

# ecbi Annual Report 2024



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
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## MESSAGE FROM THE DIRECTOR



It is with great sadness that I have to report that our dear friend and tireless supporter, not least as long-term co-chair of the ecbi Advisory Committee, Ambassador Bo Kjellén from Sweden, passed away peacefully on 26 December 2024 with his family by his side. ***Requiesce in pace, care amice!***

Our Training and Support Programme with the support of the The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) has resumed its activities with two events: a Caribbean Training Workshop (16-18 April, Tobago) and an Asia Training Workshop (22-24 October, Kathmandu).

In 2024, the Fellowship and Trust-building Programme, with the continued support by the Danish Foreign Ministry (DANIDA), convened its annual Bonn and Oxford Seminars. These addressed a range of topics central to the climate negotiations, including:

- Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (cooperative approaches)
- New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance
- future of the intergovernmental process (Quo Vadis COP?)
- climate solidarity levies and financing for Loss and Damage
- Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP)
- JTWP relationship to response measures
- Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA),
- Global Stocktake (GST),
- Mitigation Work Program (MWP).

We also published several reports, again with DANIDA support, among them an update of the 2021 report *Quo Vadis COP? Future Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings under the UNFCCC – Settled and Fit for Purpose*.

**ecbi Director Benito Müller**

Oxford, February 2025

## ECBI ACTIVITIES IN 2024

### Fellowship and Trust-building Programme

Central to ecbi's Fellowship and Trust-building Programme are its annual seminars in Bonn and Oxford. The seminars bring together developing country negotiators with their European partners in an informal setting to build mutual understanding and trust. They are conducted under the Chatham House Rule, to encourage an open and frank exchange since no one except introductory speakers are identified in the meeting reports.

The 2024 Bonn Seminar convened on 9 June 2024 on the sidelines of the 60th sessions of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body meetings. The 2024 Oxford Seminar, ecbi's flagship event, met from 28-30 August immediately following the Fellows Colloquium, which convened from 26-28 August.

#### 2024 Bonn Seminar

The ecbi Bonn Seminar is an annual event held alongside the intersessional UNFCCC Subsidiary Body meetings, which take place in May or June every year in Bonn. Since 2005, the Bonn Seminar has provided an opportunity for invited delegates from developing and European countries to share their views and ideas on topical issues in an informal setting and build mutual understanding and trust. The meetings operate under Chatham House rules, thereby providing a space for participants to speak off-the-record about pertinent topics relevant to the formal negotiations. The Bonn Seminars facilitate and maintain momentum with the aim of continuing to advance trust-building created during the annual Oxford Seminars and in other informal settings. Topics discussed are of immediate relevance to ongoing negotiations under the UNFCCC.

On 9 June, ecbi convened its **2024 Bonn Seminar** at Hotel Collegium Leoninum, with presentations and discussions on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG), and the future of the intergovernmental process. Approximately 35 European and developing country representatives were in attendance. A full report of the event is available [here](#) and the presentations are available [here](#).

In opening remarks, ecbi Director Benito Müller dedicated the 2024 Bonn Seminar to the memory of ecbi's dear friend, Saleemul Huq, who tragically and unexpectedly passed away in 2023 just prior to COP28. He explained that that he and Huq had founded ecbi together in 2005. He introduced Saleem's son, Saqib Huq, to seminar participants, who will continue Saleem's legacy with ecbi. He also noted the passing of another good friend of ecbi, Pete Betts, whose funeral he had attended in London prior to COP28.

Müller announced that Kishan Kumarsingh, Head of Multilateral Environmental Agreements at the Ministry of Planning and Development for Trinidad and Tobago, had kindly agreed, with the permission of his government, to head [ecbi's Fellowship and Trust Building Programme](#). He thanked the Danish government, and specifically Danida, for its generous support of the Programme. Kumarsingh said it was a pleasure to be assisting ecbi with its ongoing efforts to build trust among negotiators on critical issues being discussed under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement.

#### Article 6 of the Paris Agreement

The first session addressed Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, which sets out how countries can cooperate voluntarily with one another to achieve their climate targets through both market and non-market-based approaches. Under Article 6, countries can transfer carbon credits earned from the reduction of emissions to

help countries meet their climate targets, including through the [Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism](#) (the mechanism established under Article 6.4).

Kristin Qui, Climate Analytics and former chair of the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body, provided an overview of what has been happening in the negotiations on Article 6. She described the primary sub-articles:

- Article 6.2, which focuses on decentralised cooperative approaches involving Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs).
- Article 6.4, which is the more centralised crediting mechanism, with many comparing it to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
- Article 6.8, which refers to non-market approaches that do not have the transfer of credits associated with them.

She explained that at COP28 in Dubai, Parties were unable to reach agreement on Articles 6.2 and 6.4, and that resolving the sticking points and coming to a decision in Baku was a political priority. She highlighted agreement on Article 6.8 and operationalisation of the non-market approaches platform.

On Article 6.2, she described the negotiations as having three “buckets” of crunch issues:

- The first bucket relates to reporting and transparency, namely how to ensure environmental integrity through transparency and how much information is reported to ensure confidence in the system under Article 6.2?
- The second bucket deals with how to address anything that does not meet the Article 6.2 guidance already agreed to in Glasgow (COP26) and Sharm el-Sheikh (COP27). She said this is linked to issues related to sequencing and timing.
- The third bucket, which is turning out to be a bit “sticky”, relates to registries and how centralised or decentralised the system should be under Article 6.2.

Under Article 6.4, Qui highlighted three main issues, two of which were being discussed concurrently at the UNFCCC SB meetings. The first issue relates to authorisations, for example, under Article 6.4, a Party hosting a project must authorise the emission reductions that come from those projects in order for them to be used towards meeting their Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC). The second issue relates to mitigation contribution units, with Qui noting, for example, that if a private sector entity wants<sup>1</sup> to support a country in implementing a project that helps reduce its emissions, it can do so through these mitigation contribution units. She explained that, when using the Article 6.4 system, a 7% fee is applied for a share of proceeds (SoP) and for overall mitigation and global emissions.

The third issue regarding guidance from the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body on methodologies and removals was not elaborated on since it was not currently being discussed in Bonn.

Ensuing discussions among participants focused on issues related to REDD+, registries, transparency and accountability, share of proceeds, risks of non-agreement, among others.

### *New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG)*

Axel Michaelowa, Perspectives Climate Research, provided an overview of the state of negotiations on the NCQG in the lead up to Baku, where the new goal was expected to be agreed. Michaelowa mentioned critical

elements that require a decision, including overall structure, temporal scope of the NCQG, and “the elephant in the room”— the quantum (or financial number), which many Parties still do not want to discuss. He explained that thorny issues also relate to potential sources of finance, the relationship with Article 2.1c (making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low emissions and climate-resilient development), quality of the finance, transparency arrangements, and anything relating to modalities for reporting and revision.

He highlighted possible approaches to the NCQG structure, noting a trend towards the “multi-layered structure”. He said some Parties opposed too much structure. One approach could have several contributor sources and instruments, but without a hierarchy or skeleton that brings them together. Another approach would consist of thematic subgoals, with consensus that mitigation and adaptation should be thematic subgoals. However, he noted continuing contention over whether loss and damage should also be a subgoal.

Regarding temporal scope, Michaelowa said some want a short time frame with a five-year cycle for revision of the goal, noting that five-year cycles in the context of NDC updates. He highlighted there would be a strong link between NDC updates and overall climate finance. He explained that others believe ten years would be a more appropriate time frame for revision, while still others prefer the time frame go to 2050 or beyond.

Regarding potential sources of finance, he pointed to an ongoing debate over expanding the contributor base, which is mainly being supported by developed countries. He also mentioned the idea of a type of landing zone, whereby developed countries bear primary responsibility, but that others could also contribute.

On the relationship between Article 9 and Article 2.1c, some Parties say there should be a limitation to Parties versus a much broader approach where one would mobilise finance from various sources on various levels. These sources and levels are often differentiated by public and private, or domestic and international.

With respect to quality, he noted a broad discussion about instruments. He said while everyone likes grants, fewer like loans, as they are often linked to the overall sustainability of debt given the recent rise in interest rates and the increase in debt burdens.

He pointed to lengthy discussions on the need for a harmonised climate finance definition, where developing countries usually ask for such a definition and developed countries seem wary of a common definition. He also highlighted the issue of to what extent the enhanced transparency framework (ETF) can be used or whether further reporting needs would be required. In addition, he raised the question of whether bodies like the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) should be used to monitor progress or whether a new body should be established.

Michaelowa suggested thinking about a structure with concentric rings, whereby the innermost core would consist of public international funding and grant equivalent, and the second layer could be other public international funding. He explained that the third layer would consist of private international finance, while the fourth layer could be private domestic finance. The advantage of a layered approach is that it enables ongoing work with definitions and allows for more transparency with reporting. Michaelowa observed that, while none of this will determine a specific quantum at this point, there would be a tendency that the grant or the first layer would be not playing a significant role in mitigation but would play a very important role in adaptation, as well as in the context of loss and damage. Public funding would be important in all three contexts.

He explained that both international and domestic private funding would be very strong with respect to mitigation, as mitigation activities usually generate revenue and are more attractive to the private sector. For



adaptation, the revenue possibilities are less. When it comes to loss and damage, private sector engagement may be concentrated on dealing with loss and damage related to that specific private sector player.

