

2024 Pre-COP Training Workshop



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Context of the Training

The international climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are among the most complex and significant under any multilateral processes aimed at tackling the global challenge of climate change. These negotiations directly impact national development agendas and, in many cases, national survival, especially for vulnerable developing countries, such as the least developed countries (LDCs) and the small island developing States (SIDS). The decisions made in these forums shape global climate policy and determine the allocation of resources for adaptation, mitigation, and loss and damage—issues that are critical for countries disproportionately affected by climate change.

While developed countries are generally well-represented with large delegations comprising experts, lawyers, and specialised negotiators, LDCs and SIDS often face significant resource constraints that limit their ability to participate effectively. Delegations from these countries often lack the technical expertise, negotiating experience, and financial support required to navigate the highly technical and legal discussions that characterise negotiations under the UNFCCC. This imbalance creates an uneven playing field, making it difficult for the most climate-vulnerable nations to advocate for their interests and contribute meaningfully to shaping international climate policies.

Furthermore, the role of women in these negotiations remains limited. Although women make up 37% of UNFCCC negotiators overall, their representation in LDC delegations is much lower, with women accounting for only 27% of delegates. This under-representation is not only a gender equity issue but also limits the diversity of perspectives essential for comprehensive and inclusive climate solutions. Women negotiators, particularly from VDCs, often face additional challenges, including limited access to mentoring, logistical support, and training opportunities that could enhance their ability to participate actively and effectively in the negotiations.

Implementation of the Paris Agreement, which officially began in 2020, has shifted the global focus from negotiations to action. To effectively engage in these processes, vulnerable developing country negotiators must be equipped with a deep understanding of both the substantive and procedural aspects of the UNFCCC negotiations. This includes not only knowledge of international climate law and diplomacy but also practical negotiation techniques needed to defend their interests and influence outcomes.

Since 2005, ecbi has worked to address these disparities through its Training and Support Programme (TSP). Originally managed by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), the TSP is now led by the International Centre for Climate Change and Development (ICCCAD) in Bangladesh for ecbi's Phase V. The programme focuses on building the negotiating capacity of vulnerable developing country representatives, particularly those from LDCs and AOSIS, by providing training workshops, mentoring support, and logistical assistance. This initiative seeks to level the playing field, enabling negotiators to advocate effectively for their countries in the UNFCCC process.

Workshop Objectives

The pre-COP training workshop aimed to provide a platform for junior negotiators, who often do not have sufficient time to prepare for the UNFCCC negotiations, and gather sufficient information and knowledge about the upcoming COP. Participants were given information about the session and the key positions of AOSIS, the LDC Group and other Parties, so that they can effectively prepare for the COP.

Workshop Structure

The pre-COP training workshop convened on 10 November 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan, targeting junior climate negotiators in order to provide adequate information and knowledge about the upcoming COP29 key agenda items and negotiation. It provided an in-person orientation to participants with a specific focus on key agenda items related to COP29, including climate science, climate finance, loss and damage, adaptation, and just transition.

Target Audience

The workshop was attended by 21 participants, including resource persons from 12 countries, with junior climate negotiators representing the Solomon Islands, Bhutan, the Federated States of Micronesia, Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Vanuatu, and Malawi.

Key Highlights of the Training

Overview of COP29 Agenda

Following the opening of the training workshop by Md Fahad Hossain from ICCCAD, Manjeet Dhakal, Advisor to the LDC Group Chair and Head of the LDC Support Team and Director of the South Asia Office, Climate Analytics, provided an overview of the COP29 agenda and key aspects carried forward from COP28. He provided insights on where we are concerning the negotiation process with respect to the latest scientific evidence, and called on all Parties to take action on climate change.

Climate Science


Recently, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) reported that 2024 is on track to be the warmest year on record. The global observed

annual average temperature increase above pre-industrial levels reached around 1.4°C (already) in 2023, making 2023 the warmest year on record. Of the 1.4°C observed warming in 2023, about 1.3°C is attributed to human activity.


According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), global greenhouse gas emissions must peak before 2025, roughly halve by 2030 relative to 2019 levels, and be reduced by around 60% by 2035 relative to 2019 levels, before reaching net zero in the second half of this century.

With every additional increment in temperature rise, extreme changes continue to become larger. The IPCC confirms the 1.5°C limit agreed upon in the Paris Agreement is still within reach. However, deep and sustained emission reductions are required, with reductions needed at ~50% by 2030 and net zero by 2050. The IPCC reaffirms its findings from the 2018 [IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C](#), and the following action is needed to raise the ambition for limiting global warming to below 1.5°C.

- Updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) must be submitted by early 2025 and must be 1.5°C aligned.
- The Global Stocktake (GST) outcomes must be fully implemented with regular follow-up on progress within the process



- Adequate resources are needed for the full implementation of current NDCs with simplified access
- Role of the Troika on the “Roadmap to mission 1.5°C” is important



COP 29 Agenda Highlights

Manjeet explained that COP29 constitutes the 29th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP29), the 19th meeting of the COP serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP19), the sixth session of the COP serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Parties Agreement (CMA6), the 61st session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA 61), and the 61st session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI 61).

COP28 delivered a package of agreements in the form of UAE Consensus, including on: renewable energy – i.e., the transition away from fossil fuels in the energy system and the phasing out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. Countries agreed to communicate their updated NDCs by 2025 with an end date of 2035 in line with 1.5°C pathways. The UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience has an adaptation target on agricultural production, water supply, health, ecosystems, biodiversity, and mountains. Table 1 highlights progress made on each agenda item during COP28. The green, yellow, and red colors highlight the agenda items that made clear progress, moderate progress, and no progress, respectively.

