

# Climate Solidarity Alliance

## SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS

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Revised April 2026

This Note summarises a series of *Oxford Climate Policy Blog* posts advocating the formation of a [Climate Solidarity Alliance](#) (CSA) as a means of generating innovative and additional funding, in particular for climate-related loss and damage.

The CSA is envisioned as a partnership of national and inter-/[sub-national actors](#) willing to show solidarity with the poorest and most vulnerable to help them deal with climate change. A bottom-up voluntary partnership approach is chosen to enable immediate action and to sidestep the complexities of international agreements. The main elements of the proposed CSA are:

- (i) national **Climate Solidarity Trust Funds** (CSTFs) with Loss and Damage (L&D) and/or Adaptation windows designed to finance responses to loss and damage from climate change and resilience building. Having such dedicated domestic funding instruments has proven to be key to designing national responses to problems such as adverse climate impacts. The [Fund to Respond to Loss and Damage](#) (FRLD) and the [Adaptation Fund](#) (AF) would be ideally placed to support the establishment of and provide standards for such national trust funds. How they are to be sourced would be nationally determined, but the use of [Climate Solidarity Levies](#) (CSLs) – as advocated by the [Global Solidarity Levies Taskforce](#) – should be encouraged;
- (ii) a **Solidarity Bonus Mechanism** (SBM) under which eligible developing country CSA partners that contribute voluntarily to the FRLD (or the AF) would receive the contributed amount along with a solidarity bonus from the solidarity providing CSA partners as bilateral (North-South or South-South) SBM payments, thus incentivising their participation. The proposed SBM could be operationalised through what might be called a CSA ‘**Solidarity Exchange**’, that is a platform on which eligible CSA partners can advertise their intention to contribute to an eligible multilateral climate fund, and CSA solidarity providers could indicate whether they will be providing a bonus-compensation for (a share of) the advertised proposed contribution. For example, Fiji could advertise being willing to contribute €2m to the FRLD, and a CSA solidarity provider (a country like Australia the UK or France, or sub-/inter-national one, like a faith-based organisation) could indicate their willingness to cover half of that contribution under the SBM, i.e. they would pay €1m to the Fijian CSTF (e.g. Fiji’s *Climate Relocation of Communities Trust Fund*, for more on this click [here](#)) plus the applicable bonus. Fiji could then decide to contribute only the €1m covered by the said solidarity provider, or contribute the full €2m to the FRLD whether or not the rest is covered by a solidarity trade. All totally voluntary and under the fiscal sovereignty of the relevant CSA members.

The proposed CSA is to complement other initiatives regarding innovative sources – such as the [Global Solidarity Levies Taskforce](#) (Taskforce) – by voluntarily *acting now* (without the need for a multilateral agreement). Indeed, the CSA could provide a solidarity mechanism for Taskforce members, but importantly the proposed CSA is meant to be open to all countries, regardless of whether they choose to adopt a domestic solidarity levy or not.

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# Origin, Similarities & Differences

## Origin

In 2005 Presidents Chirac of France and Lula da Silva of Brazil proposed a *solidarity tax on airplane tickets* to help finance the fight against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria in severely affected countries. It was implemented by France in 2006 as an innovative funding source for [UNITAID](#), a drug-purchasing organization created at the same time by Brazil, Chile, France, Norway and the United Kingdom and hosted by the World Health Organization.

## Similarities

Being a voluntary bottom-up partnership, the CSA mirrors the Lula-Chirac proposal with the AF and the FRLD taking the role of UNITAID as multilateral solidarity provider, in this case for building climate resilience and responding to climate change induced loss and damage.

## Differences

- a) **Solidarity Revenue Sources.** While the Lula-Chirac proposal was focused on a single source of nationally collected revenue (the air-ticket tax), the national (or sub-national) revenue sources for the CSA are (sub-) nationally determined (i.e. not restricted to a particular type of source).
- b) **National Climate Solidarity Trust Funds.** Moreover, in addition to distributing solidarity through multilateral channels (such as the FRLD and the AF), the CSA also uses bilateral channels (the Solidarity Bonus Mechanism) between its partners to incentivize participation in the CSA particularly of poor and vulnerable countries. It is absolutely key that these countries are being incentivized to address adaptation and L&D domestically here and now. This is particularly the case for responding to loss and damage where the relevant government is ultimately responsible to provide response
- c) **Sub-national and International Participation.** Whereas the UNITAID scheme only involved national contributions, it is envisaged that the CSA could also have sub-national and indeed international partners. Sub-national partners are of particular interest in cases where a national partnering is out of the question – such as in the US in the current circumstances (for more, see [here](#)). International bodies, such as regional economic cooperation organisations (e.g. the Pacific Island forum Secretariat for the AP and CARICOM for the LAC collaboration discussed in the Roadmap Submission appended below) or faith-based networks could also participate as solidarity and/or administrative services providers
- d) **(Regional) Sub-Alliances.** CSA partners can decide to form sub-Alliances, such as the one described in the next section [p.3], or the one mentioned in the appended Submission to the Baku-to-Belem Roadmap [p.7].