Perspectives Climate Research and ecbi published a [briefing note on finding common ground on the NCQG](#) in August 2024.

### *Climate Solidarity Levies*

ecbi Director Müller briefly articulated the proposal for Climate Solidarity Levies (see the recent [OCP blog post](#) on the Climate Solidarity Alliance), which had been proposed earlier in the process. He said he had given up on the idea until Saleemul Huq approached him, suggesting they try to reintroduce it. However, now he is seeking to persuade individual countries to implement such a levy without an international agreement. The idea is that the levies could be akin to the solidarity tax on airline tickets that the French introduced in 2006 to support the fight against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. He stressed that the idea of solidarity levies has been “tried and tested”, should be easy to collect, and must be specifically earmarked for loss and damage, rather than going into the regular budget.

Müller also pointed out that every country must fill this pot somehow, with clear collaboration between partners in the alliance. First, developing countries could use their money for loss and damage at home. For developed countries, a share of what is collected must go to the Loss and Damage Fund, while the rest could also be used domestically. Developing countries could voluntarily contribute to the Fund if they so choose. Developed country partners in the alliance would give developing countries back twice of what they put in for their domestic fund, not through the multilateral funds, but directly. Müller also noted the suggestion for a trust fund such as Fiji has, for example, because it can attract charitable foundations. He also mentioned the recently established Global Solidarity Levies Task Force on innovative climate financing.

Expressing enthusiasm, one developed country participant discussed how this could work on the ground. He said such levies could eventually become global, but someone must start and money must be collected now for loss and damage. He noted that the task force has many members, including Kenya, Barbados, and Antigua and Barbuda. To ensure innovative finance as quickly as possible and success in Baku, he said more countries must come to the table.

### *Future of the Intergovernmental Process*

Director Müller also presented on the future of intergovernmental meetings under the UNFCCC process, providing an update to the March 2021 ecbi paper on the issue ([Quo Vadis COP? Future Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings under the UNFCCC – Settled and Fit for Purpose](#)). Noting that the COPs have included a “summit” every year since Glasgow in 2021, he believed “fear of missing out”—or FOMO—was a major driver of COP size. Müller explained that for the last four years, data shows that the moment a head of government, president, and/or prime minister attends, the size of that leader’s delegation size increases by 50%.

He described a “triad” at the big COPs of three different events happening at the same time: negotiations (sessions of the governing and subsidiary bodies); a high-level summit; and an expo. He wondered whether these three events must all take place in the same place at the same time. As a possible solution, he suggested negotiations could remain in Bonn, although he acknowledged many would disagree. He also suggested summits could be convened less frequently, for example during the years when the NDCs were up for review, or the GST was occurring. However, he conceded the decision would be up to the COP presidency.



Müller explained that he goes to meetings to network, which is possible in Bonn during the SBs. However, in Dubai, he lamented that networking was impossible, citing long queues to get in, and everyone rushing to get to meetings that are great distances from each other. He said serendipitous meetings, when you meet someone and have a quick chat, were impossible. Highlighting that such meetings and networking remain very important for the process, he lamented that mega-COPs risk damaging the UN's reputation.

## **2024 Oxford Seminar**

The Oxford Seminar is the flagship annual event of ecbi. It provides capacity building for climate change negotiators and promotes a level playing field and mutual understanding between governments in international climate negotiations. It also provides an opportunity for delegates from developing countries to come together to discuss pressing issues in the UN climate negotiations with their European partners. Since 2005, ecbi's Oxford Seminars have provided an opportunity for invited delegates from developing and European countries to meet in an informal setting ahead of the annual UNFCCC COPs. The **2024 Oxford Seminar** convened from 28-30 August at the Examination Schools, Oxford University. Developing countries met beforehand during the Fellows Colloquium from 26-28 August.

The Seminar was attended by the Chair of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), while the Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) participated virtually. Several heads of delegations and lead negotiators also attended, along with issue leads from key negotiating groups. In all, more than 30 developing countries and European partners participated, either in-person or virtually, with women making up 73% of the participants. Two regional group chairs also attended.

Topics addressed at the 2024 Oxford Seminar were: Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP), including its relationship to the discussions on response measures; gender; Article 6 of the Paris Agreement; the Climate Solidarity Alliance and climate solidarity levies; NCQG; the Sharm el-Sheikh Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme (MWP); and the Global Stocktake (GST) under the Paris Agreement.

ecbi Director Benito Muller welcomed Seminar participants, noting that significant outcomes of previous seminars have contributed to decisions and processes under the UNFCCC, mentioning common timeframes and the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF), both of which were incubated at the seminars. However, he said, this is not the main purpose of the seminar, which is to get to know each other and bond during the small informal sessions, as well as during breakfasts, lunches, and dinners. He reiterated that networking and trust building cannot happen as easily over zoom or as during the formal negotiations, stressing the importance of the Seminar in this regard. He expressed his appreciation to the Danish Foreign Office for its support for the Seminar.

Kishan Kumarsingh, Head, Fellowship and Trust-building Programme, Trinidad and Tobago, explained that the Fellows met for two and a half days prior to the seminar where developing countries were able to clarify their opinions on some of the issues that will require more focused attention at COP 29. He stressed that COP 29 is being viewed as the finance COP, reminding participants they will need to agree on a new climate finance goal.

## ***Towards Resolving the MWP Impasse***

Carlos Fuller, Permanent Representative of Belize to the UN, presented on the MWP, highlighting common expectations and concerns on the part of developing countries that were raised during the Fellows Colloquium, including that: developed countries should take the lead, both in curbing their own emissions and supporting mitigation efforts in developing countries; and developed countries should close pre-2020 implementation gaps in their NDCs. Common concerns regarding implementation of NDCs related to: implications of unilateral

measures; and the need to maximize the value of investment-focused events (IFE) to unlock finance for NDC implementation in developing countries

With respect to the way forward, he emphasized the need to:

- focus on rebuilding trust among Parties;
- reframe the work on the MWP from negotiation to implementation mode;
- adopt an experimental approach in which Parties engage in problem solving towards challenges they themselves identify in relation to their own needs;
- voluntary sharing of experiences, including barriers and opportunities for cooperation;
- look at, for inspiration, examples of existing models, such as under the Montreal Protocol; and
- align IFEs with existing relevant meetings based on thematic areas to optimise participation and attendance of key donors, investors, and non-Party stakeholders.

He described the need to consider linkages with the JTWP, GST, NCQG, technology and innovation, means of implementation, response measures, and adaptation. He asked what participants considered the specific linkages to be and how they could be resolved and taken advantage of for mutual progress. Noting there will be very little time in Baku to address the MWP, Fuller said the SB Chairs must do preliminary work. He also wondered whether informal spaces outside the COP could be more fully taken advantage of.

### *Article 6 of the Paris Agreement*

In presenting concerns raised on Paris Agreement Article 6 by the Fellows during the Colloquium, Kristin Qui, Climate Diplomacy Adviser at Climate Analytics, Trinidad and Tobago, noted potential harm to environmental integrity and to achieving the Paris Agreement's temperature goal due to unclear guidance. She discussed maintaining overall balance; encouraging participation; avoiding burdensome systems while also ensuring transparency across different reporting requirements; ensuring a functional international registry; and having a clear and logical sequencing/ordering process. She also underscored the importance of Article 6 contributions to a share of proceeds for adaptation.

On a possible way forward, she stressed identifying and engaging on political issues early, e.g., interoperability of the international registry, first transfer, and unilateral cooperative approaches, while allowing technical discussions to move forward. She also noted initial consideration of topics to address in the Article 6 review in 2028, for example emissions avoidance, to facilitate timely technical and political considerations. She stressed: many countries lack access to national registries; some issues have become very political; and lines are blurred between the political and the technical issues. Qui expressed surprise that the registry has become a political issue as she thought there was agreement in Glasgow to help developing countries participate in the registry. She recalled that in Sharm el-Sheikh, the decision was made to include in the international registry a pulling and viewing function and provide an overall picture.

Qui prefaced the ensuing discussion with guiding questions to aid mutual understanding, namely by determining which issues are technical and which are political, and how political leadership can facilitate resolution of the issues.

### *Just Transition Work Programme*

Kishan Kumarsingh presented on the JTWP, explaining that the Fellows raised concerns regarding the outcome from Bonn related to what a just transition really means and what it could imply, i.e. that tackling climate change should not increase inequalities within and among countries as this would not be a just transition. He

said: international dimensions should not be imposed on national priorities and circumstances; just transition pathways should be nationally determined and based on national circumstances and priorities; and the JTWP should address the agreed scope, that is the recognition that just transition is broader than the energy transition and includes socioeconomic workforce, social protections, and other efforts to mitigate impacts associated with the transition.

He said the emphasis has been on employment impacts and economic transitions rather than on social justice, environmental sustainability, and comprehensive socioeconomic transformation. He also underscored linkages between just transition and other agenda items, such as the MWP and response measures, and the need to avoid duplication under the respective work programmes. Importantly, he said the JTWP should not be a proxy for solving controversial issues in other areas, such as displacement and migration.

Kumarsingh emphasized the JTWP's design should dismantle barriers and challenges to and promote opportunities for implementation of just transition pathways, with respect to, among others, low carbon solutions, regional grids, and transformative technology. He said outcomes should relate to the sharing of best practices, lessons learned, a structured systematic exchange of views, and encouraging international cooperation, all of which should be part of the JTWP's implementation.