Table 1: COP28 Delivered a Package of Agreements – UAE Consensus

Global Stocktake – course correction and guidance to global climate action	Yellow	1.5°C narrative strengthens, clause related to fossil fuel dominated, weak follow-up
Loss and Damage finance – operationalization of the L&D Fund	Green	Work of the Transitional Committee
Climate finance – financing climate action	Yellow	Record financial pledges, weak guidance
Mitigation work programme – urgent action within this decade	Red	Procedural, no substantive issues or clarity for urgent actions
Global goal on adaptation – setting a global target for adaptation	Green	Thematic and dimensional targets, process to develop indicators, NAPs
Just transition – fair and inclusive transition	Yellow	Less substantive, continue understanding
Article 6 – carbon market for raising ambition	Red	No agreement on bilateral cooperation (Article 6.2) and market approach (Article 6.4)
Youth, gender, and social inclusion	Green	Presidency Youth climate champion – recognition of youth in the process
Mountains and climate change	Green	Recognition and follow-up under the GST, GGA

Manjeet highlighted that with this progress on the UAE Consensus, the two key major deliverables for COP29 in Baku are: i) delivery on climate finance through the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG); and ii) raising ambition for limiting temperature rise to below 1.5°C (GST-MWP).

Additional negotiation mandates relate to:

- Finalising the rules on Article 6 (cooperative arrangements) to support raising ambition – and not at the expense of compromising environmental integrity.
- UAE-Belém work programme, which includes making substantive progress on developing indicators under the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) Framework.
- Just Transition Work Programme to deliver actionable outcomes to enable equitable, 1.5°C-aligned transitions in line with national contexts.
- MWP with a more substantive decision at COP29, integrating mitigation elements of the outcome on the Global Stocktake (GST).

Momentum and action needed relate to:

- Countries developing and submitting 1.5°C-aligned NDCs.
- Scaled-up contributions to the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage.
- Support for the submission of the first Biennial Transparency Reports.
- Progress on technology, capacity building, and gender.

When adopting the COP agenda, the Secretariat releases two versions on the UNFCCC website. The first version includes the agenda items under the COP, CMA, CMP, etc., and only includes the agenda item's title. The second version of the agenda is called the annotated agenda and contains more details with the background of each agenda item, key documents for the session, reference numbers, and actions expected at the session. This is a must-read document for all negotiators to be able to effectively follow the process. In addition to the two versions of the agenda, the UNFCCC Secretariat publishes a supplementary agenda (for example, when additions are made to the provisional agenda). Any group or country can submit new supplementary agenda items before the agenda is adopted. For example, at COP29, Kyrgyzstan submitted an agenda item to facilitate a dialogue on mountains and climate change. Turkmenistan has proposed the establishment of a regional centre for climate change technologies in Central Asia.

The LDC Group generally supports a smooth opening of COPs and seeks to avoid any complexities in adopting the agenda. It is important to remember that the urgency now is to implement decisions that have already been taken that can put us on a track toward 1.5°C-aligned action and scaled-up climate finance with easy access. Table 2 provides an overview example of the agenda for COP29.

Table 2: Example of the Thematic List of Agenda Items for COP29

Themes	Agenda items (examples)
Adaptation	CMA agenda item 9 (a) – Matters relating to the Global Goal on Adaptation SBI agenda item 11 (d) – National Adaptation Plans
Mitigation	SBSTA and SBI agenda item 7 – Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme (MWP)
Science	SBSTA agenda item 4 Research and Systematic observation
Market and non-market mechanisms	CMA agenda item 15b, SBSTA agenda item 13b – Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement
Finance	COP agenda 8a – Long-term climate finance CMA agenda 11a – New collective quantified goal on climate finance
Technology	CMA agenda item 12b – Technology Implementation Programme
Global Stocktake	SBI agenda item 5b – Modalities of the UAE dialogue on implementing the GST outcomes
Capacity Building and Youth	SBI agenda item 18 Matters relating to Action for Climate Empowerment

Manjeet highlighted that COP29 is taking place in a challenging geo-political context. The political dynamics remain complex and volatile, with almost 50% of the world’s population in more than 60 countries holding elections this year. Political priorities and funding landscapes may shift with escalating geo-political tensions in some regions. With the world experiencing record temperatures and increasing climate extremes, COP29 will require renewed diplomatic and multilateral cooperation. The World Leaders’ Summit, high-level roundtables, and special events could provide an opportunity to strengthen political momentum. Presidency Declarations and Pledges and initiatives should build on and not distract from the core mandate, and the follow-up on initiatives remains critical. At COP29, countries must agree on a new climate finance goal and 1.5°C-aligned climate action to shape global efforts for years to come. In any context, coalitions of willing and progressive countries must remain committed and continue to work together and deliver on ambition through multilateralism.

