM, and Emissions Trading), and through some carbon sequestration activities in the land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector.
- Elements on minimising impacts on developing countries, including through a 2% levy on the CDM for adaptation funding.
- Accounting, reporting, and review, including an in-depth review of national reporting.
- Compliance measures, enforced through a Compliance Committee.

Non-Annex I countries, meanwhile, also had some commitments under the Protocol, including to:

- Improve the quality of emissions data.
- Implement national mitigation and adaptation programmes.
- Promote environmentally-friendly technology.
- Cooperate in scientific research and international climate observation networks.
- Support education, training, public awareness, and capacity-building initiatives.

Describing the process that led to the adoption of the Paris Agreement, Kumarsingh explained that the Durban COP established an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), to work towards a “*protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force*” for adoption by COP21 in 2015. He described key milestones along the way, including:

- The launch of a new commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol in Doha, at CMP8 in 2012.
- The decision to call on Parties to submit intended Nationally Determined Contributions in Warsaw, in 2013 – this call was reiterated in Lima in 2014, where a decision was taken on what these NDCs should contain.

Kumarsingh explained that, following intense negotiations, the Paris Agreement was adopted in 2015. It was decided that the Agreement would enter into force following ratification by 55 Parties to the Convention accounting for at least 55% of global emissions. The modalities for implementing the Agreement were to be agreed in time for implementation to begin in 2020. Kumarsingh highlighted the following key elements of the Paris Agreement:

- A long-term goal for Parties to limit global average temperature increase to “*well below*” 20°C, while urging efforts to limit it to 1.5°C.
- A long-term goal for Parties to achieve global peaking “*as soon as possible*”, by achieving a balance of emissions with sinks in the second half of the century.
- Undertaking a global stocktake in 2023 and every five years thereafter to ensure collective progress towards achievement of the long-term goals.
- Special recognition of the circumstances of small island developing States (SIDS).
- Commitments by all Parties to submit NDCs; pursue domestic measures aimed at achieving them; report regularly on their emissions and progress made in implementing and achieving their NDCs, and to undergo international review; and submit NDCs every five years with the clear expectation that they will be more ambitious than previous NDCs.

In the Q&A that followed, Kumarsingh said that, with respect to **mitigation**, all countries will have to account for the achievement or non-achievement of their NDCs. He explained that an international Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) sets the path for all countries to report through Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs), which have a common reporting format. Countries will be able to explain where they stand in terms of implementation in these reports, including extenuating circumstances that hindered compliance. They will then be supported to get back on track. While the ETF will also track climate finance commitments, both mobilized and received, he noted that lack of a definition of climate finance poses a challenge in tracking.

Participants also discussed challenges of reporting on adaptation, and the legal bindingness of compliance with national commitments under the Paris Agreement.

Kumarsingh then presented on other specific elements of the Paris Agreement. On **adaptation**, he said the Agreement calls for:

- Adaptation planning processes, including action plans and policies.
- Assessments of vulnerability, including of people, places, and ecosystems.
- Building climate resilience, including through economic diversification and sustainable management of natural resources.
- Monitoring and evaluation of implementation.
- Submission of Adaptation Communications, which will be considered in the global stocktake.

He said the Agreement includes a dedicated Article on **loss and damage**, which extends the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) for Loss and Damage resulting from climate change.

On **climate finance**, Kumarsingh listed the following key elements:

- Extension of the goal for mobilising US\$ 100 billion a year until 2025, with a call for a new, higher goal to be set for the period after 2025.
- A call for developed countries to provide finance, with an invitation for developing countries to voluntarily do so. Developed countries will continue with their obligations under the Convention, and “shall” provide financial resources to assist developing countries with mitigation and adaptation.

On **technology transfer and development**, the Agreement calls for:

- Strengthened cooperative action.
- Continuation of the Technology Mechanism.
- A new Technology Framework to provide overarching guidance to the Technology Mechanism.
- Finance from developed countries.

On **transparency**, he said the Agreement calls for an enhanced transparency system for all countries. A critical component of the Agreement, Kumarsingh said the transparency framework ensures that all countries are on a level playing field with flexibility for developing countries and aims to facilitate the tracking of progress through links with the global stocktake. Countries are expected to report on: GHG inventories; information necessary to track progress in implementing NDCs; and information on financial, technology transfer, and capacity-building support provided and received.

Kumarsingh then pointed participants to further information on the Katowice rulebook for the Paris Agreement, adopted in 2018, which includes further rules and guidelines on each of the elements included in the Paris Agreement. He noted that the principle CBDR was modified under the Paris Agreement, to recognize that countries will take on more responsibilities “in light of national circumstances”. There is also some flexibility for reporting by SIDS and least developed countries (LDCs). The Katowice conference marked the end of the substantive negotiations.

At COP25 in Madrid, a significant focus was on launching the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage.

At CO26, the Glasgow Pact delivered the Glasgow – Sharm el-Sheikh Work Programme on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA). On finance, COP26 urged developed countries to double adaptation finance to achieve a balance between mitigation and adaptation finance. Kumarsingh said work is underway, with the ninth dialogue taking place soon, to establish a new collective goal on climate finance, which will also consider the needs and priorities of developing countries. The rules of the Article 6 mechanisms of the Paris Agreement were adopted as part of the Glasgow Pact, based on underlying principles such as integrity, no double counting, and corresponding adjustments.

At COP27, the Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan was adopted. Parties agreed to establish a loss and damage fund and funding arrangements, and negotiations continued on the new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance.

At COP28, the UAE Consensus was adopted following conclusion of the first Global Stocktake (GST), and the loss and damage fund was formally established on the first day of

the conference. For the first time in history, there was agreement to “transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems”. The Co-Chairs of the NCQG deliberations received a mandate to begin drafting a decision for adoption in 2024. On the GGA, Parties agreed on targets on specific themes such as water, food health, poverty eradication, and cultural heritage. There was no decision on carbon markets, and discussions will continue at COP29.