# Regional Asia-Pacific CSA

It has become abundantly clear that Loss & Damage (L&D) due to adverse climate change impacts must be addressed *now*. This is particularly the case for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) who are among the most vulnerable to L&D, some of which have already domestic L&D response measures.

The proposed Climate Solidarity Alliance (CSA) is a voluntary partnership between countries that wish to support these national efforts as well as the multilateral activities of the UNFCCC/Paris Agreement *Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage* (FRLD). The proposed CSA is a multinational partnership aimed at providing innovative financial support to respond to L&D, in particular for the most vulnerable countries and communities. It is based on two key elements:

- a. all partners that are deemed eligible to receive support must have a domestic *Climate Solidarity Trust Fund*, with a L&D window, and
- b. a specific *Solidarity Bonus Mechanism* (SBM) used to distribute solidarity payments between CSA partners (thus creating an incentive for joining the CSA), and beyond (through the FRLD).

The CSA is meant to be open to all countries, yet there could be regional cooperation between partners. How could such a collaboration could work for the Asia-Pacific (AP) region?

There are Pacific Small Island States (PSIDS) who already have domestic funds that fulfil (a) and that are thus ‘CSA-ready’. For example, Fiji has the *Climate Relocation of Communities Trust Fund* (see Addendum A), and there is quite a number of PSIDS that have a national climate trust fund that could potentially serve as domestic Climate Solidarity Trust Funds (Addendum B).

To explain the workings of the proposed SBM, consider the following AP collaboration: Fiji offers to make a (totally voluntary) contribution of €2 million to the FRLD. Australia could in return offer to pay-back this contribution with an additional *solidarity bonus* (e.g. +50%) directly to the Fiji Climate Relocation of Communities Trust Fund.<sup>1</sup>

*The Pacific Island Forum Secretariat* (PIFS) could provide a platform for such SBM ‘solidarity exchanges’ with its members. Indeed, the PIFS could set up a ‘CSA Readiness Programme’ (say with the support from the FRLD) not only for itself (to set up such a solidarity exchange platform) but for its members to set up national Climate Solidarity Trust Funds to become CSA-ready..

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<sup>1</sup> If no CSA partner offers to cover the FRLD contribution offered by Fiji, then it is up to Fiji to make the contribution anyway or not.

## Addendum A: The Fiji Climate Relocation of Communities Trust Fund

In 2019 Fiji introduced a national [Climate Relocation of Communities Trust Fund](#) as financing mechanism for its National Planned Relocation Arrangements, as recently described in a [submission to the L&D Transitional Committee](#) (TCS). The Trust Fund allows for funding from an array of domestic, private, international, and bilateral sources.

The Trust Fund has been established to operate as a multi-donor trust fund. Funding accrued through different domestic and international sources, mechanisms, facilities, and donors will be pooled and used in the aggregate for the support of planned relocation activities defined by the Climate Relocation of Communities Trust Fund Act (2019), and the Climate Change Act (2021). The Fund has been designed to leverage financing from a range of different domestic revenue-raising mechanisms such as levies, or taxes.

One of these domestic sources is the Fiji Environment & Climate Adaptation Levy (ECAL), which charges 5% on the gross annual turnover of a number of prescribed services (listed in Table 3). While the Fiji government will contribute 3% of the ECAL revenue, i.e. approx USD 3.6m,[3] to the Fund, “additional international and bilateral contributions are now required to take the initiative to scale.”[TCS, p.9]

Clearly the Fiji Fund satisfies all the hallmarks of a national L&DF and the ECAL contribution could very naturally be extended with an air ticket Climate Solidarity Levy providing direct additional domestic, and as part of a CSA leveraging international funding for loss and damage in Fiji. For example, a (modest) CSL levy of USD 5 per air passenger would currently raise around USD 6.5m[4] which, when contributed to the multilateral LAFD in the context of a CSA, would yield USD 13m annually (assuming a 2-fold solidarity multiplier).