Table 3: Questions and Answers on the Session on the Overview of the COP29 Agenda

Question	Answer
We are at a critical juncture where scaled-up finance is a clear need. I hope this will be delivered during COP29. the NCQG and Article 6 are of crucial importance. In addition, what will be the expected agreement on the loss and damage fund?	In the context of loss and damage, the Executive Board for the fund has been established and the COP has less of a role now to play in decisions. The fourth board meeting will happen in the Philippines in December 2024.
I am interested in knowing, once the NCQG agreed, how it will be linked	This will be covered during the next presentation on climate finance.

with Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF), and what guide and methodologies will be there for this tracking system. How will the method be uniform, given that a different marker is being used?	
Raising ambition through NDCs – how will the developed countries play their role?	Developed countries have a role to play in historical emission cuts.
On the GST – a submission has been made: How is the COP trying to single out several thematic areas so that it will make progress?	The COP must guide all the thematic topics under the GST.
You have helped us understand the key themes that will be discussed. Can you provide your forecast or insights on the likely decisions that COP29 will take? It would be great to hear any final summary thoughts on this.	This is a very big question. This presidency was not very engaged in the negotiation process and only had a short time to prepare. We all helped them. The economy of this country is also dependent on fossil fuels. So, the way they look and perceive climate change may be different. But they have been championing, engaging, and learning to understand the context. The COP President has visited many countries. It obviously all depends on geopolitics. What we have seen in other COPs is that we do not make decisions but we lay out the process. For the NCQG, we want a strong decision and something to be delivered now, particularly if the US leaves the process after the next election. For the first time, three presidents, in the form of the Trioka (Dubai, Baku, and Belém), have been working together. The presidency is looking to champion the Article 6 outcomes. There are more technical issues rather than political ones. So we hope these are three aspects (NCQG, raising ambitions, and Article 6) will be agreed.

Climate Finance: Key Issues for Baku

Raju Pandit Chettri provided an overview of why COP29 is a finance COP and why it must deliver the pending financial commitment for a decision to set new financial goals from 2025. He added a few basics and principles on climate finance based on the Convention, Kyoto Protocol, and Paris Agreement. The agenda is linked with the principle sets and rights of the developing countries to access resources to ensure adequate funds are available for low carbon, climate resilient development. Table 4 provides relevant articles related to climate finance.

Table 4: Principles and Provisions of the Convention and the Paris Agreement on Climate Finance

UNFCCC	Kyoto Protocol	Paris Agreement
Article 3 on common but differentiated responsibilities, with developed countries taking the lead	Article 11.2 states that developed countries take on provide agreed full incremental costs	Article 9 states that developed countries shall provide and take the lead in the

		mobilization of financial resources
Article 4 says developed countries shall provide new and additional financial resources, agreed full incremental costs, need for adequacy and predictability	Article 12.8 mentions a share of proceeds to assist developing countries meet their adaptation costs	Article 2.1.c on making finance flows consistent with low emissions and climate resilient development pathways
Articles 11 and 21 on establishment of the Financial Mechanism with the GEF as an interim operating entity		Other – 10 (technology), 11 (capacity building), 13 (transparency of support), 14 (GST), and general support for implementation in Articles 4.5, 7.13, 13.14, and 15)

In accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities set out in the Convention, developed country Parties (Annex II Parties) are to provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties in implementing the objectives of the UNFCCC. Article 4.9 of the Convention states that “The Parties shall take full account of the specific needs and special situations of the Least Developed Countries in their actions with regard to funding and transfer of the technology”. The developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties. Other Parties are also encouraged to provide support if they are able, which the Paris Agreement states.



Under the Paris Agreement, financial resources (USD 100 billion per year by 2020-2025) will be provided to developing countries and are aimed at achieving a balance between adaptation and mitigation for those particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and who have significant capacity constraints, such as the LDCs and SIDS, and consider the need for public and grant-based resources for adaptation. At the same time, there are broader commitments for all countries to limit temperature rise to 1.5°C, with a net zero emission goal, and to ensure a climate action plan through their NDCs with a five-year review cycle. Climate finance is one of the means of implementation or tools that play a key role in achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement, and the COP is important to advance global efforts by ensuring the flow of finance. Despite this commitment, we are not on track to meet the global temperature goal, and poor countries must be able to build resilience to climate stress.

While we consider climate finance, a few fundamental aspects should be looked at by every country attending COPs. They are: i) making a climate finance decision is in the interest of each country, and while we attend COPs, it is much more important to understand how my community, society, and country will benefit from access to climate finance addressing the issues through global efforts; and ii) how each country’s issues, presented in their NDCs, NAPs, and long-term low emissions strategies, will be financed to respond to needs and priorities. These two aspects are driven by how global efforts will ensure adequate and simplified access to finance, avoid indebtedness and debt burden, respond to the science, and contribute to poverty alleviation, food security, and sustainable development.

Around 25 agenda items will be discussed during COP29, CMP19, CMA6, SBI61, and SBSTA61. Those items related to climate finance are being discussed with more important ones as follows: 1) Long-term climate finance and specific discussions about the USD 100 billion goal; 2) Matters relating to the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF), and with some key reports being discussed, including the second report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement and a report on progress towards achieving the USD 100 billion goal; 3) Report of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) to the COP and guidance to the GCF; 5) Report of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) to the COP and guidance to the GEF; 6) Report of the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage and guidance to the Fund; 7) Seventh review of the Financial Mechanism; 8) New collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG); 9) Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund; and 10) Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue on the scope of Article 2, paragraph 1(c) of the Paris Agreement and its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement.

Some aspects of relevance to climate finance were highlighted during the GST (2018-2023) during COP28. The GST provides a broad overview of climate finance that highlights that, among others: i) the gap is growing between the needs of developing country Parties; ii) accessible and affordable finance at scale is a pre-requisite to fully implementing climate plans, including NDCs and NAPs, especially in developing countries; iii) developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties urgently meet all relevant pledges, including delivering the USD 100 billion; iv) the international financial system – including its governance – needs to be fit for purpose, and debt reform must be central in the finance discussion; v) developed country Parties need to make progress in at least doubling adaptation finance from 2019 levels by 2025; and vi) unilateral measures that impact national efforts to achieve sustainable development and eradicate poverty should be avoided.