Another thing that proved to be a sticking point in Bonn was the proposal for a work plan on the JTWP, which some thought was premature. Others, however, believed a structured approach for implementing the elements of the JTWP through development of a work plan might be more appropriate in terms of a logical flow and to ensure implementation of all the elements.

Kumarsingh asked participants to reflect on what the transition means, how it relates to other work areas, and how JTWP implementation can avoid duplication of efforts going forward, which he said should be grounded in strong scientific evidence, linking both climate ambition and effectiveness to just transition and sustainable development. He asked participants to reflect on the way forward, given what was discussed in Bonn and reflected in the informal note. He wondered how interlinkages can best be resolved, and how resolution can be mutually supported.

ecbi Director Benito Müller elaborated on the transition of countries and sectors and on the transition of people who lose their livelihoods or communities. In the context of communities, particularly threatened ones, he stressed the importance of not just tying it down to a particular sector or cause. For example, small island communities who will lose their livelihoods over time from sea level rise will also require a just transition, as much as coal mining communities in other regions will.

During the discussion, one developed country viewed the MWP and the JTWP as two sides of the same coin: the MWP can help us to share best practices, as well as analyse which policies can work in which context and the JTWP is about how to ensure that such policies are fair and socially acceptable. She echoed that if climate policies are not fair nor socially acceptable, there will be pushback. She said the JTWP mandate includes a joint commitment to discuss pathways to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. She said that the recent informal note has a clear reference to the temperature goal of 1.5°C. Other areas of convergence include recognition through the first GST that work programmes should integrate the GST's outcomes in their future planning. She believed that the JTWP could play a role in advancements domestically, not only regarding transitioning away from fossil fuels, but also with respect to adaptation objectives which speak to health and other social issues. She noted consensus that the JTWP should focus on the most vulnerable so references to human rights, gender, Indigenous Peoples, and youth must be included in the operative paragraphs of the text.

Another said the JTWP has great potential because it speaks to something that everyone struggles with. Climate policies have changed in a way from a bucket of climate-specific policies and measures to broader policy issues. She said, in the climate sphere, the tools to fix all these issues are lacking, because climate change transition interacts with other transitions, for example the digital revolution. She explained that climate change policies alone cannot solve structural differences on human and labour rights, and the more radical the change with respect to climate change, the more the whole of society will be involved. She said one of the challenges is that the JTWP is becoming a work programme about “absolutely everything”, from sea level rise, to workplaces, to intergenerational issues, to gender, to Indigenous rights.

One speaker expressed concerns about putting “everything in the basket”. Kumarsingh suggested stepping back and addressing the more fundamental question of “What is the JTWP’s value?” He said that perhaps this can then be used “as a filter to take things out of the basket”.

A developing country emphasized that we must use science to accept uncertainty and that environmental policies must incorporate the social and economic dimension in a holistic and comprehensive manner. He also stated that the IPCC is clear that the social dimension is needed to meet the technical challenges faced. He acknowledged that climate change cannot be solved in isolation, and we must also think about the digital revolution and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as they are part of the same challenge.

One developed country said the MWP can help us to share best practices, as well as analyse which policies can work in which context, and the JTWP is about how to ensure that such policies are fair and socially acceptable. She echoed that if climate policies are not fair nor socially acceptable, there will be pushback.

### *Relationship Between Response Measures and the JTWP*

Annela Anger-Kraavi, Estonia, provided an overview of the relationship and linkages between the JTWP and the work programme on response measures, noting that part of the confusion relates to lack of a definition of just transition. She noted ILO guidance on just transition focuses on decent work, social inclusion, and the eradication of poverty, and that the definition under the IPCC is broader. She said while focused on workers and sectors, we must also discuss how to deal with any negative social and environmental impacts of economic transition, and the need to minimize negative impacts and maximize positive impacts of the transition.

She explained that the JTWP is connected to response measures because the Paris Agreement mentions consideration of economies most affected by the impacts of response measures. She noted while discussions on response measures were initially seen as the space where oil producing countries could air their concerns, the discussions have moved beyond that. She said much of what is being discussed with respect to the JTWP was discussed under the Forum on Response Measures. She noted that the issue of workforce is being discussed under both and work is being duplicated, and wondered how overlap could be avoided.

Anger-Kraavi noted some of the contentious issues under response measures are resurfacing under just transition discussions. Reiterating the shift in discussions under response measures, she lamented it is still being viewed as “toxic” by some. She acknowledged that the just transition discussions might be seen as less toxic, whereby countries will be able to trust each other more. She suggested that perhaps the response measure discussions should retain a narrow focus on just transition that is limited to workforce, while the JTWP could include all the other aspects. She also said response measures might more of a national focus and the JTWP would focus more on international issues.

Initially, when the JTWP discussions were beginning, she said some floated the idea that it should be something akin to the Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change

where Parties would share experiences about the impacts of the transition on the workforce and on vulnerable groups, for example how the transition might increase energy prices. A “knowledge pool” would enable countries and other agenda items to draw on relevant knowledge for implementing climate policies.

Kumarsingh said the idea of the session was to get a more granular look at what those linkages are under the respective agenda items on response measures and just transition to see how they can be reconciled in a structured manner under the JTWP and how it could affect a decision for adoption at COP 29.

ecbi Director Benito Muller also recalled the toxicity of the issue of response measures given it was seen as a way for oil producers to push back on mitigation. He said we must be careful about linking it directly with the JTWP to avoid some of the “image problems” still associated with response measures.

### *Advancing the Global Stocktake*

Following the conclusion of the first GST in Dubai at COP28, Parties are now looking at how the process can be improved going forward and general discussions have already begun. In his presentation, Kishan Kumarsingh noted that for the first GST, there was not enough time for political input from the technical phase. He emphasized improving the format for exchanging views and capturing outcomes. As the GST is all encompassing, he wondered how to maximize its impact, suggesting a more efficient process and the possibility of a long-term strategy synthesis report. He also mentioned such issues as: a longer lead in for consideration of outputs and incorporating this change in the second GST; the underlying importance of science; how to synchronize the IPCC and GST cycles; and linkages with finance.

During the discussion, a developing country noted differing views on which bodies should take on the follow up and how best to implement GST outcomes. A developed country urged consideration of putting in place activities that reflect GST outputs and wondered whether the GST is being considered when work programmes are implemented. Another underscored that one of the GST’s primary roles is to inform NDCs; pointed to a mandate for capacity-building workshops; and looked to the Troika of the COP27, COP28, and COP29 presidencies to keep up the pressure in this regard.

One developed country noted that the private sector is responding to the GST outcomes. Another wondered how we can ensure adaptation has a stronger narrative in subsequent GSTs.

A developing country affirmed that the GST would not impose anything on any Party or on work programmes and that every aspect of the GST will be looked at, including reducing the amount of time to collect data. Another noted that for someone outside of the process, the most salient outcome from COP29 was the text on transitioning away from fossil fuels. She said in Baku, the “common person reading the news” will want to know what progress has been made towards the transition. However, she said one year is not enough time for measurable progress to be made, and that we will have to explain why we did not make progress in the year since the Dubai decision. She also said that the Troika of the COP28, COP29 and COP30 presidencies are engaged with the UN, the GST provides direction for implementation by countries, and those that ignore the GST outcomes will be “going against the grain.”

One developed country worried that the IPCC would not be in a position to deliver its assessments in a timely manner for the GST to be conducted based on the best available science. He hoped this could be overcome. A developing country lamented that the UN Secretary-General’s Climate Summits result in many commitments and declarations with very little follow up. She said managing expectations will be complicated and much depends on the results of the US presidential election.

## *Gender Action Plan Under the Convention and Expectations for Baku*

Annela Anger-Kraavi, Estonia, presented on this issue, stressing the need to get more women into leadership positions and to better integrate gender perspective into policies. She explained that while gender is its own agenda item, it is also a cross-cutting issue. She emphasized adopting a new work programme in Belém. She mentioned sticking points, such as the Russian Federation preferring to use “biological sex” instead of “gender” and not recognizing that gender is broader than men and women. She noted that during the June sessions, women make up around 50% of delegations, while at COPs it is closer to 30%.

During the ensuing discussion, a developing country expressed concern that during the June session, we regressed even on agreed language. She said delegations should be getting more than only the gender focal points involved as they often lack good communication with the rest of the delegation. She lamented the issue often gets “sacrificed” as it is often viewed as only a cross-cutting and not a stand-alone issue.

A developed country lamented that delegations usually send junior delegates to the gender discussions so change must begin within national delegations and in countries. On the importance of mainstreaming gender, she said new climate strategies must be viewed through a gender lens.

Another developed country acknowledged that the UNFCCC is not family friendly. She highlighted travel on weekends, harassment and a bad atmosphere, and lack of adequate pay to make it worthwhile to travel to negotiations. She mentioned back-to-back workshops, the pre-COP, pre-session meetings before the COP even begins. She noted a lack of willingness to see if some events can take place virtually and hoped this would change. While a good balance exists with women under 35, after age 35, women’s participation decreases.

She lamented that few women have served as G-77 Chair, and that only two SBI Chairs have been women. While negotiations require onsite presence, she explained that other things can be done virtually or in a more effective manner, and some issues with multi-year agendas do not require negotiations every year.