Kumarsingh said the main focus of COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, will be on climate finance (NCQG and financing the energy transition).

A Q&A session followed, where participants discussed the results of the GST, which found countries were not on track to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement, and the overall effectiveness of the negotiations.

Mitigation

Carlos Fuller reiterated that the 2023 GST revealed that countries are not on track to achieve the mitigation objectives of the Paris Agreement. Following the GST, Parties resolved once again to pursue efforts to limit global average temperature increase to 1.5°C and accelerate action in this decade based on the best available science, reflecting equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), in light of different national circumstances. Parties also noted with concern the pre-2020 gaps in mitigation by developed country Parties – the IPCC had indicated that developed countries must reduce emissions by 25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020, which was not achieved.

Fuller noted that while the intentions indicated in NDCs will put the world on track to deliver a 2.1-2.8°C temperature rise if they are implemented (instead of the business-as-usual path that leads to a 4°C rise in temperature), national emissions remain higher than those promised in the NDCs. Countries will need to deliver emission reductions of 43% by 2030 and 60% by 2035 relative to 2019 levels and reach net zero carbon dioxide emissions by 2050 globally, to keep the 1.5°C target within reach.

Fuller noted that Parties are expected to submit their new NDCs by February 2025, with an end date of 2035. To achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement by 2100, through their NDCs, Parties must:

- Triple renewable energy and double energy efficiency by 2030.
- Phase-down unabated coal power.
- Accelerate efforts towards net zero emission energy systems, utilizing zero- and low-carbon fuels well before or by around mid-century.
- Transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems.
- Accelerate zero- and low-emission technologies.
- Accelerate and substantially reduce non-CO₂ emissions.
- Accelerate the reduction of emissions from road transport.
- Phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.

Parties will also need to put in place new, or intensify existing, domestic arrangements for preparing and implementing their successive NDCs as well as take into account the good practices and opportunities identified during the technical dialogue of the first GST in

enhancing their actions and support. The Chairs of the 60th meeting of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI60) and of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA60) will organize a GST Dialogue on how the outcomes of the GST are informing the preparation of the next round of NDCs, and the Secretariat will prepare a report for consideration at the 61st session of the SBs. The UAE will also convene a GST Dialogue on implementing the outcomes of the GST. Fuller also noted that the Presidency troika of UAE (COP28/ CMA5), Azerbaijan (COP29/CMA6), and Brazil (COP30/CMA7) will launch a [Road Map to Mission 1.5](#) to significantly enhance international cooperation and the international enabling environment to stimulate ambition in the next round of NDCs, with a view to enhance action and implementation over this critical decade and keep 1.5°C within reach.

He said the only agenda item that speaks to mitigation in the negotiations is the Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme (MWP), which has the mandate to urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade in a manner that complements the GST. The MWP started in 2022, under the guidance of the SBI and SBSTA Chairs, and will continue until 2026, with a view to adopting a decision on the continuation of the MWP at that session.

At least two global dialogues are held every year under the MWP, with investment-focused events. The 2023 events focused on accelerating just energy transitions, including in transport systems. Key findings, opportunities, and barriers in implementing the Work Programme in the following areas will be considered in the future:

- Renewable energy
- Grid and energy storage
- Carbon dioxide capture and use and carbon dioxide capture and storage
- Energy efficiency
- Deploying and shifting to collective and non-motorized modes of transport
- Energy and resource efficiency in the transport sector
- Electrification of vehicles and shifting to low or zero-carbon fuels
- Information on policies and measures, financing issues, technology and capacity, and sustainable development and socio-economic impacts.

The MWP-related decision at COP28 was procedural, Fuller said, welcoming the convening of the events, noting the report by the Co-Chairs, and recommending more inclusive events. The 2024 global dialogues and investment-focused events will be on cities (buildings and urban systems).


During the Q&A session, participants discussed the questionable effectiveness of nationally-driven mitigation targets in delivering sufficient mitigation goals.

Adaptation and Loss and Damage

Sindy Singh, former AOSIS coordinator on adaptation, described key milestones related to the adaptation and loss and damage negotiations, including: Article 4 of the UNFCCC, adopted in 1992; establishment of the Adaptation Fund in 2001; the 2005 Nairobi Work Programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change; the 2010 Cancun Adaptation Framework (CAF); the 2013 Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and

Damage; Articles 2, 7 and 8 of the Paris Agreement; establishment of the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage in 2019; the Glasgow – Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the GGA in 2021; and establishment of the Loss and Damage Fund in 2022 and its operationalization in 2023.

Singh described the following adaptation policy cycle, emerging from the CAF:



Source: UNFCCC Website

He said the CAF also established an Adaptation Committee to promote the implementation of enhanced action on adaptation in a coherent manner under the Convention and the Paris Agreement.

She said Article 7 of the Paris Agreement established a Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), which seeks to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience, and reduce vulnerability to climate change. Article 7 also makes explicit links to adaptation in the context of mitigation ambition, recognition of developing country efforts, the adaptation planning process, Adaptation Communications, international support for developing countries, and the GST.

The Adaptation Communications are expected to include *priorities, implementation and support needs, plans and actions, without creating any additional burden for developing country Parties*. They can be submitted and updated periodically, as a component of, or in conjunction with, other communications or documents, including a National Adaptation Plan, an NDC, or a National Communication.

Singh noted that operationalising the GGA has been a complex challenge, both because adaptation interventions are local and context-specific, and because negotiators have struggled to reach agreement on key political issues, particularly those related to who should provide adaptation finance. Singh said that national BTRs are also expected to

include information related to climate change impacts and adaptation, although this is voluntary.