### Services subject to the ECAL:

No	Service provider	Services subject to ECAL
1	Licensed hotels	Accommodation, refreshments, and <i>any other</i> services.
2	Tourist vessels operating within Fiji waters	Accommodation, refreshments, and <i>any other</i> services provided on board.
3	Licensed bars	Meals, beverages, and any other services provided in a licensed bar. This includes licensed bars located, for example, in private clubs.
4	Licensed Nightclub	Services such as music, dancing or other entertainment including other services
5	Inbound tour operators	Travel, tour and sight-seeing services.
6	Organizers of entertainment programs /product exhibitions	Entry fees to the events venue.
7	Recreational Activity operators	Recreational activities provided by these operators e.g. Skydiving
8	Cinema Operators	Entry fees and all services provided within the cinema premises.
9	Licensed Rental/hire car operators	With effect from 01/01/15 any hire of chauffeur driven motor vehicles
10	Bistros and coffee shops	Meals, beverages, and other services.
11	Licensed Restaurants	Meals, beverages, and other services.
12	Aircraft operators	This applies to charter flight services except for charter flights for medical or natural disaster relief evacuations services are not subject to STT and ECAL.
13	Water sports operators	All water sports activities including river safaris.
14	Home stay operators	Accommodation and other services provided in a private residence or property that accommodates tourists, international students or overseas visitors who are paying guests. It does not apply to hostels/accommodation operated by public educational institutions.
15	Unlicensed service operators	If a service provider is not licensed but meets the registration requirements and, it will be required to register and charge ECAL on the services provided.

## Addendum B: Other PSIDS with national climate trust funds

**Kiribati:** [Kiribati Special Environment Fund](#), aimed at supporting the government of Kiribati in addressing severe climate change impacts and strengthening sustainable environmental management. The KEF Development Project is currently supported by the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) to establish the legal, financial, and operational framework for this fund, with active recruitment and development occurring into 2026

**Papua New Guinea:** PNG has established the [PNG Biodiversity and Climate Fund](#) (PNG BCF) to manage local conservation and climate resilience efforts, serving as a channel for both international and local funds.

**RMI:** [Marshall Islands Resilience and Adaptation \(MIRA\) Trust Fund](#) seeking to provide sustainable, nationally managed financing for climate change resilience, adaptation, and mitigation. It represents a long-term commitment by the RMI to protect its people, ecosystems, and economy from the escalating impacts of climate change.

**Samoa:** The [Samoa Loss and Damage Fund \(SLDF\)](#) is designed to move Samoa “beyond just discussions” into implementing loss and damage responses.

**Tonga:** The [Tonga Climate Change Trust Fund](#) provides supplementary financial support to both pipeline and current adaptation and mitigation efforts

**Tuvalu:** The Tuvalu Trust Fund has two components/offshoots: a) [Tuvalu Survival Fund](#) (TSF) for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of public infrastructure following extreme weather events and b) a community-based fund (with a similar investment structure).

**Vanuatu:** is developing their own national loss and damage fund. The Vanuatu [Loss & Damage Policy and Implementation Roadmap](#) sets out a national framework for responding to the escalating harms caused by climate change, and the government presents it as one of the first standalone national policies of its kind. Launched in **2025**, the policy is intended to guide both Vanuatu’s international commitments and practical action on the ground. It defines loss and damage broadly and places it within a wider climate response framework that links *mitigation, adaptation, disaster risk reduction, humanitarian action, and long-term recovery*.

The policy is organized around 11 thematic areas: governance; assessment of loss and damage; programmatic responses; economic and non-economic loss; extreme, rapid- and slow-onset events; locally led action and traditional knowledge; displacement, relocation and human mobility; uncertainty, tipping points and future risks; climate justice, human rights and international legal obligations; finance and means of implementation; and international engagement and advocacy.

Overall, the policy is designed to help Vanuatu move from fragmented climate impact responses toward a more coherent national system that recognizes both immediate and long-term harms, centers communities and customary knowledge, identifies capacity gaps and research priorities, and strengthens the country’s case for international support and justice.