Raju describes the evolution of the context of the NCQG. He explained that in 2009, in Copenhagen at COP15, developed countries agreed to provide USD 30 billion from 2010 to 2012 as fast start finance, and that the USD 10 billion per year would increase to USD 100 billion per year by 2020. The USD 100 billion goal is a collective goal that all developed country Parties agreed to provide and mobilize for developing countries. After the Paris Agreement, discussions have continued regarding further this time frame, and quantity and



quality of resources, etc. The NCQG discussion began in 2021 to respond to the needs and priorities of developing countries (as per the report on finance needs) and to be in line with the science to ensure the temperature goal is met. For this reason, Parties are trying to create a new financial goal as the USD 100 billion goal expires in 2025. There have been discussions on options for setting annual goals for providing and mobilizing climate finance regarding timeline, quantum, and quality of access. There has also been an ongoing debate regarding the text proposed by developing and developed countries on setting up new financial goals. COP29 is important in setting up this decision, which will determine the future of the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

Raju also focused on accessing resources from the GCF. The general position on climate finance is that, among others: i) access to available finance is key; ii) grants for adaptation and loss and damage are needed; iii) access must be simplified and easy; iv) special provisions and flexibility are needed for LDCs and SIDs to reflect their special circumstances; and v) a definition of climate finance must be further addressed. He also highlighted the decision-making process within the COP, including agenda item-related contact groups, informal meetings, informal-informal meetings, group huddles, and drafting groups, to come up with a consensus on the text being proposed.

Table 5: Question and Answer on Climate Finance

Question	Answer
<p>If everything goes well and we have a new financial goal for the NCQG in this COP, what would be a good structure for accessing the funds?</p>	<p>There are four ways of accessing climate finance for developing countries from the global context. First, money comes from bilateral resources (i.e., GIZ, USAID, FCDO, etc.). Second, money comes from multilateral agencies and development banks (i.e., ADB, World Bank, Caribbean Development Bank, etc. Third, funds come from vertically dedicated multilateral funds (i.e., GCF, CIF, GEF, etc.). Fourth, the private sector mobilizes funds (KfW and other bank and financial institutions, etc.). Our national institutions must be strong enough to be able to prioritize resources needed based on the modalities to access the available funds.</p>
<p>The Standing Committee on Finance’s (SCF) latest report says USD 100 billion was already achieved in 2022. So, in that context, what discussions are going on in terms of tagging the budget—is any improvement being proposed?</p>	<p>Few aspects are being proposed to improve that. First, transparently communicating about what climate finance they are providing is a big issue in terms of counting development aid or bilateral funds as climate finance. This is double counting so we should avoid this. Until and unless we have a definition of climate finance, it is always vague and tricky to tag. There may be a way for mitigation, but adaptation or loss and damage is not straightforward. Second, the OECD tracks finance, not the SCF, and a biannual assessment of the flow of climate finance is being done. The OECD is not a party to the Convention. There is a discussion about whether the UNFCCC process should do the climate finance accounting; however, there is no clear methodology. So it is about adding to ODA, being clear about the definition of climate finance, and reporting of climate finance.</p>

	<p>From this year, Parties are supposed to do the Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs), and that report should indicate the amount of resources provided or accessed for adaptation, mitigation, or loss and damage. In this context, developing countries should clearly report what kind of resources were accessed and mobilized.</p>
<p>What will the new finance goal consider in terms of adding up all types of funds for adaptation and mitigation? And what about funds for responding to loss and damage—will there be new and additional funds provided by developed countries?</p>	<p>All the resources collectively will be coming from developed countries’ public resources to developing countries. It is the same pot, so all the collective resources will be accounted for in terms of disbursement to developing countries for adaptation, mitigation, and loss and damage. It is part of the USD 100 billion. The GCF is a new and additional fund. However, there is a problem with bilateral and multilateral funds regarding tagging new and additional funds. A request has been made by developing country Parties to allocate 20% of the NCQG to operating entities of financial mechanisms under the Convention. Only 1.5% is the current amount now.</p>

Just Transition: Key Issues for Baku

HRH Princess Abze Djigma, Burkina Faso, Co-Coordinator of Just Transitions on behalf of the LDCs and the G-77 and China, provided an overview of the issue under the Convention. The ultimate goal, she said, is to see how we will move forward regarding economic, social, and environmental aspects and how we will lift communities out of poverty, transitioning and transforming the local economy. In LDCs, agents of the local economy are MSMEs and the informal sector. However, there has been disagreement over how we reflect these sectors in the negotiating text.

Fundamentally, just transition is as follows: “To ensure no one is left behind, countries need just transition and economic diversification policies that are comprehensive, inclusive, and based on social dialogue and stakeholder engagement. These policies need to be integrated into national climate action plans, as well as in national adaptation plans, to avoid exacerbating inequality”.

The concept of a ‘just transition’ recognizes that a shift to a more sustainable economy can have significant impacts on workers and communities that are currently dependent on fossil fuels. A just transition refers to transforming the economy and economic system in a way that is as fair and inclusive as possible to everyone concerned, creating decent work opportunities and [leaving no one behind](#).