On the Glasgow – Sharm el-Sheikh Work Programme on the GGA, Singh said the two-year work programme has eight objectives aimed at understanding the methodologies, indicators, data and metrics, needs, and support required for assessing progress towards the Goal. Throughout 2023, proposals for GGA targets began to emerge, varying from high-level, sectoral, and aligned with the adaptation policy cycle.

She said AOSIS had proposed four high-level targets with the aim of keeping it very simple, not duplicating other targets, avoiding prescription given the complexity of adaptation in different contexts, and not adding to reporting burdens. However, in 2023, 11 targets to frame the GGA were agreed as part of the [UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience](#), including seven thematic targets and four process-oriented targets. The sectoral targets are:

1. Significantly reducing climate-induced **water** scarcity and enhancing climate resilience to water-related hazards towards a climate-resilient water supply, climate-resilient sanitation, and access to safe and affordable potable water for all.
2. Attaining climate-resilient **food and agricultural** production and supply and distribution of food, as well as increasing sustainable and regenerative production and equitable access to adequate food and nutrition for all.
3. Attaining resilience against climate change-related **health** impacts, promoting climate-resilient health services, and significantly reducing climate-related morbidity and mortality, particularly in the most vulnerable communities.
4. Reducing climate impacts on **ecosystems and biodiversity**, and accelerating the use of ecosystem-based adaptation and nature-based solutions, including through their management, enhancement, restoration and conservation, and through the protection of terrestrial, inland water, mountain, marine, and coastal ecosystems.
5. Increasing the resilience of **infrastructure and human settlements** to climate change impacts to ensure basic and continuous essential services for all, and minimising climate-related impacts on infrastructure and human settlements.
6. Substantially reducing the adverse effects of climate change on **poverty eradication and livelihoods**, particularly by promoting the use of adaptive social protection measures for all.
7. Protecting **cultural heritage** from the impacts of climate-related risks by developing adaptive strategies for preserving cultural practices and heritage sites and by designing climate-resilient infrastructure, guided by traditional knowledge, Indigenous Peoples' knowledge, and local knowledge systems.

The four process-related targets are:


1. **Impact, vulnerability and risk assessment:** By 2030 all Parties have conducted up-to-date assessments of climate hazards, climate change impacts, and exposure to risks and vulnerabilities, and have used the outcomes of these assessments to inform their formulation of national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies. By 2027, all Parties have established multi-hazard early warning systems, climate information services for risk reduction, and systematic observation to support improved climate-related data, information, and services.

2. **Planning:** By 2030, all Parties have in place country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies, covering, as appropriate, ecosystems, sectors, people and vulnerable communities, and have mainstreamed adaptation in all relevant strategies and plans.
3. **Implementation:** By 2030, all Parties have progressed in implementing their national adaptation plans, policies, and strategies and, as a result, have reduced the social and economic impacts of the key climate hazards identified in the assessments referred to above.
4. **Monitoring, evaluation and learning:** By 2030 all Parties have designed, established, and operationalised a system for monitoring, evaluation, and learning for their national adaptation efforts and have built the required institutional capacity to fully implement the system.

The UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience was weak on means of implementation, Singh said, by only: recognising the importance of concessional and grant-based funding for adaptation and of the provision of adaptation finance; the need to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation finance prioritising the needs of SIDS and LDCs; and recalling the goal of doubling adaptation finance.

The thematic targets for the GGA will be unpacked as part of the work of the UAE-Belem Work Programme, which will meet for the first time in May 2024 in Bhutan, and indicators are due to be finalized by COP30 in Belem, Brazil.

Singh concluded with the following summary of the way forward for adaptation:




During the Q&A, participants discussed the potential additional burden of reporting for the GGA, and the possibility of adaptation finance, already backsliding in 2023 according to the [UNEP Adaptation Gap Report 2023](#), being diverted to the loss and damage fund.

Climate Finance

Amb. Janine Felson, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belize, described: the global climate finance architecture; key principles and provisions related to climate finance; and the agenda elements related to climate finance.

Felson then presented the following climate finance architecture:



She said the global climate finance architecture can be described as “a multiplex of mechanisms, institutions, multilateral funds and initiatives, and processes through which financial resources are mobilised and channeled to address climate change, particularly in developing countries”.

This architecture evolved under the auspices of the UNFCCC, its Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement. It is comprised of the financial mechanism and its operating entities (GEF and GCF), and the specialized funds subsequently established under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. Various processes and institutional arrangements have been put in place to strengthen the operationalisation of the financial mechanism and to address transparency and accountability.

The Global Environment Facility (GEF) was the first designated operating entity of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, Felson said. However, the GEF Trust Fund is primarily focused on mitigation. Thus, the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) were established to support developing countries on adaptation in four key areas: agriculture, food security, and health; integrated water resource management to address water security, droughts, and flooding; nature-based solutions; and early warning and climate information systems. The LDCF focuses exclusively on the unique climate adaptation challenges of LDCs, while all vulnerable countries are eligible to access the SCCF, with priority given to the most vulnerable countries in Africa, Asia, and SIDS.

She then provided details on the governance arrangements and modalities of funds under the UNFCCC Mechanism, including the: GEF; Green Climate Fund (GCF); Adaptation Fund; LDCF; SCCF; and the new Loss and Damage Fund.