## *Climate Solidarity Levies*

ecbi Director Benito Müller opened this session and introduced Yusuf Hussein, Climate Finance Lead, Office of the Special Envoy for Climate Change, Executive Office of the President of the Republic of Kenya, who highlighted the work of the [Global Solidarity Levies Task Force](#) for the People and the Planet. He thanked the Government of Brazil, the current G20 President, for featuring the task force of the G20 Tax Symposium. He said the Global Solidarity Levies Task Force seeks new and equitable ways to generate additional financial resources for climate action and sustainable development.

Looking ahead to COP 29, he focused on how these innovative financial solutions can support a just transition, enhance climate resilience, and drive progress towards achieving the SDGs, as well as explore strategies, opportunities, and next steps for the Task Force as it prepares to bring its ideas to the international stage. He said investments to deliver on the SDGs are estimated to be around USD 5.4 trillion, with climate and nature-related investments to make up around USD 2.4 trillion, out of which USD 1.4 trillion will be mobilized domestically and USD 1 trillion will be financed through bilateral and innovative concessional finance, private finance, the MDBs, and other development finance.

Hussein explained that the Task Force aims to bring together a global coalition of countries to identify new ways to raise additional finance through legacy in an equitable manner. He recalled its formal launch at COP 28 by Kenyan President William Ruto, Barbados Prime Minister Mia Mottley, and French President Emmanuel Macron. He noted discussions were underway to broaden the group.



He underscored the objective of promoting an international agreement on one or more levy options by COP 30, whereby countries commit to implement a levy at the domestic level or in a relevant international forum and to allocate part of the revenues to climate action and development. He explained that possible revenue sources include progressive taxes on untaxed or undertaxed carbon intensive activity and on extreme wealth. He noted the Task Force is considering a levy on aviation and on maritime shipping. He also mentioned as possibilities, among others, a fossil fuel tax, an extraction tax, a financial transaction tax, and sharing revenues from carbon pricing and carbon markets. He said the Task Force will assess the options it wishes to advance through key research parameters, including revenue adequacy, international and domestic equity and fairness, behavioural response, leakage effect, and political feasibility. He reiterated that the co-chairs are willing to accommodate and build a coalition of countries to advance the Task Force's efforts by COP 30.

Müller then presented on Climate Solidarity Levies, providing an overview and evolution of the idea. He said Saleemul Huq convinced him to revive the idea of levies, which was first raised in 2006, and picked up and submitted by the LDCs in Poznan in 2008, although at that time the proposal "didn't fly." He added that one problem is that the UNFCCC lacks the remit to legislate such levies. He said if a sector raises money for climate change, they usually want to reinvest in the sector rather than allocate it for loss and damage in developing countries. He recalled [ecbi's recent discussion note on climate solidarity levies](#) and said the original idea of an international air transport adaptation levy was based on the French solidarity tax of 2006. In the case of France, the money flows into a dedicated trust fund, not into the general budget. He said studies have concluded that such levies have no impact on passenger numbers or tourism.

He noted about 20 countries, including many developing countries, have joined the Climate Solidarity Alliance, clarifying that it does not involve any multilateral agreement or decision. He mentioned the [Fiji Climate Relocation of Communities Trust Fund of 2019](#) to deal with loss and damage, noting an Environment and Climate Adaptation Levy charges 5% and 3% of this levy goes to this trust fund for loss and damage (USD 3.5 million). He said a fund that operates separately from the public budget also has the potential to attract other private sector money, as well as philanthropic sources.

He explained that if a developing country chooses, voluntarily, to contribute something from its domestic fund to the Loss and Damage Fund under the Paris Agreement, the developed country partners in the alliance, through a solidarity payback, would contribute twice as much directly to the trust fund of the developing country. He suggested getting Brazilian President Lula on board to formally launch the Alliance in at COP 30 in Belém.

Müller reiterated that the Climate Solidarity Alliance and levies are not intended to be a substitute for climate finance. The main thing is that innovative sources are earmarked for loss and damage through national loss and damage trust funds. He also maintained that the intention is not to detract from the need to reform the financial architecture. However, regardless of how long it might take to reform the international financial architecture, funding for loss and damage is needed now.

Müller reiterated that the proposal is not for an international agreement and countries can decide for themselves whether they would want to participate. He said countries can apply such a levy as they wish as long as the revenues are easily collectible and set aside for loss and damage. He reiterated that carbon taxes are not that easy to collect, but everyone has an airport tax, which could be increased a bit.

He concluded that the idea would be to provide incentives directly to those developing countries to show solidarity with them. The system, he reiterated, is purely voluntary, with voluntary contributions to the Loss and Damage Fund from developing countries, whose national loss and damage funds would then also benefit.

### *Global Goal on Adaptation*

Xolisa Ngwadla, consultant, South Africa, presented on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), noting key things agreed to in Dubai were the setting of targets: some sectoral and some dimensions of the iterative adaptation cycle. He said the work in Belém was expected to focus on the targets which are the dimensions of the interactive adaptation cycle. He highlighted planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and agreement on some but not all the dimensions.

He recalled that SB60 focused on modalities and expressed disappointment on the lack of progress with respect to the substance. He queried how experts can contribute to their development. He remarked how insufficient guidance leads to poor outcomes, particularly for adaptation-related matters, and said it COP 29 must provide guidance for experts.

Ngwadla also wondered what parameters could look like and how indicators can provide meaningful guidance, and mentioned the need for comprehensiveness and a workplan. He explained that indicators are not used as a negotiating tool but rather to provide better quality and clarity of the information towards the targets. He reiterated that as targets are not quantifiable, assessing progress is difficult.

With respect to COP 29, he underscored the importance of having finance indicators for each of the dimensions. He explained the desire to gradually move toward SDG-type targets and national targets. He said developed countries will have to bear a significant amount of the costs.

During the ensuing discussion, a developed country stressed that adaptation and mitigation will have to be in balance, and that the Belém outcome on indicators will be important. He highlighted the need to be aware of indicators that have already been developed by agencies in the field, and to determine how relevant or not relevant they are at the national level. He remarked that the issue of data readiness has not been addressed, and that if we want to have a better balance between mitigation and adaptation, it is important to monitor progress.

Ngwadla agreed we should begin with data readiness, noted some tiers are data intensive while others are not, and wondered how we can have different tiers without them becoming onerous. He mentioned looking at indicators that have been successful and whether they are applicable to the GGA. He underscored the emphasis on national ownership, that is a global goal with national dimensions and obligations. He also mentioned global indicators that can be assessed every few years. He noted indicators should be aggregable and not lead to an additional burden for countries. He also mentioned exploring how to support future GSTs, and more effective adaptation action that can be tracked globally.

### *Closing and Feedback from Participants*

In closing, ecbi Müller reiterated that the purpose of the seminars is not to come to any agreement or consensus, but to build trust and get to know each other in an informal setting. He asked participants how they feel about the seminar, whether they think the current formula is working, and for suggestions to improve for the future.

Many participants thanked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark for its generous financial support for the seminar and Benito and Kishan for organizing the meeting.

Comments and suggestions from the seminar participants highlighted:

- the importance of having discussions in smaller groups with more interaction and engaging even more during the seminar sessions themselves, possibly through smaller roundtables or breakout groups.
- that getting to know each other better in an informal setting really helps when things get tough in the negotiations;
- the possibility of bringing in other speakers to help us “think outside of the box”, for example, experts in systems thinking or artificial intelligence;
- that we all have biases which come from our cultural backgrounds, and the importance of understanding these biases so we can have positive encounters rather than conflict;
- that this setting provides the opportunity to engage with other workstreams that might not be one’s area of focus in the negotiations;
- the possibility of having young female negotiators from both developed and developing countries attend to further build capacity, especially at the Bonn seminars where no additional costs would be incurred;
- a suggestion to reshuffle the seats daily to get to know and talk to different participants;
- that these seminars create a space to make linkages and break out of the silos that exist in the climate process where things are happening in different rooms without knowing how they are evolving in the other room;
- the positive conversations among developing countries prior to the Seminar; and
- that it was “clever” to not share the questions ahead of time so statements cannot be prepared and discussions are more spontaneous.

## Training and Support Programme

The Training and Support Programme convened two training sessions for novice negotiators in 2024.

### *Caribbean Regional Training Workshop*

In April 2024, ecbi hosted a **Caribbean Regional Training Workshop** for novice climate negotiators to gain a better understanding of the climate process, the main issues being addressed in the climate negotiations, and the mechanics of negotiations so that can more effectively participate in meetings under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. The workshop, held from 16-18 April 2024 in Tobago, was attended by 22 participants from 18 countries, including ten AOSIS Fellows participating virtually from New York. The Workshop covered key issues relevant to the multilateral climate change negotiations, as well as key priorities for AOSIS. It also provided hands-on training during a mock negotiating session.

During a mock negotiating session on the third day of the Workshop, trainees came prepared to negotiate on a fictional agenda item: an AOSIS proposal for a specialised window or sub-goal for loss and damage funding under the NCQG.

Following the conclusion of the Workshop, participants commented positively on the substance, information provided, and format, saying it was engaging, well-structured, and well-managed. Specifically, participants felt that:

- Based on the breadth of information on climate change, “the facilitators did a commendable job in their presentations”.

- Providing an overview of the negotiating process and “dos and don’ts” prior to the mock negotiating session was very helpful.
- The workshop sessions helped to “demystify the process and procedure of climate negotiations”.
- The in-person setting provided a relaxed atmosphere and made it easier to communicate with the presenters and peers and “forge meaningful connections”.