The formal background documents on just transition issues are important to read to follow the process on just transition pathways that are being discussed and are as follows:

- [Work programme on just transition pathways referred to in the relevant paragraphs of Decision 1/CMA.4](#)
- [SBSTA 60 agenda item 9. SBI 60 agenda item 7. United Arab Emirates just transition work programme. Version 10/6/2024 6:30](#)
- [Draft conclusions proposed by the Chairs](#)
- [Annual summary report by the Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies](#)

Based on the decision made on SB60, the Just Transition pillar will be worked on as a joint SBI/SBSTA agenda item. At present, we are working on Decision 3.CMA.5 elements that decide the Just Transition work programme should include seven elements. For LDCs, 45 countries and about one billion people will be represented to present a strong voice on this issue. The process should be country as well as globally driven, building upon local success, clear means of implementation, adequate international cooperation, and the role of the private and informal sectors. The seven elements are:

1. Just transition pathways to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement outlined in Article 2, paragraph 1, in the context of Article 2, paragraph 2;
2. Just and equitable transition, which encompasses pathways that include energy, socioeconomic, workforce, and other dimensions, all of which must be based on nationally defined development priorities (NDCs and SDGs) and include social protection to mitigate potential impacts associated with the transition;
3. Opportunities, challenges, and barriers relating to sustainable development and poverty eradication as part of transitions globally to low emissions and climate resilience, taking into account nationally defined development priorities;
4. Approaches to enhancing adaptation and climate resilience at the national and international level;
5. Just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined development priorities, including through social dialogue, social protection, and the recognition of labour rights;
6. Inclusive and participatory approaches to just transition that leave no one behind; and
7. International cooperation as an enabler of just transition pathways towards achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement.

At the moment, we are engaging in a process led by a coordinator (in G-77 and China and the LDCs). We sent the seven elements to our colleagues and asked them to provide inputs within each chapter to come up with the key points they would like to get into the work programme. Two dialogues have allowed Parties to delve deeper into the topics with questions and provide information on the needs and pathways for the just transition. The informal summary of the dialogues from the Secretariat is available for discussion in Baku. On the just transitions pillar, every voice is important, including negotiators, practitioners, governments, civil society, the private sector, the informal sector, Indigenous Peoples, and disabled persons, so that it does not leave behind the inclusion of ideas and issues to be reflected in the text. Inclusivity of ideas is very important and should be the compass. We must never forget we are participating in these negotiations because we have the well-

being of our people at stake and want to lift them out of poverty. You must raise these ideas and go to the senior negotiators who can be influenced to take charge in the decision-making process.


Table 6: Question and Answer on Just Transition

Question	Answer
<p>I just want to step back and ask as this is all about the fair and inclusive transition to the low carbon economy for both developed and developing countries, and we know countries have different baselines. How do you see the negotiation process in terms of taking this forward? There are also risks of losing jobs, like those who work in fossil fuel-related jobs. How do you make sure this transition can realistically happen? I think this context is who has to change the engine of economic development and fast so that we also meet the 1.5°C target. For developing countries, we are still also dependent on fossil fuels and related jobs. How can the transition occur and what is the pathway being discussed?</p>	<p>Just transition is about making such changes and for that reason seven elements have been proposed. It is the responsibility of all countries and Parties to come up with leadership to make realistic changes in meaningful ways. For developing countries, the process should also be supported by means of implementation, finance, capacity building, and technology transfer. Developing countries should not be burdened and should be supported under the just transition pillar to allow leadership and support. In addition to national budget allocation on climate action, countries should be provided with adequate resources and means to act. The NCQG should also consider these circumstances, which are practical to adopt. Everyone in the COP who attends these and other discussion should voice their country’s interests.</p>

Loss and Damage: Key Issues for Baku

Hafijual Islam Khan, a lawyer and climate change negotiator with the Bangladesh delegation, provided an overview of the development of the loss and damage agenda under the Convention. The fundamental challenge of loss and damage is the definition of climate finance, which raises political difficulties—however, loss and damage also relates to technical issues in terms of assessment difficulties. There is no clear demarcation of the limits to adaptation and where loss and damage should begin. Several provisions, such as early warning systems and insurance, fall under the adaptation framework. However, our clear demand is to respond to loss and damage. The Convention has a range of views on responding to loss and damage effectively by developed and developing Parties, and this issue is difficult politically and technically.

The figure below provides an understanding of climate impacts and associated loss and damage. Mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage are three pillars of climate change. The ultimate solution for loss and damage is mitigation and is a proactive response to climate change. When countries fail to mitigate, they must adjust to the vulnerability, which is a reactive response to loss and damage. Adaptation, again, is the proactive measure of loss and damage. Ultimately, loss and damage are the reactive and ex-post responses. Some reactive responses, such as resettlement, migration, relocation, and restoration, are difficult to apply practically.



At COP27, Parties agreed to establish a Loss and Damage Fund and its Funding Arrangements, and that the fund will provide financial resources for ex-post approaches and, to some extent, ex-ante efforts to avoid loss and damage. For example, comprehensive risk management approaches could be ex-ante efforts to respond to loss and damage. There are also aspects to consider in terms of economic and non-economic loss and damages. It is easier to assess economic loss but difficult to quantify non-economic loss. There are two types of impacts and vulnerability: first, sudden and slow onset events; second, economic and non-economic perspectives of loss and damage.

In addition, global governance structures, policies, and institutional architecture are in place to respond to loss and damage. With respect to the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) established in 2013 at COP18, we agreed on a single international mechanism needed to respond to loss and damage. Since then, several discussions have led to the definition that international mechanisms can have a policy, technical, and financial arm. With that skeleton and understanding, we agreed on the WIM to enhance knowledge, promote coordination and collaboration across different actors, and take action and support at all levels working through the Executive Committee, the Santiago Network, and funding arrangements as constituted bodies.