# Oxford Climate Policy submission to the “Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3t”

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Submitted: 8 September 2025

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This Submission by [Oxford Climate Policy](#)<sup>2</sup> (admitted NGO observer organisation) in response to the request for submissions issued in [the message of 6 August 2025](#) (Reference: MOI/MTP/O/BtB Roadmap) from the Presidencies of the 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> sessions of the CMA on the “Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3t”. It addresses the third question posed in the message:

- *What other experiences, proposals or approaches could help inform and accelerate efforts to mobilize USD 1.3 trillion in financing, including through grants, non-debt creating instruments, new sources of finance, and strategies to create fiscal space?*

The idea of a ***Climate Solidarity Alliance*** (CSA) is based on a tried and tested solidarity mechanism proposed in 2005 by Presidents Chirac (France) and Lula (Brazil)<sup>3</sup> to provide support for the fight against HIV/AIDS. The CSA provides a simple, practical way in which national (and sub-national) agents can work together ***right now*** to show solidarity by providing innovative funding to the victims of today’s ‘pandemic’: Loss and Damage from adverse climate impacts.

The idea of the regional CSA collaboration introduced in the Submission arose from a meeting by Mr [John Simpson](#) CBE (BBC News, world affairs editor) and Prof [Benito Müller](#) (Managing Director, Oxford Climate Policy) with H.E. Ambassador [Antonio Patriota](#) (Brazilian Ambassador to the UK). Other regional collaborations could be envisaged, particularly with Pacific Small Island Developing States or African countries.

Appended to the Submission is some additional material on the idea of a Climate Solidarity Alliance.

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<sup>3</sup> For more on the history click [here](#).



## OCP Baku to Belém Roadmap Submission on a CSA LAC Collaboration

It has become abundantly clear that Loss & Damage (L&D) due to adverse climate change impacts have to be addressed now. This is particularly the case for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) who are among the most vulnerable to L&D, some of which have already domestic L&D response measures.

The proposed Climate Solidarity Alliance (CSA) is a voluntary partnership between countries that wish to support these national efforts as well as the multilateral activities of the UNFCCC/Paris Agreement [Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage](#) (FRLD). While the CSA is meant to be open to all countries, there could be regional cooperation between partners. This Note is to sketch how such a collaboration could work for Latin America and the Caribbean.

The proposed CSA is a multinational partnership aimed at providing innovative financial support to respond to L&D, in particular for the most vulnerable countries and communities. It is based on two key elements:

- c. all partners that are deemed eligible to receive support must have a domestic *Climate Solidarity Trust Fund*, with a L&D window<sup>[1]</sup>, and
- d. a specific *Solidarity Bonus Mechanism* (SBM) used to distribute solidarity payments between CSA partners (thus creating an incentive for joining the CSA), and beyond (through the FRLD).

There are CARICOM members who already have domestic funds that fulfil (a) and are thus ‘CSA-ready’. For example, Antigua and Barbuda, has a *Climate Resilience and Development Fund* (see Addendum 1), and Barbados, a *Resilience and Regeneration Fund* (Addendum 2).

To explain the workings of the proposed SBM, consider the following GRULAC collaboration: Antigua and Barbuda offers to make a (totally voluntary) contribution of EC\$ 2 million to the FRLD. Brazil could in return offer to pay-back this contribution with an additional solidarity bonus directly to the A&B Climate Resilience and Development Fund.

CARICOM could provide a platform for such SBM ‘solidarity exchanges’ with its members. Indeed, the CARICOM Secretariat could set up a ‘CSA Readiness Programme’ (say with the support from the FRLD) not only for itself (to set up such a solidarity exchange platform) but for its members to set up national Climate Solidarity Trust Funds to become CSA-ready.

## Addendum 1: Antigua and Barbuda Climate Resilience & Development Fund

The Antigua and Barbuda [Finance Administration \(Climate Resilience and Development Fund\) Regulations](#) – published in the Official Gazette Vol. XLIII No. 66 on 23 November 2023 – establish a Climate Resilience and Development Fund (CRDF).

The CRDF is financed by:

Monies collected as the Tourism Guest Levy, as established in the Tourism Guest Levy Act No. 13 of 2021. The CRDF serves as the instrument for the collection of this levy.

A portion of the additional Revenue Recovery Charge collected by the Customs and Excise Department.

Any other source as may be determined by the Cabinet.

According to Paragraph 7(4), the monies collected in the CRDF shall be used to:

- (A) finance projects and programmes that will build climate resilience.
- (B) provide a buffer for public finances in times of natural disasters.
- (C) fund development projects.
- (D) provide co-financing for projects funded by multilateral agencies and international development partners.

Additionally, the CRDF Committee is responsible for ensuring that at least 10 per cent of the amounts collected in the CRDF annually is allocated for fiscal contingency.

Assuming that L&D is covered by purpose (B), the CRDF fulfils the requirement for being a national Climate Solidarity Trust Fund, thus making Antigua and Barbuda CSA-ready.

## Addendum 2: Barbados Resilience and Regeneration Fund

The Barbados Resilience and Regeneration Fund (RRF), previously known as the Catastrophe Fund, is a new fund established by the government to strengthen disaster mitigation, response, and regeneration efforts. The fund has been renamed and repurposed with expanded functionality and additional financing. Contribution rates to the fund have increased, with a new contribution rate of 0.25% for employers and an increase from 0.1% to 0.25% for self-employed persons and employees, to support the fund's expanded role (see Addendum 2).

The RRF encompassing disaster mitigation, response, and regeneration activities, is part of Barbados' broader efforts to strengthen climate resilience and integrate climate concerns into public financial management.


It is, in particular, designed to provide resources for preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters, thus making it suitable as a Climate Solidarity Trust Fund, and therewith Barbados CSA-ready.

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[1] That is to say, with a sub-division dedicated to funding response to climate induced losses and damages.

## Appendix: Relevant OCP/ecbi News Items

### [ecbi Director speaks at SciencesPo on Climate Solidarity Levies and Alliance](#)



#### HOW TO OPEN A LOSS & DAMAGE WINDOW INTO THE FRENCH SOLIDARITY FUND ?



On 12 February, ecbi Director Benito Müller made a [presentation on Climate Solidarity Levies and Alliance](#) at the Center for International Studies at Sciences Po in Paris, France. He spoke about the Climate Solidarity Alliance (CSA) proposal, which seeks to create a coalition of national and sub-national actors willing to implement Climate Solidarity Levies (CLAs). Modelled on the French air ticket solidarity tax originally proposed by French President Chirac and Brazilian President Lula in 2005, the levies would seek to generate innovative funding for addressing climate-induced loss and damage, domestically and through the recently established multilateral [Fund for responding to Loss and Damage](#).

These levies are meant to be easily collectable and allocated both domestically and internationally, with a payback multiplier solidarity mechanism incentivising multilateral contributions from developing countries. Müller explained

that all CSA members would be expected to set up national Climate Solidarity Funds to channel Loss and Damage funding, mentioning, as an example, [Fiji's Climate Relocation of Communities Trust Fund](#), and raise funds by collecting such solidarity levies. He added that if a developing country CSA member, say Fiji, chooses to contribute voluntarily to the multilateral Fund, then developed country members would repay that sum directly into the Fiji Fund, with a solidarity bonus to reward Fiji's multilateral solidarity contribution. For more on the envisaged workings of the solidarity pay-back scheme, see [The Functions and Responsibilities of a Climate Solidarity Alliance & the Varieties of its Membership](#).

Given that the French air ticket solidarity tax has raised substantial revenue – EUR 370 million in 2023 alone (with no discernible impact on air traffic or tourism) – and is collected in the Solidarity Fund for Development managed by the French Development Agency, Müller said all the tools to become a founding member of the proposed Climate Solidarity Alliance are already in place. Thus, the only thing required would be to make loss and damage eligible for funding through the Solidarity Fund for Development, which already contributes to the Green Climate Fund of the Paris Agreement.

Müller also described the way forward – as proposed in [Founding the Climate Solidarity Alliance: Possible Next Steps](#) – as building on the original 2005 collaboration between France and Brazil. He cited French leadership in international climate finance, exemplified by its co-chairing of not only the [Global Solidarity Levies Taskforce](#), but also the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage. He underscored the aim of launching the CSA at COP30 in Belém, Brazil, which will also mark the 10th anniversary of the adoption of the Paris Agreement.

Alan Anic, Oxfam France, also spoke during the event, providing more details about [how to open a loss and damage window into the French Solidarity Fund](#). During his presentation, Anic reviewed the history and evolution of France's Solidarity Fund for Development (FSD) and how it functions, noting the Fund has provided a manner through which France can fulfil its international commitments and must, in the future, include loss and damage. He also discussed ways to increase the allocation of taxes for the Fund to increase its budget.

## **Pakistan: a Climate Solidarity Alliance Case Study**

by Malik Amin Aslam Khan and Benito Müller

This post by Mr Khan, former Pakistan Minister of Climate Change, and ecbi Director Prof Müller aims to explain how (a prompt launch of) a Climate Solidarity Alliance would fit in very well with efforts of developing countries, such as Pakistan, in combatting climate change and its adverse impacts. A ‘Bridgetown Postscript’ to the post looks at the welcoming address by Prime Minister Mia Motley to the participants of the fifth meeting of the Board of the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage on 9 April in Bridgetown, Barbados

## **How US Cities and States can lead on climate action under a second Trump Administration**

by Michael Franczak, Research Fellow in the Division of Peace, Climate, and Sustainable Development at the [International Peace Institute](#)

The COP29 climate talks in Baku highlighted the need for innovative financing mechanisms, with the Global Solidarity Levies (CSLs) Task Force proposing levies on aviation, shipping, and wealth to address funding gaps. A recent note by Oxford Climate Policy and the International Peace Institute outlines how American cities like New York and Los Angeles could implement CSLs, targeting high-traffic hubs such as airports, ports, and cruise terminals. While these measures could generate nearly USD 458 million annually for climate finance, their success hinges on overcoming legal, political, and public opinion challenges and leveraging state and municipal climate leadership.

## **The Functions and Responsibilities of a Climate Solidarity Alliance & the Varieties of its Membership**

Climate Solidarity Alliance membership presupposes the establishment of national Climate Solidarity Trust Funds (CSTFs) to respond to climate loss and damage domestically as well as internationally, say through the multilateral [Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage](#) (FRLD). These national Trust Funds, in turn, are meant to be sourced by domestic [Climate Solidarity Levies](#) (CSLs). At the same time, they can serve as National Funding Entities for loss and damage, which can receive contributions from multilateral climate funds, bilateral donor agencies, philanthropic organisations, and private sector entities, among others.

The Alliance would allow for national and sub-national members from both developing and developed countries to have different functions and responsibilities. This post proposes a way in which these functions and responsibilities could be set up.

## **Founding the Climate Solidarity Alliance: Possible Next Steps**

The Climate Solidarity Alliance (CSA) proposal is to establish an alliance of (national and sub-national) actors that are able and willing to introduce a Climate Solidarity Levy (CSL) earmarked as an innovative source of funding for responding to loss and damage from adverse climate impacts, in particular through the new multilateral Fund for Responding to Loss & Damage Fund (FRLD).

The proposal envisages a number of possible CSLs, collected at the national or sub-national level. Their key characteristics would be: (i) easily collectable and (ii) earmarked for loss and damage. The paradigm example is an air ticket charge, akin to the French solidarity tax on airplane tickets of 2006. It is envisaged that the CSLs would be used both domestically and to contribute to the FRLD, according to a distribution formula (to be agreed between the CSA members), which could set limits on domestic use and introduce a FRLD solidarity pay-back multiplier for certain contributors.

Our approach to establishing a CSA is to complement other initiatives that are looking into potential innovative global sources (taxes/levies), such as the new Global Solidarity Levies Task Force for climate action and sustainable development, launched at COP28 and co-chaired by Barbados, France, and Kenya, by acting now and voluntarily, without the need of a multilateral agreement.

### **COP28: Call for a Climate Solidarity Alliance**

This post calls for establishing a Climate Solidarity Alliance (CSA) with national and sub-national stakeholders as members who are able and willing to introduce a CSL in their respective jurisdictions. This is what we need! And when do we need it? NOW! With a possible launch of the CSA at the “finance COP” in 2024.

### **Call for an International Climate Solidarity Alliance**

A call on Kenyan President Ruto and French President Macron, as proponents of CSLs to announce and launch an International Climate Solidarity Alliance of countries willing to adopt an International Climate Solidarity Levy, initially focussed on air-ticket levies.

### **Climate Solidarity Levies Manifesto**

Benito Müller ([OCP](#)), Saleemul Huq ([ICCCAD](#)), Robert Filipp ([IFF](#))

Given the urgency to provide financial support to the poorest and most vulnerable countries to respond to loss and damage from climate change and given the current global economic and fiscal situation, it is difficult to see how the new Loss and Damage Response Fund could get adequately capitalised without diverting funds from other existing multilateral climate funds. This is why Climate Solidarity Levies (CSLs) should be used as a proven way to mobilize new, additional, and predictable innovative resources so as to avoid fund diversions from other climate funds. We call on governments to give CSLs for the Loss and Damage Response Fund due consideration.