Felson explained that the GCF is the second key operating entity of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC. It is mandated to support developing countries raise and realise their NDC ambitions towards low-emissions, climate-resilient pathways. Its 2024-2027 strategic plan is focused on readiness, mitigation, adaptation, and the private sector. The GCF is focused on the following results:

- Advancing the implementation of NDCs, national adaptation plans, or long-term low emissions development strategies.
- Doubling the number of Direct Access Entities with approved GCF funding.
- Establishing new or improved early warning systems.
- Enabling smallholder farmers to adopt low-emissions, climate-resilient agricultural and fisheries practices and secure livelihoods while reconfiguring food systems.
- Conserving, restoring, or bringing terrestrial and marine areas under sustainable management.
- Developing or securing low-emission climate resilient infrastructure.
- Expanding access to sustainable, affordable, resilient, reliable renewable energy, particularly for the hardest to reach, and increasing renewable energy sources in the energy mix.
- Shifting towards clean and efficient energy end-use for the transport, building, and industry sectors.
- Accessing adaptation funding, including for locally-led action.
- Providing seed and early-stage capital for innovative climate solutions, business models, and technologies to local private sector early-stage ventures and micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs).
- Enabling national and regional financial institutions to access GCF resources, and other green finance, particularly for MSMEs.

Felson then described the Adaptation Fund, explaining that it was established under the Kyoto Protocol with a focus on adaptation. It is financed largely by government and private donors, and a two percent share of proceeds of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) issued under the Kyoto Protocol's CDM projects. It is expected also to receive a share of proceeds once the Article 6.4 mechanism under the Paris Agreement is operational. The Adaptation Fund pioneered direct access, empowering developing countries to access funding and develop projects directly through accredited national implementing entities. The GCF has since adopted this access modality.

Felson said COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh in 2022 agreed to establish a new fund for loss and damage, along with new funding arrangements. It was operationalised in 2023 as an operating entity of the UNFCCC. The fund's mandate includes a focus on addressing loss and damage to assist developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in responding to economic and non-economic loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset event. The details of the fund and the funding arrangements are expected to be further negotiated and developed in the coming years.

Outside of the climate regime, Felson said other funds and financial institutions are also used as channels for the provision and mobilisation of climate finance. These include the Climate Investment Funds, the multilateral development banks, and a mix of regional, bilateral, and national funds. A useful resource for information on a range of these funds can be found [here](#).

On key principles and provisions, Felson listed the following under the UNFCCC:

- Article 3, on CBDR, calling on developed countries to take the lead.
- Article 4, calling on developed countries to provide new and additional financial resources, agreed full incremental costs, and the need for adequacy and predictability.
- Article 11, establishing the Financial Mechanism.


The following principles and provisions of the Kyoto Protocol were highlighted:

- Article 11.2, on developed countries providing agreed full incremental costs.
- Article 12.8, on making available a “share of proceeds” from the CDM, to assist developing countries to meet adaptation costs (as a source for funding for the Adaptation Fund).

The following principles and provisions of the Paris Agreement were highlighted:

- Article 9, stating that developed countries shall provide and take the lead in the mobilisation of financial resources.
- Article 2.1.c, on making finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development pathways.
- Finance-related provisions are also included in Articles 10 (technology), Article 11 (capacity building), Article 13 (transparency of support), Article 14 (GST).
- General support for implementation is included in Articles 4.5, 7.13, 13.14, and 15.

Felson provided the following overview of key climate-related decisions under the UNFCCC:



She said the climate finance architecture under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement is dynamic, with ongoing negotiations and discussions aimed at enhancing the flow of climate finance to developing countries, ensuring that it is adequate, accessible, and effectively used to support ambitious climate action. This includes discussions on the role of public finance, the mobilisation of private finance, and the need for innovative financial instruments and mechanisms to close the significant funding gap for climate action.

The agenda under the UNFCCC reflects the evolution of the climate finance architecture, Felson said, incorporating processes on:

- Long-term Climate Finance
- Reports of the Standing Committee on Finance
- Fifth Biennial Assessment of Climate Finance Flows
- Second Needs Determination Report
- Progress Report on USD100 Billion
- Definitions of Climate Finance
- Arrangements to be concluded between meetings of the COP, CMA, and the Loss and Damage Fund Board
- Seventh Review of the Financial Mechanism
- Report of the GCF
- Report of the GEF
- Report of the Loss and Damage Fund
- Report of the Adaptation Fund
- Ex ante Article 9.5 Reports
- NCQG
- Dialogue for implementing GST outcomes (2024-2028)



Felson said with the deliberations and conclusion of the work of the Ad Hoc Work Programme on NCQG to be finalized at COP29, the further evolution of climate finance will be tested, especially taking into account the continuing tensions on the role of public finance, the role of private sector, the scope of climate finance, and the question of how much gets channeled through the climate regime and in what form.

During the Q&A, participants discussed progress in the NCQG discussions, and the reporting format for finance under the ETF. Felson said the NCQG discussions had not yet reached the point where they are discussing specific elements of the decision, which is expected to be taken later this year. She noted that the final decision on the figure will be a political one, and when that figure lands, it will remain to be seen if it instils confidence for developing countries to take the catalytic action we need to see, with more accountability and assurance related to access to climate finance. She also agreed that innovative sources of funding, for instance from an air passenger levy or from the fossil fuel industry, could supplement public sources of funding.

Loss and Damage and Loss and Damage Finance

Benito Müller, ecpi Director, described the history of the loss and damage negotiations, explaining that the concept of liability and compensation was introduced in a submission by AOSIS when the UNFCCC was being negotiated in 1991. The submission called for an International Insurance Pool to provide financial insurance “*to compensate the most vulnerable small island and low-lying coastal developing countries for loss and damage resulting from sea level rise*” [para 1.5]. The pool was meant to be funded by “industrialized developed countries” according to a formula involving GNP and country emission figures “*modelled on the 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention on Third Party Liability in the field of Nuclear Energy*” [para. 4].