COP27 agreed to establish the Loss and Damage Fund and its Funding Arrangements under the Convention and anchored by the Paris Agreement. The issue of liability and compensation are a sensitive issue with respect to the Loss and Damage Fund. The following are salient features of the COP decision: i) Decision 2/CMA.4 on funding arrangements for responding to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including a focus on addressing loss and damage; ii) Decision to establish new funding arrangements for assisting developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, in responding to loss and damage, including by providing and assisting in the mobilization of new and additional resources, and that these new arrangements complement and include sources, funds, processes, and initiatives under and outside the Convention and Paris Agreement; iii) Also the decision to, in the context of establishing the new funding arrangements, establish a fund for responding to loss and damage whose mandate includes a focus on addressing loss and damage; and iv) establishment of a Transitional Committee to make recommendations for adoption at COP28.



The key issues addressed by the Transitional Committee are to: i) Establish institutional arrangements, modalities, structure, governance, and terms of reference for the Fund referred to in paragraph 3 of Decision 2/CMA.4; ii) Define the elements of the new funding arrangements referred to in paragraph 2 of Decision 2/CMA.4; iii) Identify and expand sources of funding; and iv) Ensure coordination and complementarity with existing arrangements.

The World Bank is the trustee of the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage, and will host board meetings on an interim, neutral, and independent basis for four years. The figure below describes the COP28 decision: Loss and Damage Fund and Funding Arrangements, which provide step-wise approaches to progress on the operationalization of the Fund.



The main challenge is that the Loss and Damage Fund is not like any other existing fund, for example, the GCF, Least Developed Countries Fund, or Adaptation Fund. The model of operation of existing funds is project-based. Countries develop and submit the project, and, if approved, the project gets implemented. With the Loss and Damage Fund, shortly after a flood, tsunami, or cyclone occurs, the Fund needs to provide financial and technical assistance as an immediate response. Therefore, it is a triggered-based approach and assesses for both sudden and slow onset triggers. The affected country is also expected to prepare a short-, medium-, and long-term programme on loss and damage. This needs to be submitted to the Loss and Damage Fund, and direct budget support is expected to be provided for mobilization based on the country's government budget system.

The Board of the Fund has met three times, with one more Board meeting to convene in December 2024. At the third Board meeting, Ibrahima Cheikh Diong was selected as the Executive Director of the Fund for a term of four years, beginning 1 November 2024. Board members confirmed that the conditions captured in paragraph 20 of Decision 1/CP.28 can be met in the interim period, with outstanding concerns captured in the accompanying decision text of the Board. The Board has now signed the Hosting and the Trustee Agreement with the World Bank.

The Board has the supremacy to decide on the country's request. The Fund is currently discussing access and disbursement modalities. Provisions are also being discussed with respect to communities directly accessing the funds through community-based organizations as an intermediary. The fourth Board meeting will begin discussions on the design of the Fund, including modalities for direct access and direct budget support, minimum fiduciary standards and environmental and social safeguards for direct access entities, and a minimum allocation floor for LDCs and SIDS. About USD 750 million has so far been committed by developed countries; however, the Fund requires more resource pledges.

There is a plan for the launch of the annual high-level dialogue that will take place at COP29 and CMA6 at the World Leaders Climate Action Summit on 12 November, with the first

annual high-level dialogue to be held in the margins of the 2025 Spring Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group. Regarding the agenda item on the “Report of the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage and guidance to the Fund”, the developing country Co-Chair requested consideration of the already existing extensive mandate of the Board and limited guidance coming out of COP29.

The following are the key issues for COP29 in Baku over the next two weeks.

- Third Review of the WIM.
- Comprehensive review that analyses the impact of the WIM and its bodies in delivering assistance to countries and communities to address loss and damage.
- Through its ExCom and the Santiago Network, the WIM should align its efforts to facilitate access to funding from the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage, including assistance in assessing loss and damage, assessing appropriate response measures, and meeting institutional criteria for access to finance.
- Prioritization of local and country-driven approaches through close cooperation and communication between national loss and damage contact points, the WIM ExCom, the Santiago Network, and local and national observer organizations, bodies, networks, and experts.
- Santiago Network for Loss and Damage.
- Rules of procedure adopted in Baku and the Santiago Network operating as soon as possible to facilitate loss and damage response on the ground.
- WIM governance: The WIM is governed by and accountable to both the COP and CMA; thus, under this agenda item, COP and CMA decisions should be mirrored.

In the days to come, there is clear need for the programmatic and trigger-based approaches to be integrated and coordinated in a bottom-up manner and in line with community needs

Table 7: Question and Answer on Loss and Damage

Question	Answer
<p>How should we differentiate loss and damage funds from adaptation funds? Why can we not just focus on strengthening existing funds rather than creating a new one? What is your take on that?</p>	<p>This is a very important question. If we take the business-as-usual perspective, then all available funds are ODA, there are no new or additional funds, and the funds are considered climate finance. However, we need to separate loss and damage funding with a clear mandate as all other funds have their own mandates, and loss and damage is not mandated in any financial mechanism. Thus, mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage are three responses that need to be responded to separately with mandated funds. This preference also lies in the definition of these aspects. Adaptation finance minimizes loss and damage—what happens beyond adaptation is loss and damage and is no longer adaptation finance. There is also a growing trend that adaptation (20%) and mitigation (80%) ratios are not adequately met through the GCF or Adaptation Fund and do not really cater to adaptation needs. For this reason, funds that respond to loss and damage specifically involves minimizing, averting, and addressing loss and damage. Therefore, the distinction is required in terms of the response needed and scaling-up action on loss and damage. Whether the NCQG will sufficiently allocate funding to loss and damage will become clearer over the next two weeks.</p>

Adaptation: Key Issues for Baku

Mokoena France, Lesotho, and member of the LDC Group, began by explaining adaptation, its meaning, and why it is an urgent priority. He said that when we talk about adaptation, we are talking about taking measures to reduce the negative effects or exploit the positive ones by making appropriate adjustments. We are aware that adaptation is inevitable and that LDCs are the most



affected. So, having strong adaptation action and support in place is important. More importantly, we must view climate change adaptation as an integral part of a country's development planning rather than a stand-alone issue.