Participants pointed to the utility of the mock negotiations, which: provided a “real-life view of how the COP negotiations are formatted and conducted”; instilled confidence to be more engaged in the process; and enabled the application of the theoretical knowledge gained in a practical environment. One said they had never been exposed to the intricacies of the process and came away with a greater appreciation and understanding of them.

Based on the experience that the training afforded them, participants looked forward to follow-up trainings where “a cohort can be adequately groomed for active participation in negotiations on behalf of our respective countries. The [workshop report](#) and [presentations](#) are available.

### **Asia Pacific Regional Training Workshop**

In October 2024, ecbi hosted an [Asia Pacific Regional Training Workshop](#) for novice climate negotiators to gain a better understanding of the climate process, the main issues being addressed in the climate negotiations, and the mechanics of negotiations so they can more effectively participate in meetings under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.

The workshop, held from 22-24 October in Kathmandu, Nepal, was attended by 19 participants from Bangladesh, Bhutan, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Nepal, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Eight resource persons from the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Least Developed Country (LDC) Group also attended. The Workshop had 78.95% female participation and 21.05% male participation; covered key issues relevant to the multilateral climate change negotiations, as well as key priorities for LDCs and SIDS; and provided hands-on training during a mock negotiating session.

During a mock negotiating session on the third day of the Workshop, trainees came prepared to negotiate on the agenda item on the GGA.

Participants were curious to know more about the political economy of negotiations and particularly reflecting on the interest of LDC and SIDS on prioritizing adaptation and future negotiations on increasing the quality and quantity of climate financing.

Following the conclusion of the Workshop, participants commented positively, saying it was engaging, well-structured, and well-managed. Specifically, participants felt that:

- The mock exercise was very useful. The negotiations simulation – very important for Pacific Island nations who lack capacity-building information presentations because they were very informative and the negotiations simulation – are very important for Pacific Island nations who lack capacity building.
- The sharing of experiences of all the presenters and participants was useful. It was important to have tips for the COP and the mitigation, adaptation, loss, and damage insights.
- While every presentation was useful and important, climate finance focused on adaptation and implementation is a priority and need for developing countries.

Participants also suggested using more in-person presenters, explaining theoretical lessons with examples, and providing more time for additional mock negotiating sessions, interactions, cultural exchanges, and a field visit.

## News and Announcements

### *In Memoriam: Paying Tribute to Bo Kjellén*

Long-term co-chair of the ecbi Advisory Committee, Ambassador Bo Kjellén from Sweden, passed away peacefully on 26 December 2024 with his family by his side. Following is an excerpt of Director Müller's [personal reflections](#). Bo was chief negotiator for the Swedish Ministry of Environment from 1990 and head of the Swedish delegation during the preparations for the Rio Conference in 1992 and the Conference itself, and for the climate negotiations under the UNFCCC, thereafter and until October 2001. As an inside observer of the climate negotiations from the beginning, he offered his observations on the significance of the Paris Agreement in light of history, and on possible outcomes in the coming decades, in a 2016 ecbi Discussion Note: [Personal reflections on the Paris Agreement: The long-term view](#). The topic was very important to him, so much so that he followed up with a 2018 OCP blog post on: [Climate leadership in a historical perspective and lessons for the implementation of the Paris Agreement: reflections by a former negotiator](#).

When in March 2001, the Bush Administration famously declared the [Kyoto Protocol as "dead"](#), they clearly failed to appreciate the reaction which this blatantly 'in your face' statement would generate, not least with Bo, who as the EU lead climate negotiator, when Sweden held the [Presidency of the EU Council of Ministers](#) in the spring of 2001, did his utmost to prove that the international community would not accept this unilateral death certificate. And it can safely be said that it was in a large part due to Bo's indefatigable and unwavering support that the Kyoto Protocol survived repudiation by the White House.

Bo was a staunch and unwavering supporter of ecbi from its very beginning and we all owe him a huge debt of gratitude for this. Without it, we would not be where we are today!

Let me end this tribute with a personal note. Bo was a gentle man with a great sense of humour which he self-deprecatingly displayed when starting an after dinner speech at the [2015 ecbi Oxford Seminar](#) dinner with the following joke: "A Dane, a Swede and a Norwegian having been condemned to death were given a last wish. The Dane asked for a sumptuous meal, the Swede said he wanted to make a speech, upon which the Norwegian replied shoot me now!"

## Publications and Outreach Unit

In 2024, ecbi's publications concentrated on a range of issues that it has been actively involved in, including those related to the future of and reforming the intergovernmental process and innovative financing. Within this context, 2024 saw the publication of several policy briefs, discussion notes, and blog posts, many of which related to possible innovative sources, including on [Climate Solidarity Levies](#) that could potentially be imposed by individual countries on air travel or shipping. ecbi also assessed key outcomes from COP 28 in a policy brief, and published reports from its Bonn and Oxford Seminars (as described above).

## Meeting Reports

### 2024 Bonn Seminar

As noted earlier in this report, the 2024 Bonn Seminar took place on 9 June at Hotel Collegium Leoninum. Sessions convened on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, the NCQG, and the Future of the Intergovernmental Process. Read the full report of the Bonn Seminar [here](#).

### 2024 Oxford Seminar

The 2024 Oxford Seminar took place from 28-30 August at the Examination Schools. Participants addressed relevant topics in advance of COP 29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, including Article 6, climate solidarity levies, JTWP, gender, the MWP, NCQG, and the GST. The Seminar was preceded by the Fellowship Colloquium from 26-28 August. See the full report of the Oxford Seminar [here](#) and the presentations [here](#).

## Annual Report: January to December 2024

In early 2024, ecbi published its Annual Report covering the period January through December 2023.

## Policy Briefs, Reports, and Discussion Notes

### COP 28 Key Outcomes Policy Brief

ecbi published a policy brief assessing key outcomes from COP28, highlighting some of the most salient outcomes from COP 28, while also looking forward to COP 29 to be held in Baku, Azerbaijan. The brief focuses on the evolution of the newly-established Loss and Damage Fund, discussing its initial capitalisation at COP 28 and the ongoing “spectre” of liability. With cautious optimism going forward, the brief suggests ways to allay the fears of some developed countries of this “spectre”. The document also addresses the outcomes of the first Global Stocktake (GST), highlighting, in particular, reference to fossil fuels, a first in a COP decision. Although it wasn't the phase out language many had hoped for, the text calls for transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems. Finally, the ecbi brief reviews how the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) came to be and looks at the COP 28 outcomes and what is expected to happen in the coming year, including the first dialogue, with the topic and format to be determined by the Subsidiary Body Chairs. With all eyes on Baku now and many calling COP 29 a finance COP, the new quantified collective goal on climate finance will need to be agreed to, among other things, support this transition in developing countries.

### Discussion Note on Shoring up the Social Integrity of the Voluntary Carbon Market: Operationalising the VCM International Share of Proceeds

This discussion note was written by Benito Müller, with contributions by Charlotte Streck, Co-founder, Climate Focus, and Ousmane Fall Sarr, West African Alliance on Carbon Markets and Climate Finance. It explains how an international Share of Proceeds (iSOP) for the Voluntary Carbon Market (VCM) could be operationalised to shore up the systemic **social integrity** of the VCM. It concludes that the VCM system regulators should collaborate in establishing the rules for a systemic (‘mandatory’) VCM iSOP (as part of the **ICVCM Core Carbon Principles** and the **VCMI's Claims Code of Practice**), preferably collected from credit users at the point of credit retirement. While this is likely to require the establishment of some compliance tool, it is preferable to a collection from project developers who are currently bearing most of the costs for shoring up the VCM's systemic integrity. An iSOP enhances the value of the environmental and social benefit that a carbon credit user can claim upon retirement of a carbon credit. It ensures that the use of carbon credits is further aligned with the Paris Agreement. A generally levied (non-optional) iSOP does not only increase the social value of an individual claim, but it also crucially adds overall integrity and value to the VCM, to all VCM transactions.



## *Discussion Note: Could US Port Authorities Adopt Climate Solidarity Levies? A Case Study of New York City and Los Angeles*

ecbi and International Peace Institute published a Discussion Note, titled [Could US Port Authorities Adopt Climate Solidarity Levies? A Case Study of New York City and Los Angeles](#). The note explores the potential for implementing Climate Solidarity Levies (CSLs) at the sub-national level in two major US cities: New York and Los Angeles. CSLs are proposed as innovative sources of funding for addressing loss and damage caused by climate change, particularly through the newly established multilateral Fund for responding to Loss and Damage Fund (LDF). The note examines the legal precedents and procedural possibilities for applying these levies on air and maritime travel, focusing on the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) and the Port of Los Angeles (POLA).

The note highlights the challenge of capitalizing the LDF without diverting funds from other existing climate funds and proposes establishing a Climate Solidarity Alliance (CSA), which would involve national and sub-national actors, such as port authorities, in adopting CSLs to generate revenue for both domestic loss and damage funds and the LDF. The note reviews existing fee structures, such as the Passenger Facility Charge at US airports and the Ground Transportation Tax implemented by PANYNJ, to demonstrate potential pathways for implementing CSLs without requiring federal approval.