This early reference to liability effectively killed the loss and damage discussion for 16 years, Müller said, making a stand-alone discussion on the topic taboo. The next time loss and damage was referred to in the negotiations was in 2007, when the Bali Action Plan called for enhanced action on adaptation, including consideration of “*Disaster reduction strategies and means to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change*”.


This was followed by a decision, as part of the Cancun Agreements in 2010, to “*establish a work programme in order to consider [...] approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change*”.

Three years later, Müller said, the WIM was established. Two years after that, loss and damage got its own stand-alone Article in the Paris Agreement (Article 8) – although the formulation was somewhat retrograde. The WIM talked about “*addressing*” loss and damage, while Article 8 recognizes “*the importance of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change*”. This implicitly also refers to mitigation (averting) and adaptation (minimizing). Moreover, the Paris cover decision includes a “comfort clause”, stating that the COP “*agrees that Article 8 of the Agreement does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation*”, demonstrating that the spectre of liability was perceived by some, particularly the US, as a live and active problem.

At COP27 in 2022, in Sharm el-Shiekh, a breakthrough decision was adopted, to “*establish a fund for responding to loss and damage whose mandate includes a focus on addressing loss and damage*”. The decision acknowledged the “*urgent and immediate need*” for financial resources to assist particularly vulnerable developing countries “*in responding to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change ... in the context of ongoing and ex post (including rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction) action*”.

Arrangements for the operationalisation of the fund were adopted on the first day of COP28 in 2023, in Dubai. The Board that was established to decide the modalities and governance arrangements for the fund will also be tasked with giving the fund a name. This came as the US, which for decades resisted the entire concept of “loss and damage”, pushed back against references to a “loss and damage fund”. Instead, the US repeatedly referred to the fund as the “climate impact response” fund.

Müller concluded with a short description of the potential approaches that the future fund could take with respect to the kind of activities to support and the disbursement modalities. He said while “avoiding” and “minimising” damage relates to mitigation and adaptation, they should not be the mandate of the fund, disaster relief is already covered under disaster risk reduction, and discussions on reparation will not be acceptable. He proposed instead, focusing on funding activities that relate to recovery, reconstruction, and rehabilitation.



In the discussion that followed, participants addressed: whether climate justice will be served without referencing liability; whether adaptation finance will be diverted to the new fund; the role of innovative finance; and “business unusual” modalities that will allow for easier access to the fund than existing modalities of climate funds.

Key Priorities for AOSIS

Ann Rasmussen, Lead Negotiator for AOSIS, presented on priority issues for AOSIS, expectations for 2024, and interlinkages with other international processes in 2024. On priority issues for AOSIS, she listed the following:

- Recognition of the **special circumstances of SIDS** as a driving principle.
- **Mitigation ambition**, including through: implementing the GST outcomes, in particular the ‘energy package’; timely submission of NDCs in 2025, with adequate ambition to meet the 1.5°C goal; supplementation of capacity for ambitious action through the mitigation and just transition work programmes; and the finance required to make this happen in developing countries, especially in SIDS.
- **Adaptation action**, including by: achieving the GGA with its still-to-be-agreed targets and indicators; enhancing adaptive capacity; and strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability.
- **Loss and damage**, including by strengthening the governance and technical mechanisms under the WIM; integrating the work of the WIM Executive Committee within the broader loss and damage landscape under the Convention (including the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage and the Loss and Damage Fund Board); kick-starting the work of the Santiago Network to catalyse the provision of needed

technical assistance in SIDS; fully operationalising the Loss and Damage Fund; resolving procedural matters quickly to enable the flow of funds from the Fund; and ensuring that allocation and access modalities are tailored to fully meet the needs of SIDS.

- **Finance for implementation**, including by: agreeing on the NCQG for finance that addresses the needs of SIDS over time; earmarking funds for specific needs (e.g., mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage); establishing way points that allow for the assessment of actual funding against the goal and adjustment of the goal to better meet future needs; and ensuring that the existing operating entities under the financial mechanism better serve SIDS and are integrated into the NCQG and its operation.
- **Transparency and accountability**, including by: using existing ETFs under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement to encourage ambition and gauge progress; employing the tools available to allow for a course correction where necessary both for individual Parties and collectively; and utilising the compliance mechanism under the Paris Agreement to full effect.

On expectations for 2024, Rasmussen noted that the year ahead will be challenging, with the inflation of dialogues and work programmes.

On **mitigation ambition and the GST**, she noted that in June 2024, the first annual GST Dialogue will take place to share knowledge on how the GST outcomes are informing NDCs. This will be important for linking the GST outcome with the delivery of new NDCs by early 2025. and championing the importance of strengthened 2030 targets in current and new NDCs with targets that are 1.5°C aligned. An event hosted by the UN Secretary General will convene, where countries will present their NDCs. The troika-endorsed “Road Map to Mission 1.5” process (referred to by Fuller and also referred to as the Brazilian proposal) to enhance international cooperation and stimulate ambition in the next round of NDCs. Finally, the value of the MWP will need to be enhanced, including as a contributor to GST implementation.

On **adaptation**, under the UAE-Belem Work Programme on indicators, AOSIS is supporting the adoption of indicators that SIDS already use at the national and/or regional level, which can be adapted for the GGA Framework targets, with new indicators only to fill gaps. She highlighted the importance of ensuring that the indicators are fit-for-purpose and do not disadvantage SIDS, particularly quantitative indicators. She noted that AOSIS made a submission on the UAE-Belem Work Programme in early April 2024, stating its preferences for: modalities of work; timelines; inputs and outputs; and involvement of stakeholders. She noted that agreeing on these elements by SB60 (June 2024) will be essential to maximize the time available under the Work Programme.