The risk of adverse events commonly results from three factors: exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity. Exposure concerns what is at risk from climate change, e.g., population, and resources. It also refers to the climate change that an affected system will face, e.g., sea level, temperature, precipitation, and extreme events. Sensitivity concerns the biophysical effects of climate change, such as changes in crop yield, runoff, and energy demand. It also considers the socioeconomic context, such as the agriculture system. Grain crops are typically sensitive, while manufacturing is usually much less sensitive. Adaptive capacity is about the capability to adapt, and this is a function of wealth, technology, education, institutions, information, and infrastructure, for example. *Having* adaptive capacity does not mean it is *used* effectively. Lack of adaptive capacity to respond to these impacts assumes a country is vulnerable and is the reason our countries are strongly affected. Adaptation is an iterative process and starts through impact, risk, and vulnerability assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring, evaluation, and learning.

There are several adaptation provisions under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. What is important to retain here is that adaptation is needed not only in our countries, which are not only the ones most affected but are also the most vulnerable. What differentiates us from developed countries is that they can adapt their systems to the effects of climate change, while we cannot. This is where and why the Convention calls on them to support us and help us build resilience, as detailed below.

- UNFCCC Article 4.1 (e): All Parties shall “Cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change; develop and elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone management, water resources, agriculture, and for the protection and rehabilitation of areas, particularly in Africa, affected by drought and desertification, as well as floods”.
- UNFCCC Article 4.4: Developed country Parties ... “shall also assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects”.

- Paris Agreement Article 7.2: Parties recognize that adaptation is a global challenge faced by all with local, subnational, national, regional and international dimensions, and that it is a key component of and makes a contribution to the long-term global response to climate change to protect people, livelihoods and ecosystems, taking into account the urgent and immediate needs of those developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change”.

Global Goal on Adaptation

The Paris Agreement established a global goal on adaptation to: i) enhance adaptive capacity and resilience; ii) reduce vulnerability to contribute to sustainable development; and iii) ensure an adequate adaptation response in the context of the goal of holding average global warming well below 2°C and pursuing efforts to hold it below 1.5°C.

The Glasgow-Sharm El-Sheik (GlaSS)

Work Programme on the Global Goal on

Adaptation was concluded at COP28, and the new UAE-Belém work programme was

established for two years to work on setting clear and measurable indicators for the GGA.

The first negotiations on UAE Belém work programme took place during SB60 in Bonn in

June this year. Unfortunately, at this session, Parties could not reach consensus on the

modalities to undertake this work for the full duration of the programme. The main reason

was that there was still strong pushback against the means of implementation mentioned in

relation to the indicators. However, some work advanced on initial modalities, including

experts’ recommendations to work on indicators. It was agreed that Parties should identify

the experts and that the final list of experts should be selected by the SB Chairs to ensure

geographical balance. Information from an expert meeting this month in Egypt will be

available for discussions at the COP. There was also a call for the submission on indicators

and the LDCs have submitted their views.

On NAPs, the relevant COP28 decision noted that the LDCs continue to face significant

challenges in accessing funding for the formulation and implementation of their NAPs. A

review of NAPs was called for and concluded at the NAP Expo in April of this year. The report

on this review was published by the UNFCCC Secretariat in May and will be considered as

the basis for discussions at COP29.


Adaptation Priorities for COP 29

We argue that indicators developed under the UAE-Belém work programme must include

measuring gaps in means of implementation (accessing finance, ensuring technology

transfer, and building capacity for our countries). The GGA and the NCQG sub-goal on

adaptation must be linked to ensure the framework targets can be effectively implemented.



Global Goal on Adaptation

- Indicators developed under the UAE-Belém work programme must measure gaps in means of implementation (finance access, technology transfer, capacity building).
- Linkages between the GGA Framework and the NCQG are vital if the Framework’s targets are to be achieved.

National Adaptation Plans

- The final text on the NAPs’ review must continue to recognize the special circumstances of LDCs (there was a strong push against that in Bonn).
- Negotiations on LDC matters should not be used as a substitute for debates between developed and developing countries, which can weaken the outcomes.

Table 8: Questions and Answers on Adaptation

Question	Answer
Most countries have not submitted NAPs, which shows how the GGA is evolving and is linked with the NAP process within this context.	Countries are requested to submit NAPs by 2025 with scaled-up support. The GGA and NAPs have dimensional and thematic targets. Countries should have developed NAPs by a certain year so that it advances understanding of adaptation needs and the GGA should be linked with NAPs.
9000 indicators are proposed for the GGA; what is the settlement plan and what final numbers are expected? It may be large due to sectoral considerations being made on adaptation. What is your take on this?	It is still a minimum indicator and more needs to be added for some sectors or thematic areas. The question before us is how to find manageable indicators that countries can report while addressing their adaptation concerns. The outcomes of this session at COP29 will also provide some guidance in this regard.

Closing Session

The workshop closed with a vote of thanks from Saqib Huq, ICCCAD Managing Director, who appreciated the excellent facilitation of the sessions by the resource persons. He also appreciated the active participation youth delegates in the training workshop, and the overall management and logistical arrangements on the of part the ICCCAD team. He added that we tried to capture the most important aspects that will be discussed at COP29. Believing that this helped new negotiators, he said this process would continue in the future as well.

Mr Huq encouraged all participants to reach out anytime during the two-week negotiation process to clarify anything and/or to better understand the key issues being discussed under different agenda items at COP29 in Baku.

Participants List

#	Title	Name	Designation and Organisation	Country
1	Mr	Tenzin Wangchuk	Chief Environment Officer, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, Dept. of Environment and Climate Change, Govt of Bhutan	Bhutan
2	Ms	Florence Claire Pupuka	Chief REDD+ Officer (Supervising), REDD+ Unit, Ministry of Forestry & Research, Solomon Islands Government	Solomon Islands
3	Ms	Stephanie Stephens	National Project Coordinator for CBIT project, Advisor and Secretary to the Vanuatu Climate Action Network Board and Member of the Loss and Damage thematic Group for Vanuatu	Vanuatu
4	Ms	Ugyen Dema	Asst. Env Officer, Dept. of Env and Climate change, Govt of Bhutan	Bhutan
5	Mr	Joshua J. Pangelinan	Climate Finance Specialist, FSM Delegation	Micronesia
6	Ms	Dana-Marie Salina	AOSIS Fellow	Trinidad & Tobago
7	Ms	Annika Kamilla Bellot	AOSIS Fellow	Dominica
8	Ms	Jodie Luke	Negotiator, Dominica	Dominica
9	Ms	Yordanos Getachew	Junior Negotiator, Ethiopian Delegation & Program Officer, The Youth Project	Ethiopia
10	Ms	Tara Shaniah Arnold	Technical Support Manager, CEPA, FSM Delegation	Micronesia
11	Ms	Noëla Dorice Ouédraogo	Negotiator, Burkina Faso Delegation	Burkina Faso
12	Ms	June Brian Molitaviti	Manager, Research and Aquaculture, Vanuatu Fisheries Department	Vanuatu
13	Mr	Tarcizio Kalaundi	Program Officer, Trócaire & Negotiator, Malawi Delegation	Malawi
Resource Persons and Organisers				
14	Ms	H.R.H. Princess Abze Djigma	Co-Coordinator, Just Transition, LDC Group, & Mossi Princess and Traditional Leaser, Chair of the H.R.H. Princess Abze Djigma Foundation	Burkina Faso
15	Mr	Mokoena france	LDC Adaptation Co-Coordinator	Lesotho
16	Mr	Manjeet Dhakal	Head of LDC Support Team and Director, Climate Analytics South Asia	Nepal
17	Mr	Raju Pandit Chhetri	Director, PRC & Senior Climate Finance Negotiator	Nepal
18	Mr	M Hafijul Islam Khan	Co-Coordinator, Loss and Damage, LDC Group, & Member, WIM ExCom	Bangladesh
19	Mr	Apar Paudyal	Oxford Policy Management	Nepal
20	Mr	Anton Martens	General Manager, H.R.H. Princess Abze Djigma Foundation	Burkina Faso/ Netherlands
21	Mr	Saqib Huq	Managing Director, ICCCAD	Bangladesh
22	Mr	Noor-E-Elahi	Assistant to Managing Director, ICCCAD	Bangladesh
23	Mr	Md Osman Goni Raju	Research Officer, ICCCAD	Bangladesh
24	Mr	Md Fahad Hossain	Project Coordinator, ecbi TSP and Programme Coordinator, ICCCAD	Bangladesh

Programme
2024 ecbi Pre-COP Training Workshop
Sunday, 10 November 2024 (UTC+4:00)
Venue: Hyatt Regency Baku, Azerbaijan

Time (UTC+4:00)	Session	Resource Person(s)
09:30-09:35	Welcome remarks	Md Fahad Hossain, Programme Coordinator, ICCCAD
09:35-09:45	Introductions	All
09:45-10:25	Agenda Overview: COP29	Manjeet Dhakal, Head of LDC Support Team and Director, Climate Analytics South Asia Office
10:25-10:35	Q&A/ Discussion	
10:35-11:15	Climate Finance: Key Issues for Baku	Raju Pandit Chhetri, Director, Prakriti Resource Centre, Nepal
11:15-11:25	Q&A/Discussion	
11:25-11:40	<i>Morning snacks</i>	
11:40-12:20	Loss and Damage: Key Issues for Baku	M. Hafijul Islam Khan, Co-Coordinator, Loss and Damage, LDC Group & Member-WIM ExCom
12:20-12:30	Q&A/Discussion	
12:30-13:10	Mitigation and Ambition: Key Issues for Baku	Gabriel Kpaka, Coordinator, Mitigation, LDC Group
13:10-13:20	Q&A/Discussion	
13:20-14:20	<i>Lunch</i>	
14:20-15:00	Adaptation: Key Issues for Baku	Mokoena France, Co-Coordinator, Adaptation, LDC Group
15:00-15:10	Q&A/Discussion	
15:10-15:50	Just Transition: Key Issues for Baku	H.R.H. Princess Abze Djigma, Co-Coordinator, Just Transition, LDC Group
15:50-16:00	Q&A/Discussion	
16:00-16:15	Feedback/ reflections	Participants
16:15-16:30	Closing session	Saqib Huq, Managing Director, ICCCAD
16:30-17:00	<i>Afternoon snacks</i>	

Contact: Md Fahad Hossain (fahad.hossain@icccad.org), Project Manager, ecbi Training Support Programme (TSP) & Coordinator, LDC Universities Consortium on Climate Change (LUCCC)