The analysis suggests that while no direct precedent exists for a CSL-like levy that earmarks revenues for international funds, similar mechanisms are already in place at both PANYNJ and POLA. The proposed levies—USD 5 per for-hire vehicle at airports, USD 10 per cruise ship ticket, and USD 10 per container at ports—could collectively raise approximately USD 458 million annually. Even allocating a portion of this revenue to the LDF would make New York and Los Angeles significant contributors to global climate finance efforts.

## *Briefing Note Focuses on Finding Common Ground on the NCQG*

Perspectives Climate Research and ecbi published a briefing note on [Finding Common Ground on the New Quantified Collective Goal on Climate Finance \(NCQG\)](#), which governments were expected to finalise in Baku in November at COP29. This note explores the state of play of the negotiations, Parties' priorities, and areas of contention, and emphasises areas where common ground can be found and concrete progress achieved. For example, it focuses on, among others: structure of the new goal in view of the actions to be taken and scale of funding needed considering the needs and priorities of developing countries; contributor base and whether to expand it; access to and quality of finance; tracking delivery of the goal; and enhancing transparency. The note also briefly touches on the relationship between Article 9 (developed country support to developing countries) and Article 2.1c of the Paris Agreement in the context of the NCQG. Article 2.1c calls for "making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development". Some Parties see a relationship between Article 9 and Article 2.1c in the context of broadening the contributor base, while others fear it would shift responsibility to developing countries. The note acknowledges that the monetary number of the goal (or quantum) will be a political decision most likely taken in the final hours of Baku.

## *2024 Update of ecbi's Quo Vadis COP? Report*

In December, ecbi published an [update](#) to its 2021 report [Quo Vadis COP? Future Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings under the UNFCCC – Settled and Fit for Purpose](#) (March 2021), which was premised on the fact that the purpose of the multilateral climate negotiations had shifted from negotiating multilateral treaties to implementing them. This shift of focus needed to be reflected in the role and functioning of the involved governing bodies, in particular the COP. ecbi's assessment in the [2024 Update](#) is

that the current arrangements, to be blunt, are not fit for the current purpose. The report argues that it is time to make urgent and important decisions to guide the reforms needed as early as possible. Not doing so would have major negative consequences for the multilateral climate regime, exactly at a time when we most need a well-working system the most.

There has been an extraordinary growth in the size and complexity of the annual sessions of the governing bodies of the existing multilateral climate treaties not only in terms of participant numbers, but in the number of co-located events and associated costs. The 2024 Update focuses on three major issues arising from such ‘mega-COPs’:

- Equity concerns – the most climate vulnerable states can no longer afford to preside over or host a COP and showcase their plight; indeed, even larger countries with higher capacities shy away from hosting mega-COPs, drastically reducing the inclusiveness of the multilateral process.
- Negotiations benefit from serendipitous encounters between participants, but the size of mega-COPs prevent this from happening easily.
- Lastly, mega-COPs pose a serious reputational risk for the multilateral climate change negotiations. Not only is there the risk of the mega spectacle leading to an inflation of the general public’s expectations on outcomes, but they may even pose an obstacle to appreciate the successes of more focused outcomes such as the Global Stocktake, enhanced transparency reports, and new Nationally Determined Contributions. The hype may lead to expect outcomes which are not meant to be delivered by negotiations in implementation mode, leading to the perception of these events as overblown multilateral jamborees/junkets.

The Update identifies a triad of distinct events happening at current COPs:

- Negotiations (sessions of the governing bodies and SBs), summit meetings, and trade expositions. All are, no doubt, important but they do not have to happen at the same time in the same place. This is why ecbi is recommending to spatio-temporally disaggregate the mega-COP triad as follows:
- COPs: To be held (purely as sessions of the governing bodies and SBs) in Bonn at the World Conference Center (where capacity is 5,000 participants), following the model of the mid-year SB sessions (without a ministerial high-level segment).
- COP Presidency (Climate) Summits: To be held (if possible, only in specific years when political leadership is required) in the COP Presidency’s region (possibly in conjunction with the Expos) or at the UN in Geneva. For NDC submission years, the Summit could be held nine months before the COP, when NDCs are due.
- COP Presidency (Climate) Expos: To take place in the UN Region holding the rotating COP Presidency (but not necessarily in the country of the Presidency).

**Club of Rome Letter and Relevant Media Articles:** While ecbi published an [update](#) to its 2021 report [Quo Vadis COP? Future Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings under the UNFCCC – Settled and Fit for Purpose](#), many prominent people that are or have been involved in the climate process signed onto a [Club of Rome letter](#) calling for reforming the COP process. Signatories included former UN Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon, former UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres, former President of Ireland Mary Robinson, and former EU Commissioner Connie Hedegaard, among many others, with ecbi Director Benito Müller signing on as a supporter. The letter, dated 15 November 2024, is directed to Parties to the Convention, UNFCCC Executive Secretary Simon Stiell, and UN Secretary-General António Guterres, and questions whether the current climate process is fit for purpose. In light of this letter and other voices, including ecbi’s,

calling for reforming the COP given its increase in size and plethora of activities, many news organisations have been picking up on the issue. [ecbi collated some of the recent articles](#) on whether the COP is still fit for purpose or should pursue alternative ways of organising itself in order to advance progress on reaching the goals of the Paris Agreement and combating climate change.

## **Blog Posts**

In 2024, [ecbi/OCP](#) published several blog posts related to climate solidarity levies and the future of the intergovernmental process, among others.

### **Reforming the COP**

With over 80,000 participants in the UN “Blue Zone” (and many more in the adjacent host-country “Green Zone”), the recent UN climate change conference (COP28) in Dubai was the largest multilateral climate event ever held. Impressed by the enthusiasm and the global and diverse involvement of so many stakeholders, the authors of this February blog post [Good COP? Bad COP? Time to reform COP!](#) (and following up on a 2021 [ecbi report \(Quo Vadis COP?\)](#)) felt this would be a good time to take a step back and re-examine how best to maximise the benefits from this enthusiasm without creating detrimental side effects. Thus, the decision was made to revisit and update the 2021 Policy Report, and to write this post to set the scene for possibilities going forward. The post was written by Luis Gomez-Echeverri and Benito Müller with contributions by Jen Allan, Matthias Rösti and Stefan Ruchti.

In January 2025, Yvo de Boer (former UNFCCC Executive Secretary) and Benito Müller ([ecbi Director](#)) authored [Quo Vadis COP.31?](#) They explained that the statistical analysis in the recent [ecbi report](#) has shown that if the Negotiations are removed from the Summits and Expos, their ‘stand-alone’ size is predicted to reduce to below 5000 participants, which could be hosted by any country, large or small. Regarding COP31, Australia, for example, could offer to take on the COP Presidency in collaboration with [Pacific Island Forum](#) (PIF) member countries, and share out the hosting of the Triad-events between them. This would help overcome the exclusion problem as all PIF members could host stand-alone Negotiations (while not all might be able to host a Summit or a mega-Expo). In demonstrating that stand-alone Negotiations could indeed be hosted by any country, no matter how small or poor, such a collaborative COP.31 could encourage small and vulnerable countries to put themselves forward for future COP Presidencies.

### **Loss and Damage and Climate Solidarity Levies**

A May blog post proposed a [Climate Solidarity Alliance](#) (CSA), which would bring together national and sub-national actors that are able and willing to introduce a Climate Solidarity Levy (CSL) earmarked as an innovative source of funding for responding to loss and damage from the adverse impacts of climate impacts, particularly through the new multilateral Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage. The proposal envisages several possible CSLs, collected at the national or sub-national level, which are: (i) easily collectable; and (ii) earmarked for loss and damage. The paradigm example is an air ticket charge, akin to the French solidarity tax on airplane tickets of 2006. It is envisaged that the CSLs be used both domestically and to contribute to the L&DF, according to distribution formula (to be among between CSA members), which could set limits on domestic use and introduce an L&DF solidarity pay-back multiplier for certain contributors. A CSA would complement other initiatives that are exploring potential innovative global sources (taxes/levies), such as the new global taxation taskforce for climate action and sustainable development, launched at COP 28 and co-chaired by Barbados, France, and Kenya, by acting now, voluntarily, and without the need of a multilateral agreement.

6 February blog post, [Nomen est Omen! Loss and Damage: The Liability Spectre](#), begins with a brief historical account of the evolution of the “Loss and Damage” narrative in the multilateral climate negotiations, and ends up with the recent operationalization of the new Loss and Damage Fund. In the post, ecbi Director Müller suggests that if the liability spectre associated with the phrase “Loss and Damage” is too much for some, then perhaps the name of new fund could be more specific: if not “Climate Impact Response Fund” then perhaps “Climate Impact Recovery, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (CIR3) Fund”? Müller states that the fact is, a name can be a sign of something to come, an omen, and that we must avoid having the name of the fund be regarded as a bad omen, something that has often been associated with the issue of loss and damage over the last thirty years.

A November blog post, [The Functions and Responsibilities of a Climate Solidarity Alliance & the Varieties of its Membership](#), explains that Climate Solidarity Alliance membership presupposes the establishment of national Climate Solidarity Trust Funds (Trust Funds) to respond to climate loss and damage domestically as well as internationally, say through the multilateral [Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage \(FRLD\)](#). These national Trust Funds, in turn, are meant to be sourced by domestic [Climate Solidarity Levies \(CSLs\)](#). At the same time, they can serve as National Funding Entities for loss and damage, which can receive contributions from multilateral climate funds, bilateral donor agencies, philanthropy, private sector etc.