On **loss and damage**, AOSIS is calling for the timely operationalisation of the Loss and Damage Fund, including by: agreeing on the hosting conditions between the World Bank and the Board; agreeing on a host country for the legally independent Board; hiring an Executive Director for the secretariat of the Fund; and finalising the rules of procedure, including agreeing on access and allocation modalities. AOSIS is also asking that the proposed annual High-level Dialogue associated with the funding arrangements include participation by the WIM ExCom and the Santiago Network Advisory Board. She noted that


the third Glasgow Dialogue in June 2024 will provide an opportunity to discuss the new 'landscape' on loss and damage and preparations for the HLD, and that the WIM (including the ExCom and the Santiago Network) will be reviewed at COP29.

On **finance**, Rasmussen highlighted agreement on a NCQG that is fit for purpose for SIDS. She noted that the NCQG process will entail three technical expert dialogues (TEDs), coupled with a working group to develop a framework for a draft negotiating text, with ministerial participation, and an annual dialogue from 2024 to 2028 on implementing the GST outcomes on climate finance. A high-level ministerial dialogue will also be held at CMA6. AOSIS has been calling for the NCQG discussions to reflect the urgency of achieving the Paris Agreement's objectives and its full implementation in this critical decade. This will require substantive scope and quantum to, at a minimum, address what is needed in the near term to ensure that developing countries can effectively implement the Paris Agreement's provision on mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage response, transparency, and readiness. The **timeframe** must allow for sufficient time to assess progress and impact linked to the NCQG, as well as opportunities for any review of the goal's adequacy. Access to, and quality of, climate finance for SIDS would also need to be addressed principally and urgently in the context of the NCQG. On transparency and accountability arrangements, she noted the need for a clear and common understanding on several aspects related to the NCQG, including, most importantly, what finance can and cannot be counted towards achievement of the NCQG.

On **transparency**, she noted that SIDS will submit their first BTRs by the end of 2024, recognising the discretion afforded to SIDS, and taking advantage of the multiple training opportunities offered for reporting tools at COP28. She highlighted the need for SIDS' technical experts to be trained further and to be part of the Roster of Experts for the review of BTRs, including voluntary reviews. She also noted that national Focal Points are responsible for nominating SIDS' experts.

On **interlinkages with other processes**, Rasmussen highlighted the upcoming fourth International Conference on SIDS (SIDS4) in Antigua and Barbuda at the end of May 2024, which will focus on scaling up climate action and support, including climate finance, in its Declaration. Other HLDs which have or are taking place this year prior to COP29 include: the Japan-Brazil Dialogue (February-March 2024); the Copenhagen Ministerial in March 2024; the Petersberg Dialogue in Berlin, in April 2024; special climate events at UNGA79 in September 2024; and other pre-COP ministerial meetings and dialogues later in the year.

She presented the following figure listing key meetings on the road to Baku (March - November 2024):



During the Q&A session, participants discussed: how the outcome of the GST will inform NDCs, given that the GST is a collective stocktake and NDCs are national; the gap between NDCs and actual implementation on the ground, which may render increased ambition in NDCs meaningless; and how the new negotiators can build up their capacity to provide support to the AOSIS team.

Mechanics of Negotiations

Kishan Kumarsingh provided an overview of working modalities under the UNFCCC. He noted that official documents are issued under a masthead bearing the UN and UNFCCC logos, with a document symbol (such as FCCC/SBI/2023/L.6/Add.1). The first part of the symbol denotes it is a UNFCCC document. The second designates the relevant Convention Body (for example, “CP” for the COP, “SBI” or “SBSTA” for one of the subsidiary bodies, or “SB” for documents prepared for both subsidiary bodies), followed by the year in which the document was prepared. The suffixes that follow denote the following:

- /INF denotes Information documents. These documents are not translated, are available in the original language of issue for general distribution, and are often prepared by the Secretariat
- /MISC denotes Miscellaneous documents. These documents are not translated, are issued on plain paper with no UN masthead, and are available for general distribution. In the UNFCCC process, submissions by Parties are normally issued as Miscellaneous documents.
- /Add. indicates an addition of text to the main document. The distribution category depends on the parent document.
- /Rev. indicates new text (Revision) superseding and replacing that of a previously issued document.
- /Corr. denotes corrigendum documents. It indicates modification of any specific part of an existing document to correct errors, revise wording or reorganise text, whether for substantive or technical reasons. The language of availability and scope of circulation depends on the parent document.
- /TP denotes technical papers.
- /L denotes limited distribution documents. They are usually translated. The distribution in hard copy is limited to those likely to be immediately interested in the work of the body concerned (however, these documents are usually available on the Secretariat website).

- Conference Room Papers (CRPs) are a category of in-session documents containing new proposals or outcomes of in-session work for use only during the session. The distribution in hard copy is limited to those likely to be immediately interested in the work of the body concerned (however, these documents are usually available on the Secretariat website).
- Nonpapers are unofficial papers. These are often used as proposals by Parties as a compromise. In-session documents are made available informally to facilitate negotiations.
- COP Decisions, recommendations, and resolutions are contained in the second part of COP reports, while the first part of the report contains a summary of the proceedings of the session.

Pre-session documents are available before the meeting, usually in all six official UN languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, Spanish). Post-session documents, normally the reports of a session, are also available in all six official UN languages. In-session documents are available only during meetings (CRPs, L documents, or MISC documents). While L documents are normally translated, CRPs and MISC documents are available only in the original language of issue.

On **Rules of Procedure**, Kumarsingh said the UNFCCC's draft rules of procedure contained in document FCCC/CP/1996/2 address several important issues for the conduct of business: the agenda, quorum, functions of the presiding officer, submission of proposals, motions, and decision-making. However, they were never adopted because of disagreements over Rule 42, which is related to voting. Despite this, Parties to the UNFCCC have agreed to apply the other rules in meetings held under the climate change process.