Another November post, by Michael Franczak, Research Fellow in the Division of Peace, Climate, and Sustainable Development at the [International Peace Institute \(IPI\)](#) discussed [how US cities and states can lead on climate action under a second Trump Administration](#).

The COP29 climate talks in Baku highlighted the need for innovative financing mechanisms, with the Global Solidarity Levies Task Force proposing levies on aviation, shipping, and wealth to address funding gaps. This OCP and IPI note outlines how American cities like New York and Los Angeles could implement CSLs, targeting high-traffic hubs such as airports, ports, and cruise terminals. While these measures could generate nearly USD 458 million annually for climate finance, their success hinges on overcoming legal, political, and public opinion challenges and leveraging state and municipal climate leadership.

## Activities of the Director

ecbi Director Benito Müller participated in numerous events, meetings, and seminars in 2024, presenting on issues such as Climate Solidarity Levies, which ecbi and others are proposing as a way to fund the response to loss and damage, and the future of the intergovernmental process, which are detailed in a 2024 [update](#) to ecbi’s 2021 publication: [Quo Vadis COP? Future Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings under the UNFCCC – Settled and Fit for Purpose](#).

### *Oxford Martin School Hosts Post-COP 28 Debrief and Panel Discussion*

On 16 January 2024, the Oxford Martin School hosted a panel discussion reflecting on COP 28 and whether the agreement from that conference ([The UAE Consensus](#)) goes far enough. Leading off the discussion, event moderator Benito Müller presented the results of a study that looked at how COP attendance has increased over the years, particularly with respect to the number of Party overflow badges. He said the Dubai COP had over 90,000 registered participants, and that such a huge number was not sustainable. Mentioning the update to [Quo Vadis COP? Future Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings under the UNFCCC](#), Müller lamented that there is very little interaction between participants at COPs attending the negotiations, the Summit, and the Expo. He suggested convening a smaller meeting that only focuses on the negotiations in Bonn would limit the number of participants and present the opportunity for smaller countries to preside over COPs as they often lack the necessary infrastructure and capacity to convene a large COP.

Recalling a [side event held in Dubai and co-hosted by ecbi and Antigua and Barbuda](#), Müller warned that the newly-established Loss and Damage Fund could become a “placebo” fund or siphon money from other climate funds. He explained that as governments are reaching their budgetary limits, innovative sources of finance will be needed to fund the response to loss and damage. He mentioned the proposal for climate solidarity levies (as elaborated in an [ecbi blog post](#)), which could raise €8-10 billion annually by imposing levies on air travel and shipping containers. He said these types of levies could be taken up by individual countries or even subnationally.

Professor Myles Allen, School of Geography and the Environment and Department of Physics, Oxford Martin School, said he agreed with COP 28 President Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber, saying that there is no scenario in which the phase out of fossil fuels will achieve the 1.5°C temperature goal, although many may not want to state this. He said “obfuscating what the science says” is not helpful, and that we need to focus on what is actually going to achieve the 1.5°C goal. He said the outcome text from Dubai on “transitioning away from fossil fuel in energy systems” is vague, and pointed to the list of technologies to accelerate efforts to achieve net zero by 2050, which are mentioned in the outcome. Allen said that industry is competing with itself to develop carbon neutral fuels or go out of business; wondered whether the agreement on fossil fuels will impact on investment; underscored the importance of having businesses and companies at COPs so they can lobby governments; and stressed that ensuring the process delivers is more important than number of participants and how efficient the process is.

Abrar Chaudhury, Saïd Business School, University of Oxford, provided a business and finance perspective at the COP, citing the need to bring a range of different stakeholders together. He said during the COP, a record financial commitment of USD 85 billion in new climate finance was made. He said, that even with power imbalances, bringing diverse stakeholders together is a first step towards building trust, progress, and finding solutions. Without these conferences, in the words of UNFCCC Executive Secretary Simon Stiell, we would be headed for a 5°C world. He emphasised the importance of engaging the private sector, saying they are at the heart of the climate challenge, noting that COPs provide an avenue for this engagement to happen. He mentioned that banks, technology firms, industries, start-ups, and consulting companies hosted multiple panels and events during the COP to demonstrate their commitment to addressing climate change. While sceptics might view this as greenwashing, he explained that these actions represent initial steps toward prioritising climate concerns. He stated that individual countries (and delegates) often operate in silos, talking to people they already know, and stressed the need to form new relationships, especially with the private sector and funders.

Nicola Ranger, Environmental Change Institute, University of Oxford, spoke of the critical role that academia plays at the COPs in bringing essential evidence to the process. On finance, she said the more than USD 80 billion in pledges made were positive but still represented only a fraction of the estimated USD 6 trillion needed before 2030 for the energy transition and for adaptation and a fraction of the levels of environmentally damaging subsidies that still persist from governments globally, citing a recent UNEP report on the [State of Finance for Nature](#) that points to USD 700 billion a year in nature-damaging subsidies. Noting the GST recognised the large financial gap, she said every financial institution, bank, and regulator must get on board to green the financial system, but also noted that governments around the world needed to work together to create the enabling environment for finance to flow, particularly to emerging and developing economies. On adaptation, she noted the dangerous and persistent myth that investing in adaptation means we have given up on reducing emissions reductions, emphasising that this is a false belief.

With respect to COP28, Professor Mette Morsing, Director, Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, University of Oxford, focused on two issues. First, she pointed to diversity and global attention, saying the fact that COP28 had the largest attendance of any COP thus far is an indication of the global awareness how



climate change is at the centre of our economic and social future wellbeing and no longer at the periphery. Second, she pointed out that our responsibility as researchers is not only to bring the university (research-based evidence) into the COP, but also to bring the COP back into the university (i.e., educating students on the environment). She noted the demand among students for more focus on the complexity of balancing climate change, social wellbeing, and economic development. She ended with a call to ‘the university’: to ask ourselves to what extent and to improve the ways in which climate, nature, and the environment are represented in our economics and finance curricula.

### Webcast of the Event

#### *Presentation on Climate Solidarity Levies to the Climate and Development Ministerial*

In June 2024, ecbi Director Müller introduced the proposal for a **Climate Solidarity Alliance** to a meeting of the Climate and Development Ministerial (C&DM) at Wilton Park, at the invitation of Christopher Bartlett from Vanuatu. In his pre-recorded message, Müller explained that the idea of such an alliance is based on a 20-year-old proposal for an air passenger levy to support developing countries deal with climate impacts through adaptation. While the original idea was for a global levy for adaptation, Müller explained that Saleemul Huq, who sadly passed away last year, suggested resurrecting the proposal as a **Climate Solidarity Levy for Loss and Damage**. However, he said a global levy would have to be adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which would want to keep the revenue for itself to green the aviation sector. Thus, the current proposal calls for a voluntary Climate Solidarity Alliance of national and subnational actors who would be able and willing to adopt a Climate Solidarity Levy for Loss and Damage now.

The C&DM process was initiated in 2021 by the UK to provide a forum in which to unite and support climate and development ministers to find solutions to address the priorities of climate-vulnerable countries. Technical and then political C&DM discussions throughout 2023 led to the launch of a **Coalition of Ambition on Adaptation Finance** at COP28. The Wilton Park meeting provided the opportunity to review progress and further advance three workstreams ahead of the next ministerial meeting later this year. Specific objectives of the meeting were to:

- Identify best practice in developing programmatic approaches to adaptation finance, and agree practical proposals for how countries can support and integrate long term adaptation approaches across sectors and with communities;
- Create space for constructive dialogue between funds, LDCs, SIDS and donor governments on climate finance reforms, including those related to accreditation processes and access timescales, and agree clear recommendations and actions; and
- Bring together key constituencies working on private sector finance for adaptation to aid the development of a common understanding of the challenges and opportunities of scaling adaptation finance from the private sector, and agree practical steps for moving this forward.

#### *IPI Panel on Mobilizing Finance for Climate, Inequality, and Sustainable Development: New Taxes and Levies*

During a virtual panel discussion in June that was organised by the International Peace Institute (IPI), Director Müller presented on the potential of climate levies to fund climate action, particularly loss and damage. During the event, **IPI Panel on Mobilizing Finance for Climate, Inequality, and Sustainable Development: New Taxes and Levies**, Müller discussed the proposal for aviation and shipping levies to fund loss and damage, noting such levies were not under the remit of the UNFCCC, but rather under the International Civil Aviation Organization



(ICAO), while any levy on shipping would fall under the International Maritime Organization (IMO). However, he emphasised that these organisations would want to keep the revenue to green their own sectors and not cede the money raised for loss and damage and, thus, a top-down approach, that is a global tax or treaty, would be unworkable. Thus, he reiterated his belief that a country-driven approach was the most likely to be implemented, and that countries could begin collecting taxes now. He mentioned growing traction for **Climate Solidarity Levies**, which would be introduced by a Climate Solidarity Alliance, and earmarked as an innovative source of funding for responding to loss and damage from the adverse impacts of climate, particularly through the new multilateral **Loss and Damage Fund**.

Speakers included: Tina Stege, Climate Envoy for the Marshall Islands; Laura Carvalho, Global Director of Equity, Open Society Foundations, and Associate Professor of Economics, University of São Paulo; Pascal Saint-Amans, Adviser to the International Tax Task Force; and Michael Franczak, Research Fellow, IPI.