The provisional agenda of each session of the COP, CMP, and CMA is prepared by the Secretariat in agreement with the COP President. The provisional agenda of each session of the SBs is similarly prepared in agreement with the Chairs of those bodies. When adopting its agenda, each body may decide to add, delete, defer, or amend items. Sometimes during the adoption of the agenda, Parties disagree on the inclusion of an item in the agenda. Such disagreements often lead to procedural blockage, and the item is normally held in abeyance pending further consultations. This allows the work to continue while the presiding officer holds consultations. If, by the final plenary meeting, the presiding officer has been unable to find consensus on the item, the common practice is for the presiding officer to propose to the session that the item be included in the provisional agenda of the next session in accordance with Rules 10(c) and 16 of the draft rules of procedure. The item is subsequently included in the provisional agenda of the next session with an appropriate footnote. Kumarsingh then described the institutional structure, saying the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, and Paris Agreement establish the standard institutional arrangements for the climate change intergovernmental process:

- A **supreme governing body** – Conference of Parties or COP to the UNFCCC, Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), and Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA).
- Two permanent **Subsidiary Bodies** – the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) – as well as

other subsidiary bodies established by the COP, the CMP or the CMA, such as Ad Hoc Working Groups, as deemed necessary to address specific issues.

- A **Bureau** for the COP, CMP, and CMA, to manage the process for each body.
- The **UNFCCC Secretariat**.

Collectively, these institutions participate in the process of the development of policies and guidance to support Parties on implementation of the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement.

On the organisation of work, he described the following negotiating forums:

- **Plenary meetings** of the COP, CMP, CMA, and the SBs are the formal forums for discussion and decision-making by Parties. Plenary meetings are open to participation by all Parties, observer States and organizations, the media, and other participants registered for the climate change sessions. Negotiations on key issues rarely take place in plenary meetings. These are conducted in smaller, less formal fora, such as contact groups and informal consultations. Plenary meetings provide Parties with the forum to make general statements on items on the agenda of the meeting.
- **Contact groups** are established to conduct negotiations on specific agenda items, with the aim of achieving an agreed outcome. They are established through a decision by the COP, CMP, CMA, or SBs, based on a proposal by the President, Chair of the SB, or a Party. Contact groups are open-ended, open to participation by all Parties. Representatives of observer organizations may be invited to attend any open-ended contact group, unless one third of the Parties present at the session object, and on the understanding that the presiding officer of the contact group may determine at any time that the contact group should be closed to observer organizations.
- **Informal consultations** are convened by the President or Chair of a SB or contact group. The presiding officer normally invites a delegate to undertake consultations on a particular issue and report to him or her on the outcome of these consultations, which may take the form of bilateral consultations, open-ended meetings, or a combination of both. The discussions in both contact groups and informal consultations are conducted, and documents are available, only in English.
- **Friends of the Chair** are convened by presiding officers to advance negotiations on particularly difficult and politically sensitive issues. A limited number of Parties are invited to participate in these closed meetings, usually chaired by the presiding officer. Only invited delegates attend, no formal rules are applied, and the conduct of business is entirely at the discretion of the chair.
- **Informal informals** (also referred to as drafting groups or spin off groups) have been used to troubleshoot a specific problematic issue or advance negotiations on contentious issues, for instance drafting a specific section of text or resolving a specific problem. These informal informals are established with the agreement of the group or under the presiding officer's own responsibility. The presiding officer may request a delegate to facilitate such meetings, which may be open-ended or limited only to those delegates invited to participate. Smaller group meetings are not advertised and observers are not permitted to attend.
- **Points of order** are interventions directed to the presiding officer, requesting him or her to use certain powers inherent in his or her office or vested in him or her by

the rules of procedure. A point of order may relate to: the manner in which debate is being conducted; the maintenance of order in the meeting; compliance with the rules of procedure; or the manner in which the presiding officer is exercising the powers conferred on him by the rules of procedure. Rule 34 of the draft rules of procedure provides that a representative may at any time raise a point of order during the discussion of any matter. The presiding officer is required to decide immediately on the point of order. A representative may appeal against the ruling of the presiding officer. Such an appeal shall be immediately put to a vote and the presiding officer's ruling shall stand unless overruled by the majority of the Parties present and voting. A point of order has precedence over any other matter including the procedural motions specified in Rule 38 of the draft rules of procedure being applied. Points of order are also distinct from procedural motions in one important respect: they involve issues requiring an immediate ruling by the presiding officer, subject to possible appeal.

Kumarsingh noted that the text of a decision or conclusions evolves through various versions and revisions during a negotiation process. A draft outcome text (draft decision/conclusions) is normally prepared by the Secretariat and forms the basis on which Parties negotiate. Once a text enters negotiations, individual Parties or negotiating groups offer their proposed revisions. Much of this takes place through oral interventions by delegations from the floor. More complex amendments or proposals by negotiating groups are often submitted in writing.

Sometimes, in order to bridge differences, the President, Chair, or facilitator prepares and presents a compromise text, using his or her political authority to persuade delegates to accept the text without much revision and move forward. This is known as the President's, Chair's, or Chairs' text and may include brackets. Brackets are used to denote text that are usually proposals from Parties for which there is no agreement but that remain on the table.

Kumarsingh pointed participants to the [Guide for Presiding Officers](#) as a source of additional information.

During the discussion that followed, participants discussed how issues are allocated to the SBI and SBSTA, and why the rules of procedure have not yet been adopted.

Preparing for Negotiations

In the second part of his presentation, Kumarsingh advised participants to prepare for the negotiations by seeking clarity on the following questions:

- What issues am I covering? (impossible to cover all issues).
- What documentation do I need?
- Which regional group meetings do I need to attend?
- Do I know the time and place of meetings? (usually posted on CCTVs around the venue).
- Do I need to speak to anyone in the regional groups regarding linkages with other issues and areas of concern?

He then advised participants on making an intervention, saying they would have to first request the floor – either through an electronic system (if in plenary) or by manually

turning up the country flag (in smaller contact groups). When called upon to speak, he urged them to be focused, polite, to the point, and diplomatic, while speaking in measured tones for the sake of the translators.



He advised participants to begin with a brief salutation to the presiding officer (which may not be necessary when time is short), followed by associating themselves to their negotiating group, or indicating who they are speaking on behalf of. For instance: “[My country] at the outset associates itself with the statement made by the distinguished delegate of XXX, on behalf of YYY”.

Even when countering a position, he advised diplomatic language along the lines of “My country xxx would like to bring clarification to what appears to be a clear misunderstanding of the issue raised by YYY”. He advised convincing listeners that the position presented is reasonable and acceptable, for instance by saying “Mr. Chairman, we believe that our proposal is reasonable and we urge all Parties to consider it in the spirit of compromise”. He cautioned against being terse, caustic, or flattering.

He further advised participants to:

- Take time to gain knowledge of the issue under negotiation.
- Listen attentively to the views of other Parties, to be able to engage rather than repeat prepared statements or positions.
- Be respectful of negotiating partners.
- Demonstrate patience and avoid signs of frustration. Negotiations are long and require compromise, and agreement may be elusive. He said filibustering is part of the negotiation strategy and may be necessary to buy time to get instructions or clarifications from the group or capital.
- Be politely assertive and overcome fears of taking the floor.
- Build informal consensus by speaking to other delegations, to build trust and avoid distrust.

- Know the lingo and the use and effect of words.
- Be aware of negotiating tricks (unnecessary flattery, being told the issue is covered under another agenda item, threats of hostage taking, suggestion that your position is inconsistent with that of your group).
- Seek common ground as far as possible and assess wiggle room of negotiating partners to see if there is room for negotiation. This can be revealed through the use of certain words like “we are open to the consideration of...” etc.
- Assess the positive aspects of the discussions and use them to your advantage – weave it back and use as leveraging.
- Don’t succumb to pressure and compromise.
- Know your bottom line and the right time for discussions on trade-offs.
- Ensure your views are recorded, even if bracketed.
- Be aware of all the discussions on your issue – contact groups, informal informal, Friends of the Chair, etc. To be involved in or at least aware of all the discussions requires stamina; be prepared for the long haul.
- Try to follow the issues beyond the meeting, where applicable.

Mock Negotiations

On the third and final day of the Conference, the trainees came prepared to negotiate on a fictional agenda item: an AOSIS proposal for a specialised window or sub-goal for loss and damage funding under the NCQG.

The trainees were split into four groups with divergent views on the NCQG and loss and damage – US, AOSIS, Africa Group of Negotiators, and the EU. They were asked to familiarise themselves with the positions of these groups through reading their official submissions to the UNFCCC and prepare negotiating positions, including red lines and areas of compromise and flexibility, against the presentations on negotiating mechanics and tips. Each group was assigned a “coach”, one of the resource persons, to help them prepare.

The mock negotiations took the form of a contact group which was opened by the Chair, whose role was played by one of the resource persons, with other resource persons assuming the role of the UNFCCC Secretariat.

The negotiations opened with statements after which a draft decision text was prepared and negotiated. This afforded trainees the opportunity to move from formal negotiations to informal informals, and group discussions and negotiations in an effort to reconcile differences and arrive at consensus. The format also provided the opportunity for the trainees to participate in the various modes of negotiations – formal contact group, informal informal, and line-by-line text negotiations.

At the conclusion of the session, observations were shared by the resource persons on the conduct of the mock negotiations, including use of language, interventions, negotiating strategy, and negotiating diplomacy.

Feedback

Following the conclusion of the Workshop, participants commented positively on the substance, information provided, and format, saying it was engaging, well-structured, and well-managed. They also made the following comments:

- Based on the breadth of information on climate change, “the facilitators did a commendable job in their presentations”.
- Outlining the various topics negotiated at COP, including SIDS’ views was valuable.
- Providing an overview of the negotiating process and “dos and don'ts” prior to the mock negotiating session was helpful.
- As some presentations were “quite heavy”, it was useful to receive the presentations to be able to go back and review the information.
- The sessions helped to “demystify the process and procedure of climate negotiations”.
- The in-person setting provided a relaxed atmosphere and made it easier to communicate with the presenters and peers.
- Technical problems affected those who were participating virtually and limited Wi-Fi connectivity was an issue.
- Convening the Workshop at the resort where we were staying was beneficial, and enabled participants and presenters to mingle and “forge meaningful connections”.
- The insights gained will undoubtedly strengthen our capacity to advocate for meaningful climate action and contribute to global efforts to combat climate change

Based on the comments of Workshop participants, the mock negotiations:

- reinforced aspects of the negotiation process;
- addressed negotiation tactics;
- provided a “real-life view of how the COP negotiations are formatted and conducted”;
- instilled confidence to be more engaged in the process;
- enabled the application of the theoretical knowledge gained in a practical environment;
- were “very eye opening and extremely useful, especially heading into COP, as I was never exposed to the intricacies of the process and I now have a better appreciation for it”; and
- were valuable as “you can’t get all of those skills by reading”.

Looking forward, participants:

- hoped for more in-person participation at the next workshop;
- suggested specialised editions, which could be virtual, to hone in on the specificities of the issues under negotiation and which are of particular interest;
- suggested considering the creation of a network of young negotiators to allow for more cross-collaboration not only within the region, but also with young negotiators from other AOSIS regions and other negotiating groups; and
- looked forward to follow-up trainings where “a cohort can be adequately groomed for active participation in negotiations on behalf of our respective countries”.