[Click here for a webcast of the event](#)

### *2024: The Turning Point for Innovative Financing and Solidarity Levies?*

In September, Oxford Climate Policy (OCP), the International Peace Institute (IPI), and the Global Solidarity Levies Task Force co-hosted a closed-door roundtable discussion titled **2024: The Turning Point for Innovative Financing and Solidarity Levies?** The event brought together thought leaders, negotiators on climate change, and other relevant stakeholders working on innovative finance to discuss the political and economic challenges of implementing new levies to assist developing countries in addressing the impacts of development and climate change. It was moderated by Jimena Leiva Roesch, Director, Global Initiatives, IPI, who pointed to growing momentum for solidarity levies, referencing, among others, the launch of the **Global Solidarity Levies Task Force** at COP28, co-chaired by Barbados, Kenya, and France.

Benito Müller discussed possible air ticket levies as Climate Solidarity Levies to support climate action, particularly loss and damage. Reflecting on over 20 years of advocacy for an air passenger levy, he expressed concern that without additional revenue from such innovative sources, the new Fund for Loss and Damage would become either a “placebo fund” (it is empty) or a “siphon fund” (diverting resources from other climate funds). To avoid this, he proposed introducing Climate Solidarity Levies at the national and subnational levels. He cited France’s successful 2006 aviation levy, which funds global health initiatives through UNITAID, to show how targeted, earmarked levies can generate additional and predictable funding for a multilateral effort that is fair, not prohibitive, and does not affect demand for air travel. Müller emphasized that this approach could be replicated for the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage, and cited existing examples of domestic Climate Solidarity Levies such as Fiji’s Environment & Climate Adaptation Levy used in part to replenish the domestic Climate Relocation of Communities Trust Fund. Müller called for a **Climate Solidarity Alliance** among like-minded countries, to show the idea works and to persuade countries to join and act as first movers in providing international solidarity for responding to loss and damage.

Presentations were also made by:

- Laurence Tubiana, CEO, European Climate Foundation, representing the Task Force, who underscored that the Global Solidarity Levies Task Force aims to determine which options are economically effective and politically feasible, and can be used to fund domestic and international loss and damage efforts; and
- Ali Mohamed, Kenya’s Special Climate Change Envoy, who explained that changing the rules of global finance by reforming and democratizing the international financial architecture will also be needed as will ensuring that new financing mechanisms do not exacerbate the existing debt burdens of African countries.

The event identified next steps as: making the case for solidarity levies, launching a campaign to fill the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage Fund; expanding the Global Solidarity Levies Task Force, particularly by engaging countries with significant emissions and financial resources; taking practical steps toward implementation, with the case of Denmark serving as a model; and finding solidarity levies champions and first movers to grow political will. [Event website with photos and video](#)

### *Professor Jeffrey Sachs Discusses New Approaches to Financing Loss and Damage*

On 21 October 2024, Professor Jeffrey Sachs (Columbia University), having been approached by ecbi Director Benito Müller, gave a [special lecture](#), under the aegis of the [Oxford Climate Research Network](#), on [New Approaches to Financing Loss and Damage](#). He proposed several principles for a suitable policy response to loss and damage due to the adverse impacts of climate change, including that:

- Loss and damage, as well as adaptation, funding should be based on international levies rather than on national voluntary contributions; and
- Sources for international levies could come from international shipping, international aviation, and CO2 emissions, both historical (cumulative) and current, of high-income countries and upper middle-income countries.

He explained that loss and damage finance and climate finance more broadly should be embedded in a general framework for financing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), for which reform of the global financial architecture is key. He also highlighted the importance of innovative pilots, such as the [Global Fund for HIV/AIDS](#), which has been benefitting from the French solidarity air ticket levy and is the inspiration for the [Climate Solidarity Levies](#) and the [Climate Solidarity Alliance](#) proposed for replenishing the new multilateral [Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage](#).

### *COP29 Side Event: Innovative Sources for Loss and Damage Funding*

At COP29, DanChurchAid, Oxford Climate Policy (OCP), and the International Peace Institute (IPI) hosted a side event titled [Innovative Sources for Loss and Damage Funding: Introducing the Climate Solidarity Alliance](#). The event explored the role of climate solidarity levies as a potential solution for raising domestic funds and enhancing international collaboration. Participants emphasized the urgency of scaling up funding to address the growing impacts of climate change and encouraged countries to implement these levies and show solidarity with the most vulnerable communities.

Professor Benito Müller gave a [virtual presentation](#) titled [Climate Solidarity Levies and Alliance – Walking the Talk](#) (for the video recording click [here](#)). The proposed Alliance, he said, aims to foster international collaboration and inspire countries to establish domestic Loss and Damage trust funds sourced, among others, by domestic solidarity levies tailored to specific national contexts. The idea is being considered by the [Global Solidarity Levies Task Force](#), which was launched at COP28 by Kenya, France, and Barbados.

Other speakers included Dan Lund, Special Advisor to the Government of Fiji, who discussed how, in the wake of Cyclone Winston in 2016, Fiji set up the [Climate Relocation of Communities Trust Fund](#) in 2019 and has been a key player in advancing the idea of solidarity levies for loss and damage. Panelists also included: Jean-Christophe Donnellier, France, and Co-Chair of the Board of the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage; Yussuf Hussein, Climate Finance Lead, Executive Office of the President, Kenya;

Jens Fugl, Chef Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark; and Lillian Chagas, Director for Climate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brazil, who underlined that innovative finance sources, such as solidarity levies, will be “one of the main subjects we will propose for COP30”.

Following the panel discussion, Toeolesulusulu Cedric Pose Salesa Schuster, Minister for Natural Resources, Land, and Environment, Samoa, introduced a new app to calculate the carbon footprint of travel to and from Samoa that will result in the application of a carbon offsetting levy. The fund, which these levies will be paid into, will help pay for community relocation, building a sea wall, replanting mangroves, and other adaptation and loss and damage needs in Samoa.

### *Workshop on Enhanced Direct Access for Locally Led Adaptation*

On 4 and 5 December, ecbi Director Benito Müller attended a **Workshop on Enhanced Direct Access (EDA) for Locally Led Adaptation (LLA)** in Nairobi, Kenya. The event was organised by Anju Sharma of the Global Center on Adaptation together with the Green Climate Fund and the Adaptation Fund. The meeting provided an opportunity to: hear the experiences of entities who have implemented EDA projects; provide inputs on ways in which the modality can be further streamlined; and generate ideas for future EDA proposals. Professor Müller gave a **presentation** on the evolution of EDA, which was published in **ecbi’s brief history of EDA (2009-2021)**. He also met with H.E. Ali Mohamed Doud, climate envoy of the Kenyan President, to discuss not only their work with the **Global Solidarity Levies Taskforce** but also a concrete roadmap to a **Climate Solidarity Alliance (CSA)**.

### *ecbi Seminar in New Delhi, India*

In January 2025 an ecbi seminar, took place in New Delhi, India, focusing on: future arrangements for the UN climate change process to make it fit for purpose; and the NCQG.

Benito Müller presented on **future arrangements for intergovernmental meetings** under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to make it fit for purpose, referred to the 2021 ecbi publication **Quo Vadis COP?** The report analysed participation in the UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties (COPs), with the number of participants increasing exponentially particularly in the aftermath of “mega-COPs” like Copenhagen and Paris.

Müller provided an overview of the **2024 update of Quo Vadis COP?** (as detailed above) and suggested that as the UNFCCC negotiations shift to implementation mode, the institutions and processes of the global negotiations will also have to adapt and become fit for purpose. The 2024 update proposes new arrangements that reflect this new role, particularly by slimming down the COPs considerably to deal with technical matters related to implementation. He said political elements can be dealt with in processes outside the COPs that have already been established to support implementation on the ground – such as the Global Climate Action Agenda, the Marrakech Partnership, Regional Climate Weeks, and technical meetings and workshops that support countries in formulating and implementing policies and measures in support of climate ambition.

During the same event, **Rajani Ranjan Rashmi, Distinguished Fellow, TERI, presented on the NCQG** and its impact on global ambition. He recounted that paragraph 7 of the **NCQG decision at COP29** in Baku calls on all actors to work together to enable the scaling up of financing to developing country Parties from all public and private sources to at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035. Paragraph 8 sets a goal, with developed country Parties taking the lead, to mobilize at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 for developing country Parties for climate action, from a wide variety of sources, such as public and private, bilateral and multilateral, and alternative sources.

Rashmi noted that the USD 300 billion target falls short of the USD 1.3 trillion demanded by developing nations, and is far lower than even the most conservative estimates of what is needed. He described the following elements as relevant to assessing the NCQG decision: ambition, responsibility, concessionality, contribution, access, balance, and review.

He explained that closing both the ambition and implementation gaps will depend on closing the finance gap, which is reflected in findings of the UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance (SCF). The **SCF Needs Determination Report** estimates that USD 5.1 to 6.8 trillion will be needed annually for 48% of NDCs reported by 98 countries until 2030 (or USD 455-584 billion per year). Adaptation finance needs stand at USD 215-387 billion annually up to 2030. The GST estimates USD 5.8 to 5.9 trillion will be needed for the pre-2030 period. Rashmi also highlighted the launch of the “Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T”, which mandates a review of the NCQG in 